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INTRODUCTION

A.

Approach and Scope
The prospects for meaningful, comprehensive revision of the Dis-

trict of Columbia's substantive criminal laws have improved mark-
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edly in recent years. In the most promising of recent political developments, Congress established a Law Review Commission for the
District of Columbia in August of 1974 with a broad mandate to give
special consideration to revision of the criminal code.' Since jurisdiction to initiate revision of the criminal laws will pass to the
District of Columbia Council in January of 1977 pursuant to the
Home Rule Act, Congress has substantial incentive to give final
approval to a new criminal code within two years. 2 Additionally, the
recent development of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code should
provide further stimulus to 3reform of the substantive criminal laws
of the District of Columbia.
The overall purpose of this article is to report the results of
research on the nature and extent of the need for comprehensive
criminal code revision. The research was designed to provide information and perspective for decision-making on approaches to code
revision, to aid in understanding what can be expected from code
revision, and to illustrate directions such code revision might take.
The information presented draws upon three sources: materials collected by one of the co-authors, library research of statutes and
related case law, and a questionnaire administered during the summer of 1974 to attorneys and judges who have day-to-day contact
with the administration of criminal justice.
Following additional introductory sections on the nature of the
questionnaires and the respondents and the role of the legislature
in defining and classifying criminal conduct, the analysis will continue in three parts. Part I analyzes the status of criminal code
reform in the District of Columbia. It is subdivided into four sections which discuss the national movement for criminal code reform, the historical development of the District's criminal code, the
1. Pub. L. No. 93-379 (Aug. 21, 1974).
2. See notes 85-88 & accompanying text infra.
3. See FINAL
CRIMINAL LAWS,

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL

A PROPOSED NEW

FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE

(1971) [hereinafter cited

as PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE].

4. Professor Aaronson served as a member of the Criminal Code Revision Com-

mittee, Young Lawyers Section, District of Columbia Bar Association, from 1970
to 1973, serving as chairman for the last two years. He submitted a paper analyzing
two bills to create a law review commission (H.R. 7412 and H.R. 7658), and testified before the Judiciary Subcommittee of the House of Representatives District
of Columbia Committee. He presented a resolution of the Criminal Code Revision
Committee, endorsed by the Executive Council of the Young Lawyers Section,
recommending that criminal code reform be accorded priority among the tasks to
be given a law review commission.
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resurgence of the impetus for substantive criminal code reform in
the District of Columbia, and evaluate the recently created Law
Review Commission as a mechanism to achieve criminal code reform. The need for revision of the criminal code is assessed in Part
II by identifying general problem areas or deficiencies in the present
code. This approach gives a broad overview of the degree to which
the code falls short of minimum standards. Finally, Part III presents
a case study of the provisions relating to unlawful homicide. It demonstrates the need for especially detailed scrutiny of code provisions
protecting vital community interests and illustrates an approach to
analysis of substantive offense areas involving several code sections.
B.

The Nature of the Questionnaireand the Respondents

The purposes of using a questionnaire are to obtain information
to supplement library research on criminal code deficiencies, perceptions of criminal justice professionals on the relative seriousness
of code deficiencies, and recommendations for code revision from
persons who are involved on a day-to-day basis in the administration of criminal justice. To achieve these objectives the questionnaire was administered to several groups. With the understanding
that the views expressed would not be attributed to the respondents
or the offices with which they are affiliated, cooperation was generously provided in distributing the questionnaire to supervising attorneys in the United States Attorney's Office, 5 to attorneys assigned to the Juvenile and Law Enforcement Divisions of the Office
of the Corporation Counsel,' and to staff attorneys in the Public
5. The questionnaire was distributed to each of the 22 supervising Assistant
United States Attorneys for the District of Columbia; six completed responses were
received. In addition, six completed responses were received from other Assistant
United States Attorneys, responding to the questionnaires distributed to the Section on Criminal Law and Individual Rights of the District of Columbia Bar Association. Another response was received from a former Assistant United States
Attorney. See note 8 infra.
Appreciation is expressed for the cooperation of Earl Silbert, Acting United
States Attorney for the District of Columbia; Henry Greene, Executive Assistant
United States Attorney; and Paul Friedman, Administrative Assistant United
States Attorney (currently with the Solicitor General's Office) in distributing the
questionnaires.
6. Thirty questionnaires were distributed to the Assistant Corporation Counsels
for the District of Columbia; six completed responses were received.
Appreciation is expressed for the cooperation of C. Francis Murphy, Corporation
Counsel for the District of Columbia; Michael Dowd, Jr., Chief, Juvenile Division;
and Carl McIntyre, Chief, Law Enforcement Division.
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Defender Service. 7 To get the views of other attorneys, especially
members of the private defense bar, the questionnaire was submitted to members of the Section on Criminal Law and Individual
Rights of the District of Columbia Bar Association.8 Finally, the
questionnaire was given to the associate judges of the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia.'
A total of 84 completed responses was received. The respondents
include 19 attorneys from prosecutor's offices, 30 from the defense
bar, nine judges, and 26 other attorneys holding positions primarily
as government counsel, in criminal justice agencies, and in public
interest law offices or research centers. Five of the judges indicated
that they spent at least 50 percent of their time hearing criminal
matters, and no judges spent less than 20 percent of their time.
Furthermore, six of the nine judges had at least some experience
with criminal litigation in the District of Columbia prior to judicial
service. Of the remaining 75 respondents, 62 of whom are male and
13 female, 14 have five or more years of experience, 17 have three
or more, 13 have two or more, 14 have at least one, and 17 have less
than one year of experience.
The questionnaire was long and divided into five parts. 10 The
7. Questionnaires were distributed to 44 staff attorneys of the Public Defender
Service for the District of Columbia; eight replies were received.
Appreciation is expressed for the cooperation of Norman Lefstein, Director, Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia.
8. Approximately 390 questionnaires were mailed to the residences of members
of the Section on Criminal Law and Individual Rights of the District of Columbia
Bar Association, with the exception of those members who had already been distributed a questionnaire at their offices; 55 completed responses were received.
Twenty-two were from practicing attorneys with at least some experience in defending criminal cases in the District; 13 of these were quite experienced, having
handled at least 25 felony, misdemeanor, or juvenile cases. Twenty-six of the respondents were not engaged in private practice, but held a variety of legal positions,
including public interest firms, legal education, and federal government legal work
(primarily with the Justice Department or J.A.G. staff of one of the armed services). In addition, seven of the respondents were Assistant United States Attorneys.
Appreciation is expressed for the cooperation of William Schaffer, Section Chairman, and Raymond Garraty, Executive Director, District of Columbia Bar, for
providing a computer printout of the mailing labels for section members.
9. Forty-four questionnaires were distributed to the Judges of the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia; nine completed responses were received.
Appreciation is expressed for the assistance of David Richin, then a law clerk for
one of the associate judges, in distributing the questionnaires and collecting the
responses at a time when many judges were attending conferences or vacationing.
10. The first part of the questionnaire is a short section on "Personal Data of
Respondent." The second part is the main section listing most of the criminal code

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:207

main part contained a list of the principal code sections. In order
to obtain the views of respondents with a minimum amount of time
and effort, and in order to facilitate the compilation of responses,
they were asked to check each code section, indicating "frequency
of contact" with that particular section." In addition, the respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with
the statement that "this section is in need of revision" and to comment thereon.' 2 A summary of the responses to this part of the
questionnaire, according to offense category, appears in the Appendix.
C. The Role of the Legislature and Law Enforcement Agencies
Exercising Quasi-LegislativeFunctions
1. The role and its parameters
Basic to any discussion of the revision of a criminal code must be
some analysis of the role of the legislature. The generally accepted
premise for the legislative role in making decisions as to the definition and classification of criminal conduct is that the legislature
exercises, by action or inaction, the primary as well as the ultimate
provisions. Part three is composed of nine statements relating to general problems
with the code. The fourth part consisted of questions relating to strategies for code
reform. The final section was for general comments. The questionnaire was 27
letter-size pages long. All responses to the questionnaire are on file in the office of
Professor Aaronson, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, D.C.
11. The following statement appeared in the instructions to the questionnaire:
"Frequency of Contact or Experience with Code Provision(s). Have you provided
legal services in a criminal case in which the defendant was charged (or subsequently entered a guilty plea) with the listed code sections? Four choices are provided: often, occasionally,rarely, never."
12. The following directions appeared in the instructions to the questionnaire:
"For each section(s) please indicate the extent of your agreement with the following
statement: THIS SECTION IS IN NEED OF REVISION. Please place a
checkmark in the box that most closely reflects the extent to which you agree with
that statement. Five choices are provided: strongly agree, agree, disagree,strongly
disagree, no opinion." The five point rating scale used is a technique commonly
employed in opinion surveys. See, e.g., D. MLLER, HANDBOOK OF RIMSEARCH DESIGN
AND SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 88 (2d ed. 1970); C. SELLTIZ, et al., REEARCH METHODS
IN SocIAL RELATIONS 343 (1959).
The following statement in the questionnaire's instructions related to comments:
"After you have expressed an opinion (unless the 'No Opinion' box is checked),
space is provided for 'Comment.' If time permits, please indicate in this space
views or suggestions of what should be changed and why. If your views are based
on particular case law, if possible, please indicate."
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responsibility for this activity. Less well-recognized is the vital role
of the police department, the prosecutors' offices, and, to a lesser
degree, the trial and appellate courts in this decision-making process.
The respective roles of these various groups in the maintenance
or revision of a criminal code should be viewed in terms of the
several functions of a criminal code. It is the starting point and
foundation for: 1) officially announcing minimum standards of acceptable conduct by labelling certain behavior as criminal; 2) obtaining voluntary citizen compliance and cooperation, upon which
the enforcement of the criminal laws depends, by informing the
public with as much clarity as possible of what behavior is deemed
to be criminal; 3) guiding police actions in the enforcement of the
criminal laws; 4) clarifying for the prosecutor, defense counsel, and
trial and appellate judges the limits of criminal and non-criminal
behavior, and providing the basis for instructions given to a jury of
laymen at the trial of a criminal case; and 5) promoting the educational, deterrent, and rehabilitative impact of the criminal laws
while safeguarding conduct that is without fault.
Part I of this article, which traces the historical development of
the District's criminal code, demonstrates the relatively inactive
role of the Congress in maintaining a modern criminal code designed
to serve the above-noted functions in the District of Columbia. This
discussion suggests by implication that these functions have been
met through an informal, largely unwritten, low-profile process of
criminalization/decriminalization decision-making by other criminal justice agencies, acting through the device of implementing legislative policy. 3
13. An alternative thesis is that the process of legislative policy-making cannot
be understood merely by examining the formal legislative record as reflected in the
provisions of the criminal code. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has recently observed that the legislative branch speaks with three voices in communicating to law
enforcement agencies:
The first is the statute. The second is long-term knowledge of and acquiescence in nonenforcement.... The third is appropriation of funds insufficient
for complete enforcement, compelling police and prosecutors to create a system of enforcement priorities. The argument that the second and third voices
speak louder than the statute and express the true legislative intent is based
on realism and cannot be brushed aside.
Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEXAs L. REv. 703, 715
(1974).
One difficulty with the above statement is the meaning of "true legislative intent." The informal processes of legislative communication to law enforcement
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It is submitted that statutory decriminalization by the legislature
represents the preferred remedy to the existence of an overly-broad
spectrum of conduct now subject to the sanctions of the District of
Columbia criminal code. It is essential that those to whom these
minimum standards of acceptable conduct are addressed have clear
notice that the elected representatives deem specific conduct to be
unacceptable. This is necessary if the functions of the criminal code,
principally in this instance the maximization of citizen compliance
with the criminal laws and cooperation with law enforcement agencies, are to be fully met. Respect for the law may be seriously undermined when there are wide discrepancies between "law-on-thebooks" and "law-in-action."' 4
The importance and legitimacy of broad discretion in the form of
policy-making by other criminal justice agencies and of informal
processes of communication with the legislative branch is recognized. However, it is also important to clearly distinguish between
formal criminalization/decriminalization decision-making by the
legislature and de facto decision-making by police and prosecutors. 5 The important question in terms of the wide range of conduct
agencies outlined by Professor Davis merit study. A case study of a particular
jurisdiction, evaluating the use of the budget as a mechanism for making more
refined, short-term adjustments to the criminal code, might be highly revealing. If
it were demonstrated that the dominant mode of communication was through these
informal processes, the following question would still need to be resolved: to what
degree does the informal communication, as compared to the formal communication through statutes, advance the functions performed by a criminal code?
To the degree that Davis' thesis is valid, it can be argued that a non-arrest or
non-prosecution policy for certain offenses does not represent a substitute for legislative judgment. It is suggested, however, that the neglect of the formal process of
communication is costly in terms of community acceptance of minimum standards
of conduct and maintenance of maximum community cooperation with law enforcement agencies, and respect for law and the legal processes.
14. Most police departments, however, must have non-arrest policies as to certain offenses. If all the laws in the criminal code were fully enforced, more cases
would be initiated than could be prosecuted, and great disrespect for the law would
be generated if many of the arrests involved conduct not deemed criminal by the
community. Moreover, total enforcement is precluded by the limited resources
available to law enforcement agencies. On the other hand, full enforcement of
particular code sections might force the legislature to exercise its responsibility to
decide what conduct or status should be punishable and how. See Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TExAs L. Rav. 703, 716 (1974).
15. The Congress, however, does not formally recognize the existence of any
discretion on the part of the Metropolitan Police Department in thils regard.
Penalty for neglect to make arrest.
If any member of the police force shall neglect making any arrest for an
offense against the laws of the United States committed in his presence, he
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labelled criminal in the District of Columbia is not whether to decriminalize but who should decriminalize, the extent of decriminalization, and the process for making decriminalization decisions.
The policy-making process of law enforcement agencies is basically different from that of the legislative branch. Law enforcement
decisions relating to the definition and classification of conduct as
criminal are almost always made informally, usually have low visibility, and are not published. By contrast, the legislative process
typically includes a formal fact-finding process, permitting all interested individuals and groups affected by criminal laws to provide
information and express their views, a written statement of the
policy, a statement of reasons for the policy in the form of a written
committee report, and, finally, publication of the policy, often accompanied by wide publicity. The informal process greatly increases the likelihood of unjustified selective or discriminatory enforcement of the penal laws.
If the history of the role of the legislature in the District of Columbia with regard to statutory criminal law-making is a guide, it may
be unrealistic to expect that branch of government to assert itself
in the future. If so, this responsibility will continue to rest by default
in the other criminal justice agencies responsible for enforcing the
criminal laws. Consequently, it is especially important to consider
ways to promote the better use of discretion, to insure both that
discretion is wisely exercised and, also, that it has the appearance
of being wisely exercised. An approach strongly recommended for
consideration is formal rule-making by police and prosecutors,
which might take the form of joint rule-making.6
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment in the District jail or penitentiary not exceeding two years, or by a fine
not exceeding $500.
D.C. CODE § 4-143 (1973).
16. When a non-arrest policy is formalized by means of a written rule, it enhances the level of predictability and consistency in the operation of law enforcement agencies. Such occurrences are rare. One example in the District of Columbia
is a police department rule that motorists were no longer to be stopped for passing
red lights between the hours of 3:00 and 6:00 a.m. One of the purposes of this order
is to conserve resources for more serious crimes. MEROPOLrAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
GENERAL ORDER No. 303.1, TRAFFIc ENFORCEMENT, pt. l(E)(2) (Aug. 1, 1974).
A perfect example of the failure of an attempt at formal rule-making was the plan
announced by Acting United States Attorney for the District of Columbia Earl
Silbert that persons arrested for possession of small amounts of marijuana would
not be prosecuted. Acting Police Chief John Hughes immediately criticized Sil-
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Alternate approaches to fulfilling the role

If the legislative branch is willing to exercise its statutory role, it
is important to set out the alternatives available in making criminalization/decriminalization decisions. Three types of statutory
decriminalization may be distinguished: 1) pure decriminalization,
2) reclassification, and 3) substitution of a non-criminal response for
the criminal sanction. These options, with some modifications, are
also available to the various criminal justice agencies in making
decisions involving de facto decriminalization. 8
Pure decriminalization, which is often equated with statutory
bert's plan, stating that his force would continue to make such arrests. One of his
stated concerns was the possible criminal liability of his police for failure to make
an arrest. See note 15 supra. Silbert countered by offering the police immunity from
possible prosecutions under that law. Strong support for Silbert's proposal came
from Superior Court Chief Judge Harold Greene, who was concerned with the
inordinate amount of judicial resources which petty marijuana offenses consume.
Yet, the differences between Silbert and the Police Department were apparently
irreconcilable; Silbert's proposal was withdrawn. See Silbert Ends His Stand on
Marijuana,Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 1974, § A, at 5, col. 1.
While there are a number of objections to requiring such formal rule-making on
the part of police and prosecutors, Professor Davis believes that such rule-making
could even be required by the courts since "vagueness in an enforcement policy can
be just as unfair as vagueness in a statute." Davis, An Approach to Legal Control
of the Police, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 703, 714 (1974). To overcome the problem of legislative restrictions on the exercise of formal discretion, Professor Davis endorses the
following rule: "An Officer is not obliged to make an arrest in every instance. He
may in some circumstances, for good cause consistent with the public interest,
decline to arrest notwithstanding the existence of probable cause to arrest." Id. at
715-16, citing TEXAS CRmIMIAL JUSTiCE COUNCIL, MODEL RULES
MENT OFFICERS: A MANUAL ON POLICE DISCRrION 38 (1974).

FOR

LAW ENFORCE-

17. This discussion of the criminalization/decriminalization decision and available alternatives is studied in greater detail in a forthcoming report, the "Study of
Alternatives to Conventional Criminal Adjudication," of the American University's
Institute for Studies in Justice and Social Behavior. The co-principal investigators
of this study are Professors David Aaronson, Nicholas Kittrie, and David Saari.
Special acknowledgement is made for the helpful suggestions of Peter Jaszi, legal
counsel on the project staff.
18. Uniform policies on non-arrest or non-prosecution are the analog to pure
decriminalization. Policies relating to the screening and grade of charge for certain
offenses, as well as plea-bargaining policies, may be the equivalent of reclassification. Finally, pre-trial intervention programs involve the temporary suspension of
further criminal proceedings for all arrestees meeting eligibility requirements and
the provision of services such as counselling, vocational training, and drug rehabilitation. The decision for early termination of prosecution upon successful completion of such a program may be equivalent to the substitution of a non-criminal
response for criminal sanctions.
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decriminalization, is the removal of particular offenses or classes of
offenses from statutory prohibition, without any further attempt to
penalize, regulate, or provide treatment for the previously prohibited conduct. Experience with code revision in other jurisdictions
suggests that many offenses decriminalized in this fashion are those
which have been de facto decriminalized by the police or prosecutors. This may occur either because these criminal justice officials
do not perceive the offense to be serious enough to warrant allocation of limited resources, or because arrest and prosecution in these
cases is highly unpopular or morally objectionable. A lag between
societal norms as expressed in statutory provisons and as expressed
in law enforcement policy is likely to be particularly pronounced in
a jurisdiction such as the District of Columbia where the legislature
has not undertaken a periodic review of the substantive offense
provisions. Consequently, pure decriminalization will not usually
result in any appreciable change in the processing of cases in the
criminal justice system for many types of crimes.
A second approach to decriminalization, which may be termed
reclassification, involves downgrading the criminal penalty for particular categories of offenses, rather than eliminating them completely from the criminal code. The use of this approach is likely in
two situations: 1) where the legislature still desires to regulate or
control the conduct in question by criminal sanctions; or 2) where
the legislature recognizes that the conduct involved cannot be effectively deterred by criminal sanctions, but desires to "place itself on
record" as disapproving of the conduct. The reclassification approach may be a more politically expedient method of responding
to public pressure condemning the punishment as unnecessarily
severe where pure decriminalization may anger interests more concerned with defining the conduct as illegal, irrespective of the type
of penalty.' 9
19. An example of this process in action can be seen in Oregon's reclassification
of marijuana possession. In July of 1973, Oregon amended its marijuana statute,
reducing the penalty for possession of less than one ounce from a Class A Misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for one year or a fine of $1,000, to a violation,
punishable by a fine of less than $100. ORE. Rav. STAT. § 167.207(3) (1974).
It is interesting to note that apparently the action of the Oregon legislature
merely formalized the informal law enforcement policy. Since 1969, no one had
received a sentence of imprisonment for mere possession of such amounts of marijuana and the police had made few arrests. The legislature hoped that its action
would promote the use of law enforcement resources for investigating more harmful
drugs, as well as removing the criminal label from a sizeable minority of the state's
population. Yet, by adding the $100 fine, the legislature indicated its desire to
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The third type of statutory decriminalization involves the substitution of a non-criminal response for a criminal sanction. Instead of
prescribing criminal definitions and penalties for certain conduct,
the legislature may establish a procedure for regulating and responding to it by a mechanism intended to have a non-penal purpose. The adoption of the substitution approach often suggests a
legislative judgment that the conduct formerly defined as criminal
ought to be handled as a public health problem without further
penetration into the criminal process.
An example in the District of Columbia of the substitution approach is the handling of public inebriates. It also illustrates the
importance of the judicial branch, here the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in providing the stimulus for the legislature to formulate an alternative to the criminal
response." While the court merely held that a chronic alcoholic
could not be convicted for public intoxication, Congress subsequently provided an alternative for all public inebriates, whether
chronic alcoholics or not, provided they are not a danger to themselves or others." Police officers are still the primary "pick-up"
agents, but instead of taking the public inebriate to the police station "drunk tank," the inebriate may be taken or sent to his home,
a health facility, or to the detoxification center. It should be observed that an individual taken to a detoxification center may be
detained for up to 72 hours, 2 receiving medical attention if needed,
discourage use of marijuana. See "Study of Alternatives to Conventional Criminal
Adjudication," supra note 17, at chs. 3 & 8 (unpublished draft of final report).
20. Decriminalization of public intoxication in the District resulted from the
declaration by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that
application of the public intoxication statute to chronic alcoholics was illegal.
Easter v. District of Columbia, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 33, 361 F.2d 50 (1966).

21. The legislative response was the Alcoholic Rehabilitiation Act of 1967, authorizing alternate procedures for handling all public inebriates, whether chronic

alcoholics or not. The present District intoxication statute provides that
any person, who is intoxicated in public (1) may be taken or sent to his home
or to a public or private health facility, or (2) if not taken or sent to his home
or such facility under paragraph (1) shall be taken to a detoxification center.
D.C. CODE § 24-524 (1973).
It should be noted that drinking in public is still an offense, although this provi-

sion is rarely used. See id. § 25-128.
22. Id. § 24-524. The civil-criminal distinction among legislatively prescribed

responses may be unclear. While all criminal sanctions are penalties, not all civil
(non-criminal) responses are non-penal, either by legislative implication or in their

practical effect. Involuntary detention in the detoxification center represents a
deprivation of liberty and may arguably be regarded as penal in nature. Thus,
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and other services." The impact on the criminal justice system was
the removal of a major source of court congestion and delay.
The consequence of a failure of the legislature to adequately perform its statutory role in criminal code revision is usually improvisation and the use of inadequately guided discretionary authority by
police, prosecutors, and other criminal justice officials. Additional
consequences include: 1) lack of understanding on the part of the
public as to what conduct is officially prohibited; 2) lessened respect
for the law and its enforcers; and 3) waste and misallocation of
criminal justice resources which could be better used to combat
more serious anti-social conduct.
In the analysis which follows the reader should be aware of the
respective roles played by legislative and quasi-legislative bodies
when considering effective alternatives for enacting or revising a set
of laws designed to best serve the functions of the criminal code.
I.

THE MOVEMENT FOR CRIMINAL CODE REFORM IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA

An examination of reform efforts in other jurisdictions reveals the
significant progress made in other states toward modern, comprehensive revision of their criminal codes. Most states have revised
their criminal codes in the last three decades or are in the process
of so doing. A study of the history of the District's development of
its criminal code provides a striking contrast with reform jurisdictions which have faced code revision problems similar to those faced
by the District.
This section will discuss the District's lack of progress in reforming the criminal code, most notably in relation to its unique political
status. Recent political developments will be discussed insofar as
they have a bearing on what appear to be substantially improved
although the purpose of the new procedure is non-criminal (to provide treatment),
the effect retains the penal character inherent in involuntary detention and forced
treatment. Involuntary commitment, even if short-term and for humane, nonpenal objectives, may pose serious legal questions, especially the absence of due
process procedural safeguards at least theoretically afforded under the former criminal sanctions.
23. The success of this form of substitution depends upon an effective service
capacity and a budget appropriation designed to meet the specifications of the law.
In the District of Columbia, some dissatisfaction exists among public health professionals regarding the adequacy of the delivery of public inebriates to the detoxification center and of resources for short- and long-term treatment. The institution of
a treatment-oriented approach is not sufficient; a city must be willing to invest
resources to handle the new patient case load at health service centers.
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chances for criminal code reform. Finally, the recently created Law
Review Commission will be examined in terms of its potential for
achieving comprehensive criminal code reform.
A.

The National Movement for Criminal'CodeReform
There are movements in the field of law reform just as there are
movements in the fields of art and politics; and revision of the substantive criminal law is clearly "the" law reform movement of the
sixties.Y

Indeed, 17 jurisdictions have enacted comprehensive revisions in
their substantive criminal laws in the past decade. 5 In addition,
revisions have been completed and are awaiting enactment in 18
other jurisdictions.2 6 In fact, there are only three jurisdictions which
have not revised or at least contemplated comprehensive, substantive revisions of their criminal codesY These statistics indicate that
"movement" might even be an understatement of the scope of this
phenomenon.
The trend toward reform is not based upon academic criticism of
a cumbersome but functional code of criminal law, but upon a general deterioration in the effectiveness of criminal codes in all parts
of the country. Wechsler has identified the general problems existing in virtually every jurisdiction which tend to impede the just
administration of the criminal laws:
Viewing the country as a whole, our penal codes are fragmentary, old,
disorganized and often accidental in coverage, their growth largely
fortuitous in origin, their form a combination of enactment and of
common law that only history explains. Basic doctrines governing the
scope and measure of this form of liability have received small attention from the legislature and cannot easily be renovated by the
courts. Discriminations that distinguish minor crime from major
criminality, with large significance for the offender's treatment and
his status in society, often reflect a multitude of fine distinctions that
have no discernible relation to the ends that the law should serve. 8
24. Israel, The Processof PenalLaw Reform-A Look at the ProposedMichigan
Revised Criminal Code, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 722, 773 (1968).
25. AMERcAN LAW INSTrrUTE, STATUS OF SUBSTANTIVE PENAL LAW REviSION (1974).
26. Id.
27. Id. The three jurisdictions not contemplating comprehensive revisions are
Mississippi, Nevada, and Wyoming.
28. Wechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations on Its Model
Penal Code, 42 A.B.A.J. 321, 321-22 (1956). See also Wechsler, The Challenge of
a Model Penal Code, 65 HAnv. L. Rzv. 1097, 1103 (1952).
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This very inadequacy in the substantive criminal laws precipitated the national movement towards comprehensive revision of the
criminal codes. Specifically, the pre-revision criminal codes in most
jurisdictions contained obsolete and unnecessarily verbose provisions, needless technical distinctions and overlapping, inadequate
statements of proscribed conduct, and unnecessary variations in
penalties for essentially comparable conduct."
While in many instances an efficient administration of inadequate laws tends to compensate for those shortcomings," this stopgap resolution of the problem serves to both perpetuate the underlying problems and create new ones. If the true failings of the substanThe challenge is, in substance, that the penal law is ineffective, inhumane
and thoroughly unscientific. Its ineffectiveness is argued from the prevalence
of serious offenses and the high rates of recidivism that the crime statistics
uniformly show. Its inhumanity is argued from the use of punishment as the
sanction, including even the penalty of death; the narrow range in which the
law accords importance to the causes and dynamics of criminal conduct
rather than the nature of the proved offense; the extent to which sanctions
are governed by the injury inflicted rather than the future danger the defendant may present and the requirements for an effective therapy; the wide and
seemingly anarchical disparity in sentencing practice even among judges of
one court ....
The further impeachment based on science rests in part on these contentions but in larger part on the submission that the law ... employs unsound
psychological premises ... [and] is drawn in terms of a psychology that is
both superficial and outmoded ....
Id.
29. See, e.g., Gausewitz, ConsiderationsBasic to a New Penal Code, 11 Wis. L.
REv. 346, 365-94 (1936); Remington, Criminal Law Revision: Codification vs.
PiecemealAmendment, 33 NEB. L. Rnv. 396, 398-401 (1954); Wilson, New Bottles
for Old Wine: Criminal Law Revision in Kansas, 16 KAN. L. REv. 585, 585-88
(1968).
30. In discussing this compensating process, one commentator noted:
The difficulties created by lack of organization and clarity are often overcome
by the gradually developed expertise of the lawyer who continuously works
with the criminal law. However, not even, the most experienced lawyer is
likely to be aware of every hidden provision or misleading title. Similarly,
inadequacies in coverage are usually offset by an ingenious prosecutor, always able to find some provision somewhere that relates to at least one aspect
of the defendant's conduct, or a tolerant judge, willing to strain the language
of an existing provision to encompass an act that clearly should be deemed
criminal even if the statute might not clearly say so. So too, gross inconsistencies in penalties for similar acts often are neutralized by judicious use of plea
bargaining. All of this, of course, comes at a cost-in time, effort and dignity
of the criminal law.
Israel, The Process of Penal Law Reform-A Look at the ProposedMichigan Revised Criminal Code, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 772, 779 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
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tive laws are not revealed, then the root problem, the inadequate
criminal code, will not be corrected. Also, this solution, while necessary to the orderly maintenance of a criminal justice system pending
rational reform, vests undue discretion in officials, many of whom
are not elected and thus unresponsive to citizen criticism. This
undue discretionary power resulting from a dysfunctional criminal
code negates one of the basic tenets of American society-that the
law and not individuals will rule.31
The combination of substantive inadequacies and excessive administrative discretion has supplied the chief impetus for the national reform movement. The National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recently undertook a review
of the status of criminal codes across the country. The Commission,
concerned about the problems presented by such unrevised codes
and impressed by the results achieved in reform jurisdictions, felt
compelled to assert substantive code reform as an imperative objective: "Any State that has not revised its substantive criminal law
within the past decade should begin revision immediately."3 2
This presumption of inadequacy attaching to an unrevised code
certainly seems warranted in light of the identifiable problems uniformly present in virtually every jurisdiction which has not recently
revised its substantive criminal laws. To prevent the recurrence of
these problems subsequent to a revision, the Commission found that
"continuing law revision is required if the achievements of initial
'33
code reform are to be maintained.
31. For a discussion of the role of the legislature in criminal code reform see notes
13-23 & accompanying text supra. See also Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model
Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1102 (1952).
A society that holds, as we do, to belief in law cannot regard with unconcern
the fact that prosecuting agencies can exercise so large an influence on dispositions that involve the penal sanction, without reference to any norms but
those that they may create for themselves. Whatever one would hold as to
the need for discretion of this order in a proper system or the wisdom of

attempting regulation of its exercise, it is quite clear that its existence cannot
be accepted as a substitute for a sufficient law. Indeed, one of the major
consequences of the state of the penal law today is that administration has
so largely come to dominate the field without effective guidance from the law.
This is to say that to a large extent we have, in this important sense, abandoned law-and this within an area where our fundamental teaching calls
most strongly for its vigorous supremacy.

Id.
32.

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSMcE STANDARDS AND GOA LS,

CRIMINAL JusTIncE SYSTEM

33. Id. at 195.

175 (1973).
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Continuing code revision may be almost as important as the
initial revision itself.3 4 Indeed, the inadequacies present in unrevised
codes have resulted-from the legislatures' failure to maintain criminal codes responsive to changing societal institutions. 5 As the penal
codification movement of the nineteenth century introduced the
principle of statute law to replace the common law,3" the code reform movement of the twentieth century should promote the concept of a more flexible code, amenable to change in response to
community needs.
34. As the National Advisory Committee stated:
Much of the confusion in criminal law coverage in States that have not
revised their criminal statutes recently is the product of random, uncoordinated legislation enacted over many years of legislative sessions. The confusion can be prevented or controlled only by reluiring that all bills be reviewed
promptly to determine whether they actually are needed. When changing
conditions create new needs, new code provisions are necessary....
Much of the benefit realized through revision is likely to be lost unless
revision is a continuing process, through which omissions or duplications in
coverage can be remedied, defects in administration cured, and the inevitable urge to pass new statutes resisted to the utmost.
Id.
35. The following passage clearly indicates the breadth of problems created by
an unrevised criminal code.
Actually even a penal code that had been totally revised in 1931 could not
be expected to deal adequately with the vast changes in society that have
occurred in just the last ten or fifteen years. New developments in the economic structure-the widespread use of credit; the recognition of-new security interests in legislation like the Uniform Commericial Code; the use of
services and rentals as major commodities on the market; and the creation
of new items of value such as trading 9tamps and credit cards-would alone
require significant changes in various provisions dealing with the misappropriation and destruction of property. Similarly, the tremendous expansion in
the operations of government, accompanied by various changes in administrative functions, would require substantial alterations in the numerous provisions that affect public administration.
Israel, The Process of Penal Law Reform-A Look at the Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code, 14 WAYNE L. Rlv. 772, 774 (1968).
36. That earlier movement, however, was perhaps too rapid and insufficiently
implemented, resulting in cumbersome and insufficient penal codes.
After the Revolution, there was a general desire among the states to break
away from the English criminal common law, due to the harshness of the
provisions from which the colonies had suffered. . . . Our criminal laws...
have developed into a patchwork of inconsistencies, contradictions, and confusion by reason of the desire to break away from the common law and create
as rapidly as possible a legal system more nearly adapted to local conditions.
Molnar, Criminal Law Revision in Georgia, 15 MERcER L. REV. 399 (1964).
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B. HistoricalDevelopment of the District of Columbia Criminal
Code
The evolution of the District's code is chronicled in the preface
to the current code. It should be noted, however, that this account,
like most of the code, has not been updated since first printed in
the 1929 edition.37 Since its original codification in 1901, there has
been no general revision of the substantive criminal code.
The history as recorded evidences a pattern of congressional disregard for' the state of the substantive laws in the District of Columbia. Although the Congress has the plenary power to "exercise exclusive legislation in all Cases whatsoever" in regard to the District
of Columbia,38 that power has rarely been exercised to qualitatively
reform the criminal laws.
When the District of Columbia was ceded by Maryland and Virginia to the federal government," the common law of those jurisdictions followed the cession of the land. Congress at that time made
no attempt to clarify the laws in force in the District other than:
[t]hat the laws of the state of Virginia, as they now exist, shall be
and continue in force in that part of the District of Columbia, which
was ceded by the said state to the United States, and by them accepted for the permanent seat of government; and that the laws of
the state of Maryland, as they now exist, shall be and continue in
force in that part of the said district, which was ceded by that state
to the United States, and by them accepted as aforesaid."
Thus, from their creation the District's laws were a confusing
amalgam of federal law and the laws of two states, applicable to the
territory which they respectively ceded to the federal government.',
This state law, moreover, was little more than the inherited English
common law in force as of the time of the Declaration of Independence. The District's substantive laws were thus comprised of: 1) the
maxims and principles of equity; 2) the British common law as of
1776; 3) the British statutes in effect in 1776; 4) laws of Maryland
in effect in 1800, including those passed by the Maryland colonial
37. D.C. CODE xvii-xxii (1973).
38. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
39. See Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 28, § 1, 1 Stat. 130.

40. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 2, 2 Stat. 103.
41. Since, however, the territory ceded to the federal government by Virginia was
retroceded to Virginia in 1846, whatever laws were in effect in that territory had
little if any effect on the development of the District's law. See Act of July 9, 1846,
ch. 35, Preamble, 9 Stat. 35.
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government; 5) laws of Virginia likewise in effect4 in
1800; and 6)
2
those federal laws not inapplicable to the District.
From that time until 1900 a number of attempts, congressionally
authorized and otherwise, were made to organize these laws. There
was no official codification of the laws until 1901, however, although
the problem had increased through the continuing enactment of
laws to govern the District, many of which were "buried in appropriation acts."43
The congressional codification of 1901 did little to clarify the state
of the laws in the District. While the Congress enacted the overall
code with some 1,642 sections stating positive law in force in the
District, a confusing mass of laws unaffected by the codification
were continued in force in the District. These included:
The common law, all British statutes in force in Maryland on the
twenty-seventh day of February, eighteen hundred and one, the principles of equity and admiralty, all general acts of Congress not locally
inapplicable in the District of Columbia, and all acts of Congress by
their terms applicable to the District of Columbia and to other places
under the jurisdiction of the United States . . .
Therefore, the codification served merely to delineate certain laws
without eliminating or organizing the vast bulk of laws applicable
to the District but unaffected by the codified provisions.
The 1901 code had slightly over 100 provisions relating to substantive criminal offenses, six provisions concerning general matters
such as attempts, and about two dozen sections on various criminal
procedure matters.4 5 The chapter covering the criminal offenses was
divided into eight subchapters: offenses against the person, property, public peace, public justice, public policy, morality, miscella46
neous, and general provisions.
Since 1901, there has been no general revision or even a reconsideration of the substantive criminal provisions. While a variety of
specific offenses have been added or deleted, often without thought
as to the effect of such amendments on other provisions of the code,47
42. See D.C. CODE xvii (1973) (statement of James Easby-Smith in 1926).
43. Id.
44. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 1, § 1, 31 Stat. 1189.
45. Id. §§ 798-939.
46. Id. §§ 798-910.
47. When, for example, the housebreaking section was entirely amended to establish two degrees of burglary, the felony-murder clause of the murder provision
was not amended to reflect that change. Compare D.C. CODE § 22-1801 (1973), with
id. § 22-2401.
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the only comprehensive change enacted has been rearrangement of
the provisions.48 Even that Act resulted in a change from a societalinterest arrangement to an alphabetical one, a move ill-considered
in light of the uniform rejection of the alphabetical format in contemporary criminal codes."
The District's criminal code has never been fully resurrected from
the mass of conflicting laws resulting from the combination of several jurisdictions. In fact, the jurisdictional c6nflict still continues
as Congress and the District Council both have authority within
their respective spheres to legislate criminal offenses.5 For the first
time since its creation, however, the District may be able to avoid
this cumbersome problem in January of 1977, when jurisdiction to
initiate criminal laws for the District of Columbia will reside solely
in the Council.5'
C.

The Recent Impetus for Substantive Criminal Code Reform

With the steadily rising crime rate of the 1960's came the increased awareness that the system of administering criminal justice
in this country was not achieving its primary purpose-the deterrence of actual and potential criminals and the rehabilitation of
individual offenders. To study the causes of this phenomenon, the
federal government established a number of commissions and committees. Among these were two concerning the District of Columbia.
The President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia
reported on many substantive and procedural failings in the criminal justice system, as well as reporting on the need for broader
community programs. Pursuant to one of the recommendations, the
Commission on Revision of the Criminal Laws of the District of
Columbia was established. For a number of reasons, however, that
Commission failed in its task.
Yet, the interest in substantive criminal code reform, fueled by
political developments favorable to the District, has continued.
This section will trace the evolution of this recent drive for substantive code reform in the District which has culminated in a new Law
Review Commission with a mandate to give special consideration to
revision of the criminal law.
48. In 1941, the Committee on the Revision of the Laws of the House of Representatives rearranged the District's code into what is basically its present form.
Authority for that action was granted by the Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 910, § 3, 45
Stat. 1007; and Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 586, § 2, 45 Stat. 1541.
49. See notes 159-61 & accompanying text infra.
50. See note 89 & accompanying text infra.
51. See notes 86-87 & accompanying text infra.
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1. The President's Commission on Crime in the District of
Columbia
In 1965 President Johnson established a Commission to examine
in depth a number of institutions relating to the administration of
criminal justice in the District.5 2 One of its many functions was to
evaluate and report on the "adequacy and effectiveness of the criminal laws." 53 The results of that study were included as a major
section in the report of that Commission.-"
The findings of the Commission presented numerous examples of
inadequacies in the substantive criminal law. 5 Overall, the Commission found the District's criminal code needed "modernization,
clarification, a more rational penalty structure, and thoughtful consideration of many difficult substantive and procedural problems." 56 As a result of that study, the Commission recommended:
1. The criminal law of the District of Columbia should be reviewed
and reformed. The review should include a reexamination of all substantive and procedural provisions of the law to provide a clear definition of criminal behavior, to achieve fair and consistent policies in
dealing with offenders, and to introduce new concepts of treatment
into the code.
2. Congress should create and support a commission to undertake
revision of the District of Columbia criminal laws.57
2. The Commission on Revision of the Criminal Laws of the
District of Columbia
The creation and subsequent abolition of this law revision com mission was a reflection of the Congress' general lack of concern over
the state of the criminal laws in the District of Columbia, as well
as the conflict in philosophy and approaches of the House and Senate District Committees. In December of 1967 the Congress passed
"An Act Relating to Crime and Criminal Procedure in the District
of Columbia.""8 Title 10 of that Act established a Commission to
52. EXEc.
53. Id.
54.

ORDER

No. 11,234, 3 C.F.R. 326 (Supp. 1965).

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRIME IN THE Dismicr OF COLUMBIA

626-35 (1966).
55. The more striking examples discussed by the Commission were the need for
precise definitions of criminal behavior, elimination of confusing and inconsistent
Code provisions, and the institution of a systematic and effective penalty structure.

Id.
56. Id. at 627.
57. Id. at 635.
58. Act of Dec. 27, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-226, §§ 1001-09, 81 Stat. 734.
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make a full and complete review and study of the statutory and case
law applicable in the District of Columbia for the purpose of formulating and recommending to the Congress a revised code of criminal
law and procedure for the District of Columbia. The Commission
[was also to] include in its recommendations proposals for the repeal
of unnecessary or undesirable statutes and such changes in the penalty structure as the Commission may feel will better serve the ends
of justice. 59
The legislative history of the Act suggests that, for the House of
Representatives at least, the Commission was secondary to the passage of accompanying "law and order" offenses." In fact, the Commission was created pursuant to a Senate amendment to the
House's strong anti-crime proposals for the District,6" and the House
concurred simply to enact its proposed anti-crime measures.2
The Act provided for an eleven-member commission,"' which was
to submit an interim report within two years and a final report
within three years. 4 The Commission held an initial meeting in the
spring of 1968; however, no attempts were made to recruit a staff
until early in 1970, largely because of lack of appropriated funds.,'
In hearings before the Senate District Committee in the spring of
1970, the Commission's chairman, Wiley Branton, argued for the
necessity of funds for the project to accomplish its task, noting:
There is considerable case law that needs to be enacted into legislation, to prevent the confusion and to eliminate some of the archaic
59. Id. § 1003.
60. The House Report stated that the Commission was passed by the House
solely because of the overriding "interest of getting some effective House-passed
anti-crime proposals ... into the statute books .... ." H. R. Rep. No. 907, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1970).
61. See 113 CONG. REc. 36079 (1967).
62. See id. at 36405-09.
63. Act of Dec. 27, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-226, § 1002, 81 Stat. 734. The members
uf the Commission on Revision of the Criminal Laws of the District of Columbia
were: Chairman Wiley A. Branton, Senator Alan Bible, Senator Winston L. Prouty,
Representative John Dowdy, Representative Lawrence Hogan, Judge Edmond T.
Daly (D.C. Court of General Sessions), Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III (United
States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit), James Francis Reilly, Lawrence Speiser,
Sylvia A. Bacon, and Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr. (United States District Court,
D.C.) Hearingson S. 2601 Before the Senate Comm. on the District of Columbia,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, at 2093 (1970).
64. Act of Dec. 27, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-226, § 1008, 81 Stat. 734.
65. See Hearings on S. 2601 Before the Senate Comm. on the District of
Columbia, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, at 2092-93 (1970) (letter from District of
Columbia Mayor Washington to Senator Tydings, March 11, 1970).
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laws which are on the books. There are many criminal statutes on the
books which are no longer applicable. 6
Mayor Washington also urged funding for the Commission in a letter to Senator Tydings.6 7 At least one Senator on the Committee
indicated his support for funding the Commission. 8
Congressman Dowdy, a Commission member, introduced legislation to abolish the Commission and delegate the work of revision to
the District Committees of both Houses. 9 The rationale for this
action was that the "Commission to date has not initiated any study
or review of the D.C. Criminal Code," had not met in two-and-onehalf years, had not secured any funds for its operations, and had
failed to submit its required interim report." Thus, it was felt that
"the Congress itself, through its own Committees, can more effectively carry on the review, study, and revision of the District's criminal laws." 1 In fact, the Commission had met, had secured some
funds to initiate its study, and had attempted to acquire all of its
authorized funds from the House District Committee.
One explanation for the failure of the Commission is that while
it enjoyed the support of the more liberal Senate District Committee, the conservative House District Committee lacked confidence
in its membership and procedures. The basis of the House District
Committee's objection lay in its inability to supervise the activity
of the Commission. Consequently, it exerted pressure to prevent
73
adequate funding and ultimately sought its dissolution.
The Commission was abolished by legislation which included,
according to Senator Ervin, some of the most repressive anti-crime
legislation ever enacted. 74 In light of this predilection on the part of
66. Id. at 2137.
67. Id. at 2092-93.
68. Senator Mathias stated, "I personally hope that you can proceed with the
job and get your staff in place and get on obviously with what needs to be done."
Id. at 2137.
69. H.R. 15555, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
70. H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 130-31 (1970).
71. Id. at 131.
72. See Hearings on S. 2601 Before the Senate Comm. on the District of
Columbia, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, at 2092-93 (1970) (letter from District of
Columbia Mayor Washington to Senator Tydings, March 11, 1970).
73. Interview with Hayden Garber, former Counsel for the House of Representatives District of Columbia Committee, in Washington, D.C., Sept. 24, 1971.
74. Senator Ervin declared:
[Tihis bill is just as full of unconstitutional and unjust and unwise provisions as a mangy hound dog is of fleas .... It is literally a garbage pail of
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the Congress at the time, it may be inferred that the Commission
was never appropriately funded and eventually abolished partly
because of congressional concern, especially on the part of some
House District Committee
members, that its recommendations
75
would be too liberal.
3. Subsequent political developments-Improved prospects for
criminal code revision
Since the demise of the former revision commission, several significant political events have occurred which have greatly enhanced
the prospects for substantive criminal code reform in the District of
Columbia. First, there was a radical shift in the leadership of the
House of Representatives Committee on the District of Columbia,
with Congressman Charles Diggs replacing Congressman John
McMillan as chairman.7 1 Second, the Home Rule bill for the District
of Columbia was passed. 77 The transfer of legislative powers over the
criminal code was delayed until January of 1977,8 thus creating a
strong incentive for Congress to revise the criminal code before the
transfer occurs. Last, Congress passed a bill in August of 1974 which
some of the most repressive, near-sighted, intolerant, unfair, and vindictive
legislation that the Senate has ever been presented.
Hearings on S. 2601 Before the Senate Comm. on the District of Columbia, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, at 2076-77 (1970) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
In addition to abolishing the Revision Commission, the Act provided for preventive detention, no-knock entries for searches, the compelling of production of physical evidence, and broad wiretapping authority. See Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-358, §§ 210a, 601, 84 Stat. 473. The "no-knock" entry provision has since
been repealed. Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-481, § 4(e), 88 Stat. 1455.
75. During the Hearings it was suggested that the District was being used by the
Congress as an anti-crime image-builder at the expense of the rights of the local
citizens.
Once again a majority of the members of the House District Committee
have shown themselves willing to authorize serious invasions of liberty on the
voteless residents of the District of Columbia which they would never tolerate, much less support, against their own constituents.
Hearings on S. 2601 Before the Senate Comm. on the District of Columbia, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, at 2138 (1970) (letter from Lawrence Speiser to all Congressmen, March 16, 1970).
See also 116 CONG. Rac. 8096 (1970), where Representative Broyhill stated, "[W]e
should view the District of Columbia as a laboratory for reforms, as an opportunity
to test new techniques to reduce crime." Id.
76. See notes 82-84 & accompanying text infra.
77. Act of Dec. 24, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774.
78. Id. § 602(a)(9).
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created a Law Review Commission,7 9 charged with giving special
consideration to the revision of the substantive criminal code for the
District. 0
The change in the leadership of the House District of Columbia
Committee opened the way for home rule in the District of Columbia. While Representative John McMillan of South Carolina was
chairman of this Committee from 1948 to 1972, he consistently opposed legislation granting home rule to the District.' Consequently,
virtually all such bills were retained in committee. However, during
the 1972 campaign, Congressman McMillan faced a primary runoff.
To secure the support of the third-place finisher in the primary, he
pledged to vote for home rule.82 Nonetheless, on September 12, 1972,
McMillan lost the runoff, and the chairmanship of the House District Committee passed to Representative Charles Diggs. 3 Chairman Diggs, a member of the Congressional Black Caucus and a
strong supporter of home rule for the District, 4 used his new position to successfully initiate the home rule legislation.
The District of Columbia Self-Government and Government Reorganization Act provided the District of Columbia Council with
legislative authority over "all rightful subjects of legislation within
the District consistent with the Constitution of the United States
and the provisions of this Act subject to all restrictions and limitations imposed upon the States by the tenth section of the first article
85
of the Constitution of the United States."
Among the limitations placed upon that power, however, was that
the Council could not legislate with "respect to any provision of any
law codified in title 22 . . . during the twenty-four full calendar
months immediately following the date on which the members of
79. Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-379, 88 Stat. 480.
80. See text accompanying notes 97 & 98 infra. The unprecedented effort on the
Proposed Federal Criminal Code should provide additional momentum for revision
of the District's criminal laws. See note 3 supra.
81. See 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2337 (1972). In 1971, McMillan's position on
the Committee was threatened at a Democratic caucus when party liberals
attempted to replace him as chairman. The attempt failed, however, by a vote of
126 to 96. Id.
82. See 28 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 653 (1972). The sincerity of that pledge was doubtful, however, for McMillan attempted to postpone a Committee meeting relating
to proposed Home Rule legislation until after the runoff. That move failed, but the
Committee was unable to muster a quorum for the meeting. Id.
83. See id. at 654. For a general discussion of these events see 30 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2337, 2479 (1972).
84. See 28 CONG. Q. ALAtANAc 653-54 (1972).
85. Act of Dec. 24, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 302, 87 Stat. 774.
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the Council . . .take office.""8 The purpose of this limitation was
to provide time for Congress to revise the criminal code prior to the
transfer of authority to the Council." During the interim, it was
understood, the mechanism for the revision would be a law review
commission to be created by the Congress, which would have as one
of its responsibilities reviewing and recommending reforms of the
code's criminal provisions. 8
Even after jurisdiction is transferred to the Council, changes in
title 22 will be subject to a congressional veto by eitherHouse within
30 legislative days. Other laws enacted by the Council require the
adoption of a concurrent resolution by both Houses within the same
period in order to void the proposal. 8
It should be emphasized that Congress has, historically, been
concerned with the maintenance of public order in the nation's capital,9" and has never viewed the issue of law enforcement in the
District of Columbia as one readily delegated to local officials. Yet,
Congress has not only passed the home rule legislation, but has also
established a new Law Review Commission.'
Contrary to opinions expressed at the time of the abolishment of
the earlier Commission, 2 Congress itself was unable to accomplish
code reform for the District through its own committee process. The
need for a law review commission whose powers include recommendations on substantive criminal law revision once again has been
given congressional recognition.
86. This was a compromise reached in the conference committee called to reconcile the House amendments to the bill (S. 1435). The amendment limited the
District Council's jurisdiction over the criminal laws and the organization and
jurisdiction of the District court system. The conference committee agreed to
"transfer authority to the Council to make changes in Titles 22, 23 and 24 of the
District of Columbia Code, effective January 2, 1977." H.R. REP. No. 703, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1973).
87. The House Report stated:
It is the intention of the Conferees that their respective legislation committees will seek to revise the District of Columbia Criminal Code prior to the
effective date of the transfer of authority referred to.
Id. at 76.
88. See H.R. REP. No. 924, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
89. Act of Dec. 24, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-198, §§ 602(c)(1), (2), 87 Stat. 774.

90. In fact, the Congress first became interested in establishing a separate seat
of government in 1783 when local law enforcement officials stood aside as disgruntled soldiers rioted around the Congress in Philadelphia, forcing the Congressmen
to flee. See THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrED STATES OF AMERIcA-ANALYSIS

S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 352 (1973).
91. See note 79 supra.
92. See note 71 & accompanying text supra.
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D. The Law Review Commission as a Vehicle for Criminal Code
Reform
As of August 21, 1974, a Law Review Commission for the District
of Columbia was established.9" The establishment of this Commission implements a recommendation made in 1972 by the Commission on the Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia.94 This recommendation, in turn, relied heavily upon the
function and operation of the New York Law Revision Commission,
established in 1934, which has served5 as the prototype for similar
9
commissions created since that date.
The District's Commission was created with a broad mandate to:
(1) examine the common law and statutes relating to the District
of Columbia, the ordinances, regulations, resolutions, and acts of the
District of Columbia Council, and all relevant judicial decisions for
the purpose of discovering defects and anachronisms in the law relat93. Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-379, 88 Stat. 480.
94. Act of Sept. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-405, tit. I, 84 Stat. 845. See REPORT OF
THE COMM'N ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DisTRicT OF COLUMBIA,

H.R. Doc. No. 317, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 1, at 127 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT].

Recommendation No. VIII-3- The Commission recommends that the District Government initiate legislation that would authorize the establishment
of a Law Revision Commission for the District of Columbia, in the form of a
permanent body .

. . ,

to be composed of fifteen members appointed as

follows: (1) two each appointed by the Mayor-Commissioner, Chairman of
the District of Columbia Council, District of Columbia Corporation Counsel,
and the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia; (2) one each
by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, majority leader of the Senate, the respective minority leaders of the House of Representatives and
Senate, and the Chief Judges of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
and District of Columbia Superior Court; and (3) the Chairman by the President of the United States, subject to Senate confirmation.
Id. (emphasis added).
See also id., vol. 2, at 763-66 (discussion of the reasons for this recommendation).
95. See id., vol. 2, at 763-66. Compare Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93379, 88 Stat. 480 (D.C. Law Review Commission), with N.Y. LEGIs. LAW §§ 70-72
(McKinney 1952) (N.Y. Law Revision Commission).
Other states have established law review commissions as a permanent part of
their legislative structures. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 10300-40 (West 1966);
LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 201 (1969); ANN. CODE MD. art. 40, §§ 48-53 (1971); MICH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4.322-.324 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 65, 431.1 (Purdon
1969); CODE OF VA. §§ 30-29 to -34 (1973).
For a more detailed reference to law revision or law reform agencies, see MacDonald, Legal Research TranslatedInto Legislative Action, 48 CORNELL L. REv. 401,
409 n.38 (1963).
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ing to the District of Columbia and recommending needed reforms;
(2) receive and consider proposed changes in the law recommended
by the American Law Institute, the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, any bar association or other learned bodies;
(3) receive and consider suggestions from judges, justices, public
officials, lawyers, and the public generally as to defects and anachronisms relating to the District of Columbia; and
(4) recommend from time to time, to the Congress, and where
appropriate to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia and to
the District of Columbia Council, such changes in the law relating to
the District of Columbia as it deems necessary to modify or eliminate
antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and to bring the law relating
to the District of Columbia, both civil and criminal, into harmony
with modern conditions."
Moreover, the Commission is charged with formulating uniform
rules of practice and preparing a manual for administrative procedure in the District.17 In short, the Law Review Commission has
been created to study all laws in the District of Columbia, both
substantive and procedural, and to recommend needed reforms.
In providing such broad responsibilities, patterned after the New
York Law Revision Commission,98 it was expected that the new Law
Review Commission would "supply a much-needed service now
96. Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-379, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 480 (emphasis
added).
97. Id. § 3(b).

98. The New York Law Revision Commission is charged by statute with the
following duties:
1. To examine the common law and statutes of the state and current
judicial decisions for the purpose of discovering defects and anachronisms in
the law and recommending needed reforms.
2. To receive and consider proposed changes in the law recommended by
the American law institute, the commissioners for the promotion of uniformity of legislation in the United States, any bar association or other learned
bodies.
3. To receive and consider suggestions from judges, justices, public officials, lawyers and the public generally as to defects and anachronisms in the
law.
4. To recommend, from time to time, such changes in the law as it deems
necessary to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and
to bring the law of this state, civil and criminal, into harmony with modem
conditions.
5. To report its proceedings annually to the legislature ... and, if it deems
advisable, to accompany its report with proposed bills to carry out any of its
recommendations.
N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1952).
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lacking in the legislative and administrative machinery of the District Government."99 It was observed:
Experience demonstrates that an active Corporation Counsel's office,
burdened with the day-to-day workload of litigation and accumulated administrative responsibilities, has little time or adequate facilities to undertake studies into legislative shortcomings, or to exercise
initiative in formulating recommendations for specific legislative
improvement."'
An important question in the establishment of the Law Review
Commission was what priority, if any, should be given to substantive criminal code revision among the many possible subject areas
in need of revision. Specifically, should substantive criminal code
revision take precedence over revision of the civil laws? In the two
initial bills proposing a law review commission' ° introduced in the
House of Representatives in May of 1973, civil and criminal code
revision were mentioned without any designation of priorities. However, in the hearings on these bills before the Judiciary Subcommittee of the House District Committee held on July 11, 1973, the
Committee was urged to require that criminal code revision receive
priority in order to finally implement the 1966 recommendation of
01 2
the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia.
99. REPORT, supra note 94, vol. 2, at 763.
100. Id. at 765. It was also stated that
[t]he work of law-revision commissions serves to supplement and assist, as
well as ultimately to strengthen, the resources available to the chief lawenforcement officials. There need be no conflict between the two; in fact,
there has been no occasion for incongruity but rather an opportunity for
meaningful cooperation between them. The District Corporation Counsel is
included among those that would be given a voice in the selection of members
of the Commission proposed for the District of Columbia.
Id.
101. H.R. 7412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (introduced by Congressman Diggs)
and H.R. 7658, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (introduced by Congressman Nelson).
102. See notes 54-57 & accompanying text supra. See also Statement of David
E. Aaronson, Chairman, Criminal Code Revision Committee, Young Lawyers Section, District of Columbia Bar Ass'n, before the Judiciary Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on the District of Columbia, on H.R. 7412 and H.R. 7658 establishing a Law
Revision Commission for the District of Columbia, July 11, 1973 (unpublished):
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Section 2 [of H.R. 7412] be amended to
include the following language in order to implement the recommendation
of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia (1966):
"In the review of both civil and criminal common law, statutes, and judicial
decisions, in receiving and considering proposed changes, and in making
recommendations for changes in the law, revision of the substantive criminal
law shall be accorded priority."
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In the subsequent combined bill, dated February 14, 1974, 13 criminal code revision was accorded priority over civil code revision:
In carrying out its duties under this Act, the Commission shall give
priority to the examination of the common law and statutes relating
to the criminal law in the District of Columbia, and all relevant
judicial decisions, for the purpose of discovering defects and anachronisms in the law relating to the criminal law in the District of
Columbia and recommending needed reforms, and this task shall be
completed before the Commission begins the examinationof the civil
law in the District of Columbia.' "
Subsequently, the House District Committee substituted "special
consideration" for "priority" and deleted the language requiring
that criminal code revision be completed before the commencement
of the examination of the civil law. 105 This change apparently was a
compromise between the position of Congressman Diggs and that of
Congressman Nelson, who expressed concern about the effect of the
stricter provision on the appointments, staffing, and broad base of
the Commission.' 8
The foregoing was a unanimously adopted resolution of the Criminal Code Revision
Committee. On July 26, 1973, the Executive Council of the Young Lawyers Section
formally considered the Committee's resolution, and voted to endorse it. Letter
from Lawrence S. Schwartz, Chairman, Executive Council, Young Lawyers Section, District of Columbia Bar Ass'n, to Congressman Fauntroy, Chairman of Judiciary Subcomm. of House District Comm., Aug. 14, 1973.
103. H.R. 12832, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (introduced by Congressman Diggs).
104. Id. § 3(a) (emphasis added).
105. Section 3(a), as amended, reads:
In carrying out its duties under this Act, the Commission shall give special
consideration to the examination of the common law and statutes relating
to the criminal law in the District of Columbia, and all relevant judicial
decisions, for the purpose of discovering defects and anachronisms in the law
relating to the criminal law in the District of Columbia and recommending
needed reforms.

Id.
106. Congressman Nelson's position was that
[a]s originally provided in H.R. 12832, the Commission could not undertake
the consideration of other matters until its examination of the criminal law
was "completed." I agree with and quote favorably from a letter written by
Frank J. Whalen, Jr.... :
This priority provision seems to me to preclude establishment of the Commission on a broad base commensurate with the all-encompassing purposes
described elsewhere in the legislation. Although the Commission should obviously devote a fair share of its attention to the criminal law, the effect of
the priority provision would cause the Commission, for at least the first two
years of its existence, and probably longer, to deal exclusively with criminal
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The accompanying House Report is explicit, however, in stating
that criminal code revision is to take precedence over civil code
revision.' 7 After observing that the District Council will receive
jurisdiction over the criminal code 24 months after it takes office in
January of 1975, the Report states:
Due to the longstanding need for criminal code revision, it is the
intention of the Committee that the Law Revision [sic] give special
consideration to the examination and recommendation for revision of
the criminal law. The Committee intends that while the Commission
need not deal exclusively with the criminal law, it should have substantially completed its work on criminalcode revision before turning
its attention to the civil law. The Commission should therefore to the
extent possible complete the long-needed recommendationsfor crimirevision before turning its attention to other areas of the
nal code
08
law.'

After a brief hearing on the House-passed bill,'' the Senate District Committee unanimously approved the bill on August 7, 1974,
using language identical to that in the House Report with respect
to the intended meaning and effect of the phrase "give special consideration to the examination" of the substantive criminal laws of
the District of Columbia.""
Two additional questions considered in the creation of the Law
Review Commission and their resolution are particularly worthy of
mention."' First, should the Law Review Commission be established as a permanent structure, or should it be given an initial trial
period subject to extension by Congress? Despite the fact that Conlaw. In my view, the appointments to the Commission will inevitably be
made with this in mind, and the staffing and funding of the Commission will
be similarly one-sided.
H.R. REP. No. 924, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974) (Additional Views of Representative Nelson).
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added).
109. See S. REP. No. 1076, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
110. Id. at 4.
111. A related issue concerned the residency of the proposed Commission members. The compromise language in the Act read as follows:
At least eight persons appointed to the Commission shall be bona fide residents of the District of Columbia who have maintained an actual place of
abode in the District of Columbia for at least the ninety days immediately
prior to their appointments as such members. The remaining persons appointed as members of the Commission shall be residents of the National
Capital Region ....

Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-379, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 480.
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gress can effectively destroy any such commission simply by withholding appropriations, and notwithstanding the fact that it was
recommended by the Commission on the Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia to be a permanent body,"' the
bill as enacted provides for a four-year life unless extended by Congress."' The Chairman of the Commission on Organization noted
that such retained control would effectuate the passage of the Law
Review Commission through both Houses of Congress."'
The second question concerns whether the funding of the new
Commission should come from moneys in the Treasury "credited to
the District of Columbia" or from general Treasury funds. The bill
reported out of the House District of Columbia Committee authorized money to be appropriated from general Treasury funds."' However, the passage of the bill in the House was prefaced by a heated
discussion about the propriety of committing federal funds for what
was seen to be an essentially local project."' Consequently, Congressman Nelson proposed a floor amendment, inserting after the
word "treasury" the phrase "credited to the District of Columbia.""' 7 Following approval of this amendment, the Law Review
112. See note 94 supra.
113. Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-379, § 4(b), 88 Stat. 480.
114. See H.R. REP. No. 924, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974) (Additional Views of
Representative Nelson):
It was not our desire to limit the life of the Commission, unless the Congress
in its judgment considered that it was failing to perform its duties as contemplated in such legislation. There is a similar provision in this bill, and I
believe it is a provision which enhances its passage in the House and the
Senate.
Id.
115. See H.R. 12832, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1974).
116. The following interchange between District Delegate Fauntroy and Representative Gross of Iowa shows the split of opinion on the question of federal funding:
Mr. Fauntroy ....

I think it would be unfair to ask the citizens of the

District of Columbia to assume the cost.
Mr. Gross. What is unfair about it? They have just been granted home rule.
What is unfair about the District of Columbia financing the revision of their
muncipal code? What is unfair about it?
Mr. Fauntroy. This is a Federal responsibility.
Mr. Gross. If this bill is approved, every municipality should be able to come
here and get funds. If any municipality in any congressional district wants
to revise its municipal codes, right here is the place to get the money. The
line forms on the left.
120 CONG. REc. 2,085-86 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1974).
117. Id. at 2,088. As amended, section 6 of the Act provides:
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Commission passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 220
to 119.111 The Commission then passed in the Senate without debate."'
The District of Columbia government has estimated that it will
cost $223,000 per year for the operation of the Commission-based
on salaries for 15 Commissioners, a staff of five professionals, clerical support, and normal operating, contractual, and travel expenses. Thus, the four-year cost of the Commission is estimated at
$892,000.120
While the new Law Review Commission certainly has 1a2 greater
chance of success than its more specialized predecessor, ' it will
nevertheless have many obstacles to overcome. The Commission is
superior to its predecessor, being wisely modeled after the very successful New York Law Revision Commission. 2 1 While the political
climate has changed, continuing resistance to the Commission
could still arise when appropriations are being considered. If Congress can reach agreement on appropriating funds, the Commission's work will likely produce a long overdue reform of both the civil
and criminal laws in the District. It is hoped that the two-year delay
in the transfer of jurisdiction over the criminal code to the District
Council will provide a sufficient impetus for the Commission to
actually give the criminal laws the "special consideration" which
they unquestionably require.
II.

NEEDS AND DIRECTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CODE REFORM:
GENERAL PROBLEM AREAS AND CODE DEFICIENCIES

What are the principal deficiencies of the substantive criminal
laws of the District of Columbia? This question is addressed in this
section by identifying and illustrating problems in the District of
Columbia criminal code which are counterproductive to the public
For the purpose of carrying out this Act, including the amendment made by
this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated, out of moneys in the Treasury creditedto the Districtof Columbia and not otherwise appropriated, such
amounts as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act.
H.R. 12832, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 6 (1974) (emphasis added).
118. 120 CONG. REc. 2,088-89 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1974).
119. 120 CONG. REC. 14,647 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1974).
120. S. REP. No. 1076, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). In the House Report, Congressman Nelson noted that the annual budget of the New York Law Revision
Commission was approximately $350,000. H.R. REP. No. 924, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
13 (1974) (additional Views of Representative Nelson).
121. See notes 65-75 & accompanying text supra.
122. See note 95 supra.
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ends which it should serve. The problem areas selected represent
aspects of the basic minimum standards of an effective criminal
code. It is submitted that the extent of their presence is an indicator
of the success or failure of the criminal code and suggestive of priorities for criminal code reform. The general problem areas are: 1)
absence of fair notice as to what constitutes criminal conduct; 2)
code provisions inconsistent with contemporary values; 3) absence
of a rational system of gradation and penalties; 4) overlapping and
confusing code provisions; 5) sexual discrimination; and 6) absence
of provisions in areas deserving protection of a criminal code.
The discussion is organized according to the Eibove general problem areas. No attempt is made to exhaustively categorize applicable
code sections. The approach is to describe the problem area, to
analyze general problems into components or sub-types where possible, and to clarify the nature and seriousness of the problem by
selecting representative or particularly interesting illustrations from
among the code sections. Frequently, one or two offenses are then
discussed in greater detail, both in relation to the particular problem and to appropriate remedies and directions for reform.
A. Absence of Fair Notice as to What Constitutes Criminal
Conduct
The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments

to the Constitution embody the values expressed in one of the fundamental principles of the American system of criminal justice: fair
notice as to the nature and scope of conduct declared to be criminal.
The absence of this notice in penal statutes has been somewhat
deterred by the "void for vagueness" doctrine developed by the
Supreme Court, imposing minimum standards for the degree of
notice required of the legislature in drafting statutes.,, The values
underlying this doctrine have been clearly articulated by the Court
in a recent case:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we as123. See generally Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MICH. L.

REv. 831 (1923); Amsterdam, Federal ConstitutionalRestrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing
Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CmrM. L. BULL. 205 (1967); Freund, The Use of
Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 437 (1921); Scott, ConstitutionalLimitations on Substantive CriminalLaw, 29 ROCKy MT. L. REv. 275 (1957); Note, The
Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
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sume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct,
we insist the laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. . . .Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to
"'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of
the forbidden areas were clearly marked."'' 4
This expression of the doctrine's premises is reflected in two fundamental notions inherent in the development of Anglo-American
criminal law: 1) that an individual is responsible to society for the
consequences of his volitional acts; and 2) that all persons should
receive equal treatment under the law. These twin objectives can
only be achieved by maximizing precise drafting of statutes in order
to give the citizen a clear choice between licit and illicit conduct,
and to minimize the potential for inequitable application of the
criminal laws which arises from an undue grant of discretion to
various officials charged with administering criminal justice.
It is submitted that an important test of the adequacy of a criminal code is its ability to perform this essential notice function. It is
also submitted that criminal statutes should be scrutinized in the
code revision process to insure not merely that the minimum due
process standards of fair notice are satisfied but that every effort has
been made to provide as clear notice as possible.
The District of Columbia's criminal code contains four major
problems tending to diminish this notice function. 2 5 The first is the
absence of any definition of offense elements in most code sections.
This problem is compounded where elements of offenses embody
confusing common law concepts and distinctions. The second problem arises from offense elements which are defined in vague, confusing terms. The third problem is a result of the absence of general
124. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
125. See Questionnaire on the Reform of the District of Columbia Substantive
Criminal Code, Response No. 50, Comment to Q. I A 1 (" 'Fair notice' is a
fiction."); id., Response No. 58, Comment to Q. II A 1 ("The D.C. Code is one of
the poorest I've ever seen."); id., Response No. 83, Comment to Q. IIA 1 ("This
is not a problem of 'fair notice' but rather a problem of solidifying and simplifying
the criminal sections of the code.") [hereinafter cited as Questionnaire].
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definitions, especially those governing the mental states which distinguish criminal from non-criminal conduct. The fourth failing of
the notice function is seen in the inadequate organization and indexing of criminal offenses.
1.

The absence of definitions of offense elements

While a number of provisions in the District's code fail to define
the elements of the offense, this omission obviously raises greater
problems in certain offense areas than in others. For example, a lack
of definition of the requisite elements for the offense of adultery is
not very serious since the offense's scope has changed little, if at all,
since first "codified" in the Ten Commandments." 6 On the other
hand, the scope of the offense of manslaughter has undergone considerable refinement since its common law origin in England., 7 Indeed, it is probably safe to say that few citizens other than practicing criminal attorneys, judges, and some law students could even
define the exact conduct encompassed by that offense in the District. 12 Yet, the code simply provides for punishment upon conviction of manslaughter, without even attempting to outline its reach
in the statute.
There are a number of provisions suffering from this infirmity-a
number sufficiently great to seriously impair the overall notice function of the code. Thus, mayhem, affray, assault, attempt, libel, and
escape are among those substantive offenses which are declared
criminal without statutory definition. 2 To charge all citizens with
knowledge of the law assumes that the scope of the criminal law is
generally known or ascertainable by one of ordinary intelligence.
When there is no readily available source for this information, this
assumption becomes especially unreasonable, particularly if applied to other than malum in se offenses. 3 '
126. Compare D.C. CODE § 22-301 (1973), with Exodus 20:14 (King James).
127. See generally notes 481-528 & accompanying text infra.
128. See Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 57, Comment to Q. II 2 b
("There presently is some confusion among judges as to whether there are two
manslaughters (voluntary & involuntary)-this confusion should be settled-at
common law there was one which could be committed two ways.").
129. D.C. CODE § 22-506 (1973) (mayhem); id. § 22-1101 (affray); id. §§ 22-501
-05 (assault); id. § 22-103 (attempt); id. §§ 22-2301-03 (libel); id. § 22-2601
(prison breach).
130. It may be argued that malum in se offenses do not require the degree of
notice of malum prohibitum offenses because they are generally known and proscribed by standards of community morality. However, the scope of the conduct
legally proscribed may differ from that generally morally proscribed. Also, since
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A criminal proscription summarily declared without limiting or
explanatory language to describe the full reach of the offense fails
to be "sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties
"131

2.

Offense elements defined in vague, confusing terms

A second defect in the District of Columbia's criminal code impairing its notice function is evident where the legislature has set
out offense elements but the definitions are either insufficiently
explicit in clarifying the offense's scope or do not fully reflect the
body of case law 'defining the offense's total reach. In either case,
the attempt at clarification has contributed little to the full explication of the conduct proscribed or has actually furthered confusion
surrounding the offense.
An illustration of an archaic definition of an offense element is
provided by the rape statute. That section reads in part, "Whoever
has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will
.... -132 While the actus reus of the offense clearly requires that
the act be by force and without the consent of the female, it is deficient in totally outlining the conduct which may be sanctioned
under the statute. The essential element of the offense, carnal
knowledge, is a vague term of biblical origin which, when included
in a penal statute, may represent the antithesis of precise drafting.
Not only does the term fail to give clear notice that sexual intercourse is required, but it does not indicate that the definition of
intercourse for rape entails the mere penetration of the female's
labia majora without requiring that the male achieve emission.133
Thus, the use of the term "carnal knowledge" does little, if anyone of the functions of a criminal code is to reinforce community conceptions of
minimum standards, the argument involves an element of circular reasoning. Cf.
notes 156-70 & accompanying text infra.
131. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (Oklahoma statute prohibiting state contractors from paying their employees less than the "current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed" held void
for vagueness).
132. D.C. CODE § 22-2801 (1973). See also Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 60, Comment to Q. II 3 a ("Forcible rape should be separated from
carnal knowledge ... should be explicit in requiring sexual intercourse."); Appendix infra.
133. See Wheeler v. United States, 93 U.S. App. D.C. 159, 211 F.2d 19, cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954); United States v. Fuller, 243 F. Supp. 203 (D.D.C.
1965).

244

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:207

thing, to describe the essential element of the actus reus.
Additionally, the term "forcibly and against her will" does not
fully describe the conduct within the scope of the statute. In fact,
that limiting phrase is affirmatively misleading in light of the judicial interpretation it has received. Thus, the force element has often
been diminished by emphasis placed upon the element of lack of
consent.'34 Rape may be committed without force if the mere threat
of use of serious force is present. 3 ' Likewise, the statute may include
sexual intercourse without force if the female is incapable of granting consent in cases where she has been drugged or is incompetent
by reason of mental infirmity. 38 The "notice" thus given by the
section is inconsistent with its scope in that force is not always a
requisite element.
134. In cases where consent has been induced by threats of force, the courts have

held that the apparent consent will be no defense to the rape charge even though

no force was actually used. See, e.g., McGuinn v. United States, 89 U.S. App. D.C.
197, 199, 191 F.2d 477, 479 (1951):
The court properly instructed the jury "there must be an absence of consent
unless the consent is induced by putting the woman in fear of grave bodily
harm or death or by the exercise of actual physical force against her person."
Id.
135. See, e.g., id.; Ewing v. United States, 77 U.S. App. D.C. 14, 16, 135 F.2d
633, 635 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 776 (1943):
There are cases, especially older ones from other jurisdictions, which seem
to require resistance to the victim's ultimate physical powers in order to
sustain conviction for this crime. But the law is no longer in this last-ditch
stage. Whatever it may have been in other times, it is generally settled now
that consent is not shown when the evidence discloses resistance is overcome
by threats which put the woman in fear of death or grave bodily harm, or by
these combined with some degree of physical force.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See also Farrar v. United States, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 204, 212, 275 F.2d 868, 876
(1960) (Prettyman, C.J., Memorandum on Petition for Rehearing in Banc):
A girl cannot simply say, "I was scared," and thus transform an apparent
consent into a legal non-consent which makes the man's act a capital offense.
She must have a reasonable apprehension, as I understand the law, of something real; her fear must be not fanciful but substantial.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
But the fear inducing apparent consent may be a "general fear of her assailant,"
as opposed to fear induced by a specific threat. See Johnson v. United States, 138
U.S. App. D.C. 174, 426 F.2d 651 (1970).
136. See, e.g., Sanselo v. United States, 44 App. D.C. 508, 510 (1916):
Even in the case of a woman, where the element of force is an essential
ingredient of the crime, it is no defense that she did not protest or resist, if,
in fact, by reason of drunkenness, stupefaction, or idiocy, she was incapable
of yielding consent.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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The statute also fails to give notice as to certain other elements.
While the actor is simply described by the neuter term "Whoever,"
the qualifying phrase "has carnal knowledge of a female," when
taken together with the fact that carnal knowledge is limited to
sexual intercourse, indicates that the offense may only be committed directly by a male. 13 7 Although the statute does not exclude

married couples from its coverage, nor has any case explicitly so
held, the statute does describe the common law offense which included this exception. 38 Finally, one of the most controversial issues
of the offense, the requisite evidentiary element of corroboration of
the victim's testimony, is omitted from the statute entirely.13'
Read in light of the interpretative case law, the rape statute fails
in three ways to fulfill its notice function. Several significant elements of the offense are entirely absent from the provision's definition. The central element of the offense, sexual intercourse, is defined in a term too vague to add any clarity to the generic term
"rape." And, the gravest failure of the provision is found in the
element of force which misleads citizens into believing that the rape
must be forcible, while, in fact, it need not be if it is against the
victim's will. "°
137. A female may, however, commit the crime of rape of another female when
acting as an accessory to a male perpetrator. See, e.g., State v. Pikel, 116 Wash.
600, 200 P. 316 (1921).
138. Compare D.C. CODE § 22-2801 (1973), with R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 152,
156 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as R. PERKINS].
139. Corroboration is required in the District of Columbia as to both the corpus
delecti of the offense and the identity of the assailant. See, e.g., Allison v. United
States, 133 U.S. App. D.C. 159, 409 F.2d 445 (1969); In re W.E.P., 318 A.2d 186
(D.C. Ct. App. 1974). But see United States v. Arnold (D.C. Super. Ct., Crim. No.
45274-73, Jan. 14, 1974), wherein Newman, J., held that corroboration was no
longer required in the District of Columbia; this decision, however, was not binding
on other Superior Court judges unless approved by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals. See also Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 56, Comment to
Q. II 3 a ("Corroboration requirement is outrageous-only assault so requiring-vestige of day where crime less relevant-serious impediment to needed prosecution."); id., Response No. 48, Comment to Q. H 3 a ("Recent decision in U.S. v.
Wiley [160 U.S. App. D.C. 281, 492 F.2d 547 (1973) (independent corroboration of
carnal knowledge insufficient for conviction)] . . . is an outrage. Corroboration
requirement should be dropped."); Appendix infra.
140. The drafters of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code had little difficulty in
including these elements in their proposed rape sections.
Rape.
(1) Offense. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife
is guilty of rape if:
(a) he compels her to submit by force, or by threat of imminent death,
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Another illustration of an inadequate definition of offense elements can be found in the false pretenses statute.' While the
lengthy provisions delineate several means by which the offense can
be committed, the essential offense does not completely define the
requisite elements. In general, false pretenses requires: 1) a false
pretense or representation of a past or existing material fact; 2) the
actor's knowledge of the falsity; 3) a specific intent to defraud; 4)
reliance by the victim upon the actor's false pretense or
representation; and 5) defrauding or obtaining of value.' Yet the
generic section of the statute only provides, "Whoever, by any false
pretense, with intent to defraud, obtains from any person any service or anything of value .... ,,1
This definition omits two essential elements: the defendant's
knowledge of the falsity and the victim's reliance thereon. A further
infirmity in that statute's definition is that it fails to note the requirement that the pretense or representation be in regard to a past
serious bodily injury, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on any human being;
(b) he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control her

conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge intoxicants or
other means with intent to prevent resistance; or
(c)
the victim is less than ten years old.
(2) Grading. Rape is Class A felony if in the course of the offense the actor
inflicts serious bodily injury upon the victim, or if his conduct violates
subsection (1)(c), or if the victim is not a voluntary companion of the actor
and has not previously permitted him sexual liberties. Otherwise rape is a
Class B felony.
PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 3, § 1641.
Gross Sexual Imposition.

A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of a
Class Cfelony if:
(a) he knows that she suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders
her incapable of understanding the nature of her conduct;
(b) he knows that she is unaware that a sexual act is being committed upon

her, or knows that she submits because she mistakenly supposes that he is
her husband; or
(c) he compels her to submit by any threat that would render a female of
reasonable firmness incapable of resisting.
Id. § 1642.

Definitions for Sections 1641 to 1649.
In sections 1641 to 1649:
(a) "sexual intercourse" occurs upon penetration, however slight; emission
is not required.
Id. § 1649.
141. D.C. CODE § 22-1301 (1973).
142. See Hymes v. United States, 260 A.2d 679, 680 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970).
143. D.C. CODE § 22-1301 (1973).
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or existing thing, rather than merely a false promise."' In failing to
describe all but a few of the offense's elements, the legislature affirmatively misleads the public into believing that the scope of the
offense is broader than the actual offense. The conclusion is warranted that the failure to provide initial adequate drafting and the
failure to continuously review the code to insure that it reflects the
present state of the law offends the values underlying the due process clause. Law enforcement officials and private citizens should
not be required to read through the case law in the hopes of finding
a clear statement of the basic elements of criminal offenses. As the
Supreme Court stated, "No one may be required at peril of life,
liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.
All are entitled to be informed as to what the state commands or
forbids."''
3.

Absence of definitions of general criminal law principles

The legislature has never attempted to codify general principles
of criminal law.'46 At present, the criminal code contains only two
general definitions: one governing "writing" and "paper,' 47 the
other, "anything of value."'' 4 These would seem inadequate even
without considering the fact that neither definition has been revised
since first codified in 1901, while the subject area to which they refer
has evolved radically.14 1 Jurisdictions recently revising their codes
have included detailed general definitions. 5 0
At a minimum, the District's code should include a comprehensive definition of mens rea. The present code uses almost every
imaginable formulation in its various provisions, such as "will144. The misrepresentation must relate to a material fact existing at the time
the statement is made. See Chaplin v. United States, 81 U.S. App. D.C. 80, 157
F.2d 697 (1946). See also Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 59, Comment to Q. H 10 g ("False pretenses in addition should be made out where the
provision is of future action just the same as larceny by trick. The distinction is
meaningless."); Appendix infra.
145. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (statute penalizing one
for being a "gangster" unconstitutionally vague).
146. However, the General Index of the D.C. Code lists some 50 specific definitions provided in title 22, ranging from "wild animals," D.C. CODE § 22-1628 (1973),
to "sado-masochistic abuse," id. § 22-2001.

147. Id. § 22-101.
148. Id. § 22-102.

149. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
150. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-3 (1972); Ky. REv. STAT.
090 (Baldwin 1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (McKinney 1967).

ANN. §

433A.1-
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fully," "maliciously," "deliberately," "knowingly," "unlawfully,"
and "intentionally." There is no need for a proliferation of confusing
terms describing required mental states.
The drafters of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code have expressly included a definitional scheme for such mens rea elements:
(1) Kinds of Culpability. A person engages in conduct:
(a) "intentionally" if, when he engages in the conduct, it is hi
purpose to do so;
(b) "knowingly" if, when he engages in the conduct, he knows or
has a firm belief unaccompanied by substantial doubt that he is
doing so, whether or not it is his purpose to do so;
(c) "recklessly" if he engages in the conduct in conscious and
clearly unjustifiable disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence of the relevant facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross
deviation from acceptable standards of conduct, except that, as provided in section 502, awareness of the risk is not required where its
absence is due to voluntary intoxication;
(d) "negligently" if he engages in the conduct in unreasonable
disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence of the relevant
facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross deviation from acceptable standards of conduct; and
(e) "willfully" if he engages in the conduct intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
(2) Where Culpability Not Specified. If a statute or regulation
thereunder defining a crime does not specify any culpability and does
not provide explicitly that a person may be guilty without culpability, the culpability that is required is willfully. Except as otherwise
expressly provided or unless the context otherwise requires, if a statute provides that conduct is an infraction without including a requirement of culpability, no culpability is required."'
Naturally, the codification of general principles should not be
limited to the various mens rea elements. For example, the Proposed Federal Criminal Code also includes definitions of mens rea
151. PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 3, §§ 302(1), (2). In addition,
the drafters indicated that doubt as to whether the mens rea should be applied to
each element of the offense should be resolved in favor of the defendant, excepting
express statutory language to the contrary:
Except as otherwise expressly provided, where culpability is required, that
kind of culpability is required with respect to every element of the conduct
and to those attendant circumstances specified in the definition of the offense, except that where the required culpability is "intentionally," the culpability required as to an attendant circumstance is "knowingly."
Id. § 302(3)(a).
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defenses-ignorance or mistake of fact or law-and causal relation1 2
ship between conduct and result.

1

There is some controversy as to whether afficmative defenses
should be codified or left to judicial development.1 3 Accepting, arguendo, the latter position, it should be noted that
the use of language of defenses in criminal statutes is an indispensable draftsman's tool. The criminal process as a whole is put in a more
accurate light if certain elements are identified as matters of defense.'
For example, in regard to theft offenses, after setting forth the definition of the offense, revisers could include references to specific
defenses such as claim of right or intra-spousal property.155
Requiring such provisions serves a number of important functions
in the administration of criminal justice. First and foremost, general
definitions provide clear notice to citizens as to what conduct on
their part will be considered unacceptable under the code as well as
qualifying that conduct by describing its necessary concomitant
152. Id. §§ 303-06.
153. See generally Cosway, The Revised Washington Criminal Code's Vital
Structure: The Burden of Proof, Felony Murder, and JustificationProvisions, 48
WASH. L. &ev.57 (1972); Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A ComparativeStudy
of Burden-of-PersuasionPracticesin CriminalCases, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968); Hall,
Science and Morality of CriminalLaw, 9 ARIz. L. REV. 360 (1968). See also Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 53, Comment to Q. III A 9 ("It is an area
where I think it would be a shame to stifle common law development, though some
codification-if not made the exclusive source of law-might be helpful."); id.,
Response No. 64, Comment to Q. III A 9 ("On the one hand, there are all varieties
of justification in terms of lesser evil which should be provided for (& more broadly
than at common law). On the other hand, it would be a mistake to try to anticipate
in definition every sort of such justification that may arise.").
154. See Cosway, The Revised Washington CriminalCode's Vital Structure:The
Burden of Proof, Felony Murder, and JustificationProvisions, 48 WASH. L. REv.
57, 59 (1972).
155. The drafters of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code included the following
defenses to the theft provisions:
It is a defense to a prosecution under sections 1732 to 1738 that:
(a) the actor honestly believed that he had a claim to the property or
services involved which he was entitled to assert in the manner which forms
the basis for the charge against him; or
(b) the victim is the actor's spouse, but only when the property involved
constitutes household or personal effects or other property normally accessible to both spouses and the parties involved are living together. The term
"spouse," as used in this section, includes persons living together as man and
wife.
PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 3, § 1739(1).
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mental state. Secondly, officials charged with the administration of
the criminal laws are given clear standards by the legislature to
apply to their roles in the system. Thirdly, comprehensive definitions will promote equitable administration of justice by maximizing uniform interpretation of the criminal code.
4. Inadequacies in the organization and indexing of criminal
offenses
Three organizational inadequacies in the present code contribute
to a diminution of the code's notice function. They are: 1) an inadequate general index for the code; 2) the alphabetical arrangement
of offenses in title 22; and 3) the proliferation of criminal offenses
in virtually every title of the code.
A major problem is the general index of the code. 5 ' It is evident
that it is both outdated and inadequate in performing its task. Code
provisions long eliminated and no longer found in the code are still
carried in the index. 157 Likewise, the index is only useful if one
already knows the precise term used for the information one is seeking. Cross references are few and far between, and the wisdom of the
choice of many of the index categories is certainly questionable.'
The criminal code in the District is basically arranged alphabetically by offense name, although even that scheme has deteriorated
as sections have been gradually amended, eliminated, or added over
the years since the 1901 codification.'' Yet, the alphabetical system
has been largely rejected by the many jurisdictions which have recently revised their codes.' 0
156. See Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 2, Comment to Q. Ell A 1
("The Code index is terrible."); id., Response No. 77, Comment to Q. V ("I believe
the biggest problem to the practicing lawyer is the lack of a good index to the

code.").

157. For example, the Index refers to a provision penalizing advertisement of
abortifacient drugs or instruments deleted from the code in 1967 by the Act of Dec.
27, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-226, § 606, 81 Stat. 738.
158. The General Index to the Code has a general heading of "Criminal Offenses," followed by about seven pages of offenses. Yet, while "Vehicles, larceny from"
is listed, there is no general "Larceny" section. Instead, one must know in advance
that the District retains "Grand" and "Petit Larceny" and look under those headings for the code section.
159. When originally codified in 1901, the code was arranged by social problem
area, the arrangement currently used by revisors of criminal codes. See text accompanying notes 48 & 49 supra.
160. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. tit. 53a (1972); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. chs.

433D-34G (Baldwin 1974).
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In fact, the inadequacies of the alphabetical arrangement of offenses in a criminal code were identified as early as 1915 by at least
one legal scholar in this country.
Unless one knows in advance the denomination chosen for each
offense, the alphatbetical [sic] arrangement adds nothing to the
facility of reference; it looks cheap and mechanical, and generally
goes hand in hand with inferior care and skill in definition.''
The alternative suggested therein, and the one most widely adopted
by contemporary drafters, is an offense classification scheme reflecting the various interests protected by the offenses. Such a system
seems superior both for the legal practitioner and the citizen in
terms of providing ready access to relevant sections and notice of the
various provisions relating to similar interests and conduct.
While Part IV of the District of Columbia Code purports to encompass criminal law and procedure in the included three titles,
literally scores of criminal provisions are scattered throughout the
rest of the code.' 62 In addition, other criminal offenses which the
Congress has authorized the District government to enact are found
in two completely separate publications: Police Regulations of the
District of Columbia" 3 and Highways and Traffic Regulations." 4
While the bifurcation of legislative jurisdiction over the District
of Columbia may excuse the second problem, the former seems to
be unnecessary and could be easily remedied. The vast majority of
the penal provisions found in various parts of the code are misdemeanor sanctions for violations of regulatory provisions. Those cases
are normally addressed to a limited group of citizens subject to the
regulations. An example of this can be seen in the requirement that
no persons practice as certified public accountants without having
been so certified.'65 While criminal sanctions attach to a violation
of that section, the fact that the sanctions are found in title 2 of the
code instead of title 22 does not seem to present a serious notice
problem.
161. Freund, Classification and Definition of Crimes, 5 J. CRm. L. 807, 809
(1915).
162. See D.C. CODE, General Index, at 3297-304 (1973) (criminal offenses).
See also Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 70, Comment to Q. ll A 1
(".

.

. regulatory offenses only belong in a Code if serious, otherwise should be

petty offenses with special procedures & no possibility of imprisonment.").
163. Cf. D.C. CODE §§ 1-224-26 (1973) (police power comparable to that of a
state delegated to District of Columbia Council).
164. Cf. id. § 40-601 (authority over highways and traffic regulation delegated
to District of Columbia Council).
165. Id. §§ 2-911-31.
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Yet, provisions concerning a broader group of citizens should not
be left under a regulatory heading but should be consolidated within
the general criminal offense area of the code. To require citizens to
find the definition and sanctions for public drinking under the title
of the code concerning Alcoholic Beverage Control, ' or concerning
negligent vehicular homicide in the title governing regulation of
traffic,'67 or even the entire scheme of sanctions involving drugs in
completely different chapters of the title on Food and Drugs,'68
seems unreasonable. Should the numerous citizens who either drink
alcoholic beverages, drive cars, or come in contact with various
drugs in the District desire to be informed as to the requirements
of the criminal law, they are forced to discover these criminal provisions amid myriad non-criminal regulatory statutes.' 9
Criminal offenses which are addressed to the general public's be166. See id. §§ 25-127-28.
167. See id. §§ 40-606-08.
168. See id. §§ 33-401-25; id. §§ 33-701-12.
169. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Blackwell, 102 WASH. L. RPMr. 1681 (D.C.
Super. Ct., Crim. No. 44293-74, July 26, 1974):
The defendant is charged with "running a yellow light," a violation of...
the Highways and Traffic Regulations ....

The Court had never heard of

the regulation and since it requires a substantial change in the driving habits
of motorists in the District of Columbia, the Court took the matter under
advisement to determine if the regulation had been properly promulgated.
An examination of the records reveals that it was.
Id,
The issue of notice raised by this case was commented upon in a Washington Post
editorial.
Most people who drive in the District are probably not aware of the D.C.
regulation 74-4 ....

But many drivers may be finding out about that little

legal change the hard way in the months ahead, because regulation 74-4
outlaws a common habit of the local road: running a yellow light.
One driver, ticketed for violating this rule, took his case to court recently
and pleaded innocent on grounds that he had not heard of the new law.
Superior Court Judge Tim Murphy had not heard of it either, so he checked
and there it was, properly passed by the City Council. . . and signed by
Mayor Washington ....

(For the record, this newspaper reported the coun-

cil's action on March 6 in two sentences in the fourth paragraph of a story
headlined, "Council Votes Regulation of Repair Shops.")
The aim is to reduce traffic jams by discouraging motorists from rushing
to beat a red light. .

.

. But the effect of this attempt at reform depends on

public education, and so far it seems that the word has not gotten around.
In an informal survey at several local intersections the other day, we saw 22
vehicles approach a comer as the light turned yellow-and 17 of those vehicles went right on through.
Wash. Post, Sept. 3, 1974, § A, at 10, col. 1.
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havior should be consolidated. Criminal sanctions regulating a particular class of persons who know, or by reason of their particular
status should know, the nature, scope and penalties of code provisions governing their conduct do not present as serious a notice
problem. Perhaps such regulatory sanctions can be maintained in
code sections including the entire regulatory scheme, assuming,
however, that an adequate general index to the code can be devised
to ensure that notice is given that non-compliance with certain regulations will subject one to criminal sanctions."'
The other problem, publication of criminal offenses enacted
under the authority of the District of Columbia government in
sources other than the code, is more difficult. Yet, the advent of
home rule for the District of Columbia may eventually eliminate
this problem when the legislative power to criminalize conduct is
consolidated in one legislative body.17 1 Code revision should be undertaken with an eye toward the advisability of incorporating, at
least by reference, this additional body of regulatory offenses into
the code of District law.
Code revision in the District of Columbia should certainly include
consideration of alternative methods of improving the code's effectiveness as a working document. Without coherency of organization
and ready access aids, the benefits of substantive revision cannot be
fully realized.
B.

Code ProvisionsInconsistent with Contemporary Values

This section deals chiefly with the failure of the District's criminal code to proscribe only that behavior which is in fact unacceptable to a substantial majority of the community. The specific problems which will be examined are: 1) code provisions for which there
is no longer a particularized need; 2) code provisions proscribing
behavior which is no longer clearly unacceptable to the community;
and 3) code provisions which have been or are likely to be held
unconstitutional.
1. Archaic provisions
One of the major problems which an antiquated code presents is
the plethora of special provisions enacted by the legislature to curb
170. See notes 156-58 & accompanying text supra.
171. One of the sections of the recent Law Review Commission Act requires the
District government to promulgate a municipal code cross-indexed to the present
Code. See Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-379, § 5, 88 Stat. 480.
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a particularized social harm.' This "patchwork" method of ad hoc
resolution of narrow or short term social problems is the antithesis
of the contemporary approach to codifying the criminal law.' Instead of specialized statutes, often drafted and enacted without
consideration of consistency with other code provisions, contemporary code revision involves the use of more comprehensive provisions, broadly defining certain proscribed conduct in a given offense
area and relying upon a clear definitional framework to guide specific application. 4
The District of Columbia's criminal code contains a number of
provisions which are no longer applicable to contemporary society
or which are included within more comprehensive provisions. An
example of the former type is the section concerning duelling. 5
While the control of duelling may have been a concern in the District even as late as the turn of the century when the provisions were
codified,'78 clearly such conduct no longer presents a significant social problem. Even if it were to be argued that duelling may return
to popularity, it is clear that the normal assault and homicide provisions would adequately treat the problem.
172. See NATIONAL ADvisoRY

COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,

REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 173

(1973):

Successive legislatures in each State reacted to new economic and social
problems, not by a thorough recodification but by individual statutes to meet
specific cases.
Id.
The Commission's remedy for this problem was to recommend continuing code
revision.
Much of the confusion in criminal law coverage in States that have not
revised their criminal statutes recently is the product of random, uncoordinated legislation enacted over many years of legislative sessions. The confusion can be prevented or controlled only by requiring that all bills be reviewed
promptly to determine whether they actually are needed. When changing
conditions create new needs, new code provisions are necessary.
Id. at 195.
173. For an example of this evolution in drafting style, compare MODEL PENAL
CODE §§ 220.1-.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), with D.C. CODE §§ 22-401-04
(1973). See also H. MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCAL RECONSTRUCTION 20307 (1967) (the "Generalklauseln"approach to the drafting of criminal offenses).
174. See notes 255-64 infra.
175. See D.C. CODE § 22-1102-04 (1973). See also Questionnaire, supra note
125, Response No. 52, Comment to Q. I 13 f ("I'm not sure society could not
possibly continue to exist without this statute."); id., Response No. 62, Comment
to Q. 113 f ("It's a good law to have just in case!"); id., Response No. 65, Comment
to Q. H113 f ("Repeal-silly to have a special section."); Appendix infra.
176. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, §§ 852-54, 31 Stat. 1328.
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Additionally, there are a number of provisions regulating conduct
involving horses which were promulgated at a time when they were
the principal means of transportation.177 As many contemporary
codes contain special provisions regarding motor vehicles,' chiefly
because their proliferation makes them a special social problem,
older codes dealt extensively with the use of horses and horse drawn
carriages. In view of the substantial decrease in the number of
horses in the District of Columbia, it would seem that these special
statutes are mere surplusage and should be eliminated. Any problems concerning the District's minute horse population can probably be dealt with by more comprehensive provisions concerning cruelty to animals and traffic control.'
Other provisions, such as theft of certain scarce commodities during wartime, 0 were enacted for short-term problems and should not
be retained in the absence of a continuing need for their specific
coverage. Such provisions often do not add to the coverage of more
general provisions, but provide additional sanctions during times
when the problem is acute. 8 ' Such added protection could be more
easily obtained by amending the general sentencing provisions to
include the specific circumstances as an aggravating factor in the
offense.1 2 This solution would accomplish the legislative purpose of
providing an added deterrent without unnecessarily cluttering the
criminal code with specialized statutes of limited duration.
These archaic provisions do not present a problem of variance
with contemporary morality or of discretionary enforcement; they
are simply no longer needed.' These provisions are probably the
177. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-814 (1973) (docking tails of horses). See generally
id. §§ 22-801-14; this chapter, dealing with cruelty to animals, is basically designed to prevent overwork of animals, not malicious cruelty.
178. See, e.g., id. § 22-2204; MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.9 (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
179. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.11 (Proposed Offical Draft 1962).
180. D.C. CODE § 22-2204a (1973) (only applicable when "any restrictions on the
sale or use of any of the articles... are in effect pursuant to any law of the United

States").
181. The conduct proscribed in section 22-2204a is also covered by section § 222202 (petit larceny). However, the former section provides a sentence of up to three
years, while the latter is limited to a fine of $200 and a sentence of up to one year.
182. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(grading of theft offenses).
183. The enforcement of such a statute after long disuse may, however, raise an
aspect of equal protection of the laws known as the doctrine of desuetude. See A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLMCS

143-56 (1962); Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement,

256
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easiest to recognize because of their contrast with modern conditions. They are also the easiest problems to remedy; they may be
simply eliminated from the code without any loss of control over
truly harmful behavior.
2. Provisions inconsistent with contemporary morality
The criminal code can maintain its legitimacy only through regulating conduct in a manner consistent with the predominant,
fundaniental views of the community. In retaining provisions criminalizing conduct acceptable by a majority or even a substantial
minority, the legislature places an intolerable strain on law enforcement officials. When the "criminal" conduct is engaged in by a
considerable number of the community's members, it is impossible
to apply the sanctions uniformly. The resulting patterns of selective
enforcement greatly diminish the deterrent value of the code and
respect for law enforcement in general.'
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has recently recommended that, particularly in
regard to offenses of this nature, "the criminal code should reflect
a more rational attitude toward current social practices and a more
realistic appraisal of the capabilities of the criminal justice system.""' The Commission therefore recommended
that States reevaluate their laws on gambling, marijuana use and
possession for use, pornography, prostitution, and sexual acts between consenting adults in private. Such reevaluation should determine if current laws best serve the purpose of the State and the needs
of the public. 8 '
After considering the general ineffectiveness of incarceration as a
49 IowA L. REV.389 (1964); Rodgers & Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IOWA
L. Rav. 1 (1966). Whether this doctrine has been accepted by the Supreme Court
is in doubt. Compare Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924)
(law passed to meet emergency may become invalid when situation changes even
if valid when enacted), with District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346
U.S. 100 (1953) (1873 law compelling restaurant service of non-whites upheld despite its long disuse).
184. See generally K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JusTcE-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

(1969); Tieger, PoliceDiscretionand DiscriminatoryEnforcement, 1971 DUKE L.J.
717; Wright, Beyond DiscretionaryJustice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1971). See also District of Columbia v. Walters, 319 A.2d 332 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974); notes 13-23 &
accompanying text supra.
185. NATIONAL ADvisoRY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALs,

A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDucE CRimE 132 (1973).
186. Id.
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deterrent to these offenses, the Commission further recommended
that, as a minimum, each State remove incarceration as a penalty for
these offenses, except in the case of persistent and repeated offenses
by an individual, when incarceration for a limited period may be
warranted.'
The District of Columbia has numerous provisions in its criminal
code concerning this sort of conduct-the so-called "victimless
crime." 1 8 Criminal sanctions in the code probably will not deter
fornication,8 9 consensual sodomy,' adultery,'' prostitution,'9 2 pornography,'93 gambling,'9 4 or use of marijuana. 9 ' Such acts, when
187. Id.

188. See Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 64, Comment to Q. III A
4 ("I don't know what 'contemporary values' are. I do know that criminal law has
no business dealing with private morals: sex ....
189. D.C. CODE § 22-1002 (1973).

drugs, suicide, etc.").

190. Id. § 22-3502.
191. Id. § 22-301.
192. Id. §§ 22-2701-22. See WASHINGTON

LAwYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVII, RIGHTS
UNDER LAW, LEGALIZED NUMBERS IN WASHINGTON: IMPLICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
LAW ENFORCEMENT, Cw RIGHTS, AND CONTROL BY THE COMMUNITY, App. C, at 24

(1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGALIZED NUMBERS IN WASHINGTON]:
A general conclusion which can be drawn from these data and those presented in the
appendix is that the sample favored legalization and regulation of prostitution, considered the spread of venereal disease as a major concern, and rejected the notion that
prostitution enforcement should be limited only to certain types of offenders, e.g., only
streetwalkers or only procurers. In addition, the officers sampled rejected items which
suggested that prostitution simply be ignored o-that enforcement be maintained as it
is currently.

Id.
193. D.C. CODE § 22-2001 (1973).
194. Id. §§ 22-1501-15. See LEGALIZED NUMBERS IN WASHINGTON, supra note 192,
at 28:
Based upon the tables presented and others too numerous to include, we
may conclude that the majority of the sample approve of a legalized lottery
(87%); that over 80 percent agree that gambling should be licensed and taxed
by the District; that police resources should be redeployed toward more seri-

ous offenses; and that virtually all agreed that "Gambling will always be
around regardless of the law ..

Id.
195. D.C. CODE §§ 33-401-25 (1973). The national problem regarding enforcement of the marijuana laws is increasing. Over 400,000 persons were arrested on
marijuana charges in 1973, an increase of some 100,000 over the preceding year.
See Wash. Post, July 22, 1974, § A, at 2, col. 3. As a result, many state legislatures
have been considering alternatives to the present means of enforcement, including
diminishment of penalties for possession or use of marijuana. See, e.g., ORE. REV.
STAT. § 167.207(3) (1974) (limiting penalty for possession of an ounce or less of
marijuana to $100 fine). See also note 19 supra.
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committed by consenting adults in private, do not present a threat
to social order and serve to divert law enforcement resources from
more harmful conduct.196 However, it has been noted that
there are at least four legitimate purposes of the criminal law which
are served by some of the sections which had their genesis in the
regulation of morality: (1) prevention of direct physical injury to
others (e.g., forcible sodomy, cruelty to children, indecent act on a
minor child); (2) prevention of even non-forcible'sexual contact with
children who are too young to understand and cope with such conduct
(e.g., indecent act on a minor child where force is not involved, statutory rape); (3) prevention of public nuisance (e.g., indecent exposure,
fornication in public); (4) as a means to combat other evils (e.g., the
involvement of prostitution in muggings, con games, drug traffic,
etc.) .'9
Nevertheless, in many prosecutions for these so-called "victimless
crimes," the "victim" whose sensibilities have allegedly been outraged by this conduct is an undercover policeman.'98 The nature of
196. See Rittenour v. District of Columbia, 163 A.2d 558 (D.C. Mun. App. 1960),
wherein the court, despite clear legislative intent to the contrary, construed D.C.
CODE § 22-1112(a) (1951) (lewd, indecent, or obscene acts) as not applicable to acts
between consenting adults in private.
197. P. Friedman, Crimes Against Morals and Social Welfare 1 (1972) (unpublished memorandum presented to the D.C. Criminal Code Revision Comm., Young
Lawyers Section, D.C. Bar Ass'n).
198. In regard to solicitation for sodomy cases, one Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Columbia who has handled numerous such cases has
confidentially provided the following description of a typical case:
Usually the "victim" of the solicitation is a young police officer selected for
his probable appeal to homosexuals; the "victim" lingers in parks, gay bars,
or lavatories until he has whetted the appetite of the "criminal." This having
been accomplished the officer offers no resistance until the proposition is
made. The investigation of homosexual solicitation and sodomy may well
turn on the fact that the police do not like homosexuals, not the fact that
the conduct is illegal or that it affronts the public.
Indeed, if one has been to the area of Rock Creek Park (the 2600 block of
Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.) from which most homosexual sodomy cases
emanate, one knows it is hardly public. The gay community and the Metropolitan Police are the only ones likely to endure the treacherous terrain in
search of fleeting, anonymous liaisons.
The law should be written to avoid this sort of invitation to selective
enforcement growing out of an individual, if not institutional bias against
homosexuals.
Some have suggested that punishing non-commercial homosexual solicitation affronts free speech and equal protection.
See also Guarro v. United States, 99 U.S. App. D.C. 97, 237 F.2d 578 (1956) (assault
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the activities are such that only a rare case will be brought by the
complaint of a private citizen. Thus, not only do the sanctions fail
to operate as effective deterrents, but the enforcement of these provisions requires the expenditure of an extraordinary amount of effort
by law enforcement officials.'99
Without considering the relative merits of pure decriminalization
of such conduct, it may be said that a number of factors militate
against the retention of such offenses. Ineffective and, at best, selective enforcement, failure of sanctions as a deterrent, and, most
often, lack of a complaining witness, all indicate the need to reexamine these offenses as they are now defined and sanctioned.
3.

Unconstitutional provisions

While none of the provisions presently in the District's criminal
code have been specifically ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, some of the provisions still carried in the 1973 edition of the
code are probably unconstitutional under recent Court decisions.
The abortion statute,"' as currently worded, represents an unconstitutional infringement of the police power on a woman's right of
privacy under the Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton decisions.201 While
the Supreme Court was clear as to the scope of the police power in
this regard,0 2 those decisions have raised a considerable amount of
controversy, including the proposed constitutional amendments
which would act to reverse the mandate of the Court.0 3
conviction reversed where arresting officer allowed defendant to think there was
consent to his homosexual advances); Rittenour v. District of Columbia, 163 A.2d
558 (D.C. Mun. App. 1960) (conviction for committing "lewd, obscene, or indecent
act" reversed where officer had entered home of defendant under false pretenses
and encouraged defendant's advances).
199. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MErOProTAN PoLiC DEPARTMENT, WASMNGTON, D.C. 5 (1973) (an average of 143 police personnel were assigned to vice investigation on any given day).
200. D.C. CODE § 22-201 (1973).
201. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
202. As the Court pointed out in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the state has
a legitimate interest both in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant
woman and in protecting potential human life. Id. at 148-51. However, the Court
concluded that although the right of personal privacy is broad enough to cover the
abortion decision, the state's legitimate interest in potential life becomes controlling only at the point of viability. Thus, if the state is interested in protecting fetal
life after viability, it may regulate and even proscribe abortion during that period,
except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Id. at 162-65.
203. See generally Byrn, Abortion Amendments: Policy in the Light of
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Pending resolution of this political issue, the District could either

eliminate its abortion statute or revise it to conform with the Court's
decisions. Thus, a statute could be drafted proscribing abortions at
any time by one other than a licensed physician, or by anyone
during the third trimester of pregnancy.0 4 Revision in this area
should, however, proceed cautiously and any proposed revision
should carefully consider the prevailing views of the community on
the abortion question.
The homicide section provides for a death penalty with procedures similar to those found unconstitutional by the Supreme
0 5 Without debating the merits of the death penalty, it should
Court.1

be noted that unless radically revised, the present provisions cannot
be constitutionally enforced. This section should be revised only if
the community views the death penalty as a necessary and effective
deterrent, assuming a 20
death
penalty can be drafted so as not to
8
offend the Constitution.

In addition, the code provisions relating to disorderly conduct 0 '
and vagrancy 28 should be carefully examined in regard to similar
Precedent, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 380 (1974); Rice, Overruling Roe v. Wade: An
Analysis of the Proposed ConstitutionalAmendments,15 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rv.
307 (1973).
204. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-67 (1973).
205. Compare D.C. CODE § 22-2404 (1973), with GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1005, -1302
(Supp. 1971) (held violative of eighth amendment as applied in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
206. See Comment, Capital Punishment After Furman, 64 J. CraM. L. 281
(1973); Comment, Response to Furman: Can Legislators Breathe Life Back into
Death?, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 172 (1974).
207. D.C. CODE §§ 22-1107, -1112, -1121 (1973). Cf. District of Columbia v.
Walters, 319 A.2d 332 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974) (third clause of section 1112-"any
other lewd, obscene, or indecent act"-held unconstitutionally vague). See also
13 g ("ReQuestionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 5, Comment to Q. H1
peal-too vague."); id., Response No. 31, Comment to Q. 1 13 g ("The acts constituting the offense should be specified to avoid misuse of the statute for harassment."); id., Response No. 48, Comment to Q. H1 13 g ("Probably unconstitutionally vague & unfair.... "); Appendix infra.
208. D.C. CODE §§ 22-3302-06 (1973). See also Questionnaire, supra note 125,
Response No. 2, Comment to Q. II 13 m ("Everyone has the right to do nothing
for at least short periods of time."); id., Response No. 43, Comment to Q. II 13 m
("This statute is just about without redeeming features. There are grave burden
of proof problems, it is overbroad-and how can one require a person to have a
lawful occupation in our economy."); id., Response No. 52, Comment to Q. 11 13
m ("Should be totally repealed; overbroad, unconstitutional & unnecessary offense."); Appendix infra.
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statutes held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 2 9 The retention of unenforceable provisions in the criminal code detracts from
the code's total deterrent value by undermining its credibility. A
criminal code, even one newly revised, should be continually reappraised in relation to developments in the law.2 10 The code should
reflect the proscription only of that conduct which the legislature
may constitutionally regulate; the dead weight of unconstitutional
provisions will only be a detriment to the efficient functioning of the
criminal code.21
C. Absence of a Rational System of Gradationand Penalties
There is little evidence in the present criminal code of any systematic attempt to provide a consistent plan for the gradation of
offenses and penalties. The legislature, through the formulation of
relative degrees of crimes within a given offense area, ought to provide broad guidelines for the judiciary to follow in the sentencing
process. Thus, the gradation of offenses represents the evaluation of
the legislature as to the degree of social harm which is created by
various forms of socially unacceptable conduct.
The District's criminal code suffers from two types of problems
in this regard. First, the criminal code does not provide a classification scheme for sentencing purposes; each statute contains its own
statement of authorized punishment. Among the criminal statutes
there are over 23 different authorized periods of incarceration, ranging from 30 days to life in prison, and at least 17 separate fines,
209. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (municipal vagrancy statute unconstitutionally vague); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965) (breach of peace statute overbroad).
210. See notes 34-35 & accompanying text supra.
211. Other provisions of the District's criminal code could also be found unconstitutional on various grounds. As to the District's sodomy provision, D.C. CODE §
22-3502 (1973), for example, one of the respondents to the Questionnaire replied:
Unconstitutionally vague-should be limited to forcible, nonconsensual or
public acts-bestiality should be separate provision or indictment language
is probably unconstitutional & should be abolished.
Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 60, Comment to Q. II 3 d.
Several respondents also questioned the constitutionality of D.C. CODE § 22-3601
(1973) (possession of implements of crime). See, e.g., Questionnaire, supra note
125, Response No. 2, Comment to Q. H 1 d ("Every implement has an illegal use.");
id., Response No. 61, Comment to Q. H 1 d ("I think 'satisfactory account' language
shifts burden of proof and violates 5th amendment."); id., Response No. 63, Comment to Q. H 1 d ("Overbroad-burden of proof should be on defendant only if
implements have no non-criminal use."). See also Appendix infra.
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ranging from one dollar to $10,000. Second, the code prescribes
identical penalties for acts which are qualitatively different. It is
essential that a criminal code differentiate on reasonable grounds
between serious and minor offenses. Penalty provisions should reveal a hierarchical scheme of wrongs, ranging from the most serious
down to the near trivial, with meaningful gradations.
The District of Columbia classifies crimes by the common law
rule of what punishment may be applied upon conviction, distinguishing between offenses punishable by incarceration exceeding
one year and those that are not. 21 This broad classification system,
while perhaps useful at common law when the choice of available
sanctions was more limited, is unsatisfactory for a modern penal
code.
The lack of a comprehensive system of gradation has been largely
corrected in most revised codes. The American Law Institute's system of gradation, designed to give a reasonable amount of legislative
guidance to the courts in fixing penalties, has been generally followed in the revision of criminal codes. 213 For example, the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code provides the following scheme:
Classification of Offenses.
(1) Felonies. Felonies are classified for the purpose of sentence into
the following three categories:
(a) Class A felonies;
(b) Class B felonies; and
(c) Class C felonies.
(2) Misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are classified for the purpose of
sentence into the following two categories:
(a) Class A misdemeanors; and
(b) Class B misdemeanors.
21 4
(3) Infractions. Infractions are not further classified.
Two methods for the maximization of consistency in the application of specific sanctions according to offense categories are mandatory minimum penalties and express aggravating and mitigating
factors. However, the use of the former method in the District has
212. There is, however, no clear statement to that effect in the code. But see D.C.
Code § 23-301 (1973) (necessity for indictment in lieu of information determined
by length of potential sentence for offense); id. § 23-581(a)(1)(B) (arrest without
warrant authorized if officer has probable cause to believe person committed a
felony). Compare id. § 22-2201 (grand larceny: one to ten years), with id. § 22-2202
(petit larceny: up to $200 fine and/or up to one year).
213. MODEL PENAL CODE

214.

§

1.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE,

supra note 3,

§ 3002.
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raised some serious problems. Mandatory minimum punishments
are provided for some offenses, but appear to exhibit no pattern of
rationality. For example, a mandatory two-year penalty is provided
for the crime of bigamy,21 5 while no mandatory minimum punishment is imposed for forcible rape. 216 The concept of mandatory minimum punishments incorporated into the criminal code should be
217
reviewed.
Analysis of aggravating and mitigating factors has been included
in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, wherein the courts are directed to consider a number of factors militating for or against probation before imposing sentences of imprisonment. 218 This method,
215. D.C. CODE § 22-601 (1973).
216. Id. § 22-2801.
217. The President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia recommended such review:
Some members of this Commission believe that all mandatory minimum
sentences are inappropriate because they operate to limit judicial discretion
and hinder the rehabilitative efforts of correctional officials. Other members
believe that in some limited instances mandatory minimum sentences have
a significant deterrent effect on specific kinds of crime. The Commission
recognizes, however, that the mandatory penalty provisions which now exist
are largely obviated by the District's indeterminate sentencing laws. Despite
the mandatory minimums provided by statute, suspended sentences may be
given, probation is available, and the actual time served may be as little as
1 day. At the very least, the Commission believes that this apparent conflict
between the mandatory minimum provisions and the indeterminate sentence
law requires review.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRIME IN THE DisTar OF COLUMBIA 630-31
(1966) (footnote omitted).
218. The mitigating factors to be considered are:
(a) the defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
harm to another person or his property;
(b) the defendant did not plan or expect that his criminal conduct would
cause or threaten serious harm to another person or his property;
(c) the defendant acted under strong provocation;
(d) there were substantial grounds which, though insufficient to establish
a legal defense, tend to excuse or justify the defendant's conduct;
(e) the victim of the defendant's conduct induced or facilitated its commission;
(f) the defendant has made or will make restitution or reparation to the
victim of his conduct for the damage or injury which was sustained;
(g) the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity,
or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense;
(h) the defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to
recur;
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as opposed to that of legislatively mandated minimum sentences,
seems far superior in promoting equitable application of sanctions,
while still considering the specific circumstances of each case.
In addition to these general problems stemming from the absence
of comprehensive grading and a detailed penalty structure, the District's criminal code also evidences certain more specific, but
equally serious, inequities. Among numerous possible examples,
such inequities are readily identifiable in the areas of attempt, rape,
robbery, and theft.
While there is a general misdemeanor provision governing attempts, 29 there are many offenses, apparently selected at random,
for the attempt of which the legislature has provided specific and
much harsher penalties. No effort has been made to formulate a
general system by which a penalty for an attempt is related to the
degree of social harm posed by the completion of that offense.
One such example of the disparity in penalties for attempts has
been presented to the Criminal Code Revision Committee of the Bar
Association of the District of Columbia.
In the case of arson an attempt to maliciously burn the property
of another is punished the same as for the completed offense-with a
prison term of from one to ten years. Since [that section] covers both
attempts and the completed offense, the punishment provided in
[the general attempt provision] has no application. The succeeding
section, however, covers only the completed offense of maliciously
burning one's own property, with intent to defraud or injure another.
(i) the character, history and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he
is unlikely to commit another crime;
(j) the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment;

(k) the imprisonment of the defendant would entail undue hardship to
himself or his dependents;
(1)the defendant is elderly or in poor health;
(m)the defendant did not abuse a public position of responsibility or trust;
and
(n) the defendant cooperated with law enforcement authorities by bringing
other offenders to justice, or otherwise. Nothing herein shall be deemed to
require explicit reference to these factors in a presentence report or by the

court at sentencing.
supra note 3, § 3101(3).
219. Whoever shall attempt to commit any crime, which attempt is not
otherwise made punishable by this title, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both.
D.C. CODE § 22-103 (1973).
PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE,
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So, a person violating [that section] "shall be imprisoned for not
more than fifteen years" but a person frustrated in his attempt to
violate [the same section] faces a maximum of only one year in
prison and a thousand dollar fine. Since the same danger to society
is posed by a completed violation of this section and a frustrated
2
attempt to violate it, this result is hard to justify."
The rape statute does not differentiate either in terms of general
gradation or penalties between forcible and statutory rape:
Whoever has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her
will or whoever carnally knows and abuses a female child under sixteen years of age, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for
life."'
This equal grading is most inequitable for several reasons: 1) the
relatively high age of the victim for statutory rape; 2) that mistake
of fact as to age is not a defense; 22 and 3) the possible imposition of
life imprisonment for consensual sexual relations between teenage
223
persons.
The Proposed Federal Criminal Code has reduced the age for
statutory rape to ten years, 224 and has created a separate offense for
consensual sex involving persons under sixteen.
(1) Offense. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not
his wife or any person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with
another or causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse is
guilty of an offense if the other person is less than sixteen years old
and the actor is at least five years older than the other person.
220. R. Seymour, Inchoate Offenses, Part I-Criminal Attempts in the District
of Columbia 2 (1971) (unpublished memorandum submitted to the Criminal Code
Revision Comm., Young Lawyers Section, D.C. Bar Ass'n). Arson is treated in D.C.
CODE § 22-401 (1973).
221. Id. § 22-2801.
222. D.C. BAR Ass'N, CmIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DsmTxcr OF COLUMBIA
167 (2d ed. 1972). Note, however, that the only case cited as authority for this
instruction, Fuller v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 203 (D.D.C. 1965), is not at all
supportive. Nor is there any discoverable authority as to whether or not the District
courts have followed this common law rule.
223. See Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 30, Comment to Q. H 3 b
("Some means should be found for flexibility as to defendant's age-it seems
ludicrous to charge this offense [statutory rape] to an individual close to complaining witness' age .... ."); id., Response No. 48, Comment to Q. I 3 b ("Protection needed for both underage boys and underage girls. Reasonable mistake as to
age should be a defense if it is not now, & age difference (a la Model Penal Code)
should be enacted."). See also Appendix infra.
224. PROPOSED FEDERAL CRMINAL CODE, supra note 3, § 1641.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:207

(2) Grading. The offense is a Class C felony, except when the actor
is less than twenty-one years old, in which case it is a Class A misdemeanor."'
Thus, the drafters exempted "sexual experimentation among
inter-generational peers" entirely, and eliminated the label "rape"
for consensual sex involving teenage females. In addition, mistake
of fact as to age would be a defense."'
Another example of identical penalties for acts which are qualitatively different is presented in the robbery section. Robbery has
traditionally been viewed as a larceny in the aggravated form, arising from the force or violence used or threatened to be used upon
the victim."' It thus calls for a heavier penalty than simple larceny.
The District's code, however, blurs this distinction by adding to the
traditional concept the alternative of a stealthy seizure. 2 2 Thus, no
force or violence need be used upon the person nor must the victim
be put in fear. If a secret taking from the person, or from his immediate actual possession, which is usually interpreted to include the
immediate vicinity of the person, occurs, the crime in the District
of Columbia is not mere larceny, but robbery. If it is thought that
stealthy taking from a person should be punished more heavily than
simple larceny, it should be stated as a separate form of aggravated
larceny, carrying a lesser penalty than robbery.
The theft offenses in the code present a number of problems resulting from inadequate gradation. These problems include an
archaic value-of-property distinction and what appears to be an
arbitrary distinction based upon whether the property was privately
owned or was government property. The majority of the offenses
involving wrongful acquisition of property differentiate between felony and misdemeanor sanctions solely on the basis of the value of
the property involved. 2 The line of demarcation has only been increased twice since codified in 1901. In 1937 the value was increased
from $35 to $50.3 In 1953 it was increased to the present level of
225. Id. § 1645.
226. Id. § 1648(1)(b). Note, however, that mistake of fact as to age is not available as a defense to statutory rape, i.e., involving a female child of less than ten
years of age. Id. § 1648(1)(a).
227. See R. PERMs, supra note 138, at 279-81.
228. D.C. CODE § 22-2901 (1973).
229. See, e.g., id. § 22-1207 (punishment for embezzlement); id. § 22-1301 (false
pretenses); id. §§ 22-2201-02 (larceny).
230. Act of Aug. 12, 1937, ch. 599, 50 Stat. 628.
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The District's criminal code should be amended by upgrading the value distinction to compensate for economic inflation and
by including a graduated penalty structure correlating the value
23 2
and nature of the property involved with a scale of sanctions.
The American Law Institute has proposed a tripartite gradation
scheme for theft, establishing felony, misdemeanor, and petty misdemeanor categories. 23 This proposal was based upon the
$100.21

judgment that the attitudes which justify discrimination by amount
probably recognized three groups of transactions: those involving
really petty values, another group at the other end of the scale relating to very substantial amounts, and a third group in between.
New York, in adopting this scheme, set the categories at less than
$250, more than $250 to $1500, and more than $1500.35
A second problem in the theft area of the District's code involves
a substantive distinction between government and private property.
The present code contains a number of separate provisions regarding the theft of property belonging to the District of Columbia government. These sections penalize wrongful appropriation of such
property much more severely than wrongful appropriation of private
property.
Thus, embezzlement of District property carries sanctions of up
to 20 years imprisonment and a fine of up to twice the value of the
property embezzled.23 7 In contrast, the majcr statute governing
embezzlement of private property has maximum sanctions of only
ten-years imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000.21
There is also a catchall provision covering embezzlement, stealing, or purloining government property, with attendant sanctions of
231. Act of June 29, 1953, ch. 159, § 215, 67 Stat. 99.
232. See Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 31, Comment to Q. H 10
b ("The $100 value requirement should be increased considering the inflation since
the statute was enacted."); id., Response No. 36, Comment to Q. I 10 a ("Redraft
to define [grand larceny as] theft of property of value of $1,000 or more."); id.,
Response No. 49, Comment to Q. II 10 b ("Penalty way too high, $101.00 ought
not to make the difference between 1 and 10 years.").
233. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
234. Id. § 223.1(2), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
235. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.25-.40 (McKinney 1967).
236. See D.C. CODE § 22-1201 (1973) (embezzlement of property of District of
Columbia); id. § 22-2206 (stealing property of District of Columbia); id. § 22-2207
(receiving property stolen from District of Columbia).
237. Id. § 22-1201.
238. Id. § 22-1207.
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up to five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.2 9 Yet, if the property in question were less than $100 in value, the maximum sanction
for petit larceny would be less than one-year imprisonment and/or
less than a $200 fine, 40 a rather wide distinction to be based upon
mere ownership of the property.
More severe penalties can be understood for the provision concerning embezzlement of the District's property, since that section
requires that the actor be a government official.24 However, that
limitation does not apply to the other sections concerning government property. Perhaps because of this, the District's courts have
required proof of scienter regarding government ownership.2 ' 2 The
theory for that construction is that the more severe penalties will
only deter theft of government property if the actors are aware that
the property belongs to the government.2 43 Assuming the validity of
this ownership distinction as a factor in gradation, statutes governing District property should be consolidated to provide clear notice
that stricter sanctions will apply. Also, the requisite scienter developed by the courts should be codified.
The absence of legislative initiative in the area of gradation and
penalties is particularly counterproductive of the ends served by a
modern penal code. A sentencing judge will often be forced to decide
in each instance the relative gravity of the offense, having received
little guidance from the legislature. Providing similar penalties for
essentially dissimilar acts is detrimental to the administration of
justice.
D.

Overlapping and Confusing Code Provisions

Overlapping and confusing code provisions abound in the District
of Columbia Criminal Code, primarily as a consequence of the ad
hoc development of the code and the failure to undertake an effort
to rationally organize offense areas. The existence of these provi239. Id. § 22-2206.
240. Id. § 22-2202 (petit larceny).
241. Id. § 22-1201.
242. See Mitchell v. United States, 129 U.S. App. D.C. 292, 394 F.2d 767 (1968)
(convictions under D.C. CODE § 22-2206 reversed for lack of scienter).
243. This theory was cogently stated in Mitchell:
Since § 22-2206 would be a greater deterrent only if the potential wrongdoers were aware that the property they were intending to steal belonged to
the District of Columbia, the statute would have its intended effect only if
construed to require scienter.
Id. at 299, 394 F.2d at 774.
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sions creates uncertainty in the attempt to apply closely related
provisions to particular fact situations. It gives rise to unnecessary
issues in litigation and encourages the use of technical defenses in
an effort to find loopholes in the statutes. It encourages prosecutors
to use "shotgun" indictments (charging of offenses in the alternative) in an effort to make certain that the particular facts of the
case, as subsequently developed at trial are covered-a practice
which often makes it more difficult for the defendant to prepare a
defense.
This section focuses upon one illustration of the need to rationalize an offense area: the area of theft of property. The general interests of citizens to enjoy their acquired rights in property free from
wrongful appropriation have been met not by a comprehensive classification scheme, but by a wide array of highly technical, overlapping categories of acquisitive conduct, determined more by historical accident than social need, or even logic. The District of Columbia must thus preserve the integrity of its modern economy through
the use of legal concepts designed to maintain a feudal economic
system which have been haphazardly updated to fill technical gaps
in their coverage.
There are three major chapters in the District's criminal code
relating to theft: embezzlement, false pretenses, and larceny.244
Each of these chapters has from eight to eleven separate provisions.
In addition there are numerous scattered provisions enacted to meet
special problems, such as stealing books or manuscripts, 45 offenses
regarding property of public utilities,24 and the issuance of warehouse receipts for goods not received.2 47
The theft offenses in the District represent varieties of the common law offenses of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses,
with the addition of numerous specialized statutes. The distinctions
marking the boundaries of these offenses are among the most esoteric of the criminal law doctrines. Completely unintelligible and
meaningless to one not schooled in the law, they are also quickly
forgotten by many practitioners. The differences among these
offenses can be made intelligible only by the use of a historical
approach which provides a fascinating illustration of the development of the law from feudal times. No attempt is made here to trace
244. D.C. CODE §§ 22-1201-10 (1973) (embezzlement); id. §§ 22-1301-08 (false
pretenses); id. §§ 22-2201-08 (larceny).
245. Id. § 22-3106.
246. Id. §§ 22-3115-18.
247. Id. §§ 22-3701-06.
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A few com-

ments may be helpful, however, in explaining the multiplicity of
existing provisions.
Larceny was the first theft offense. The concept of larceny underwent some expansion at early common law with the aid of legal
fictions such as the doctrine of breaking bulk and substituting fraud
for force. These led to the judicial development of the new crime of
larceny by trick in order to accommodate expanding needs of commerce. It also underwent periods of very narrow interpretation in
order to avoid the harsh penalty of death for larceny. This is reflected in the type of property that was subject to larceny, consisting
of only tangible, personal property. Real property and intangibles
such as services were excluded.
The requirement of a taking by "trespass" was developed to include fine distinctions between "possession" or "custody" in determining whether there was a trespassory taking and carrying away
of the personal property of another with intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. Special treatment of certain problems
involving, for example, distinctions between lost, mislaid, and misdelivered property also has developed.
The separate offense of embezzlement was created by statute
when courts ruled that persons who were entrusted with goods by
the owner and subsequently misappropriated them had not committed a "trespassory" taking. The early embezzlement statutes were
very restricted in coverage. New statutes were enacted to deal with
numerous actors and types of activities. Other shortcomings in the
law of larceny were revealed where the defrauder persuaded the
victim to part with both possession and title of his or her property,
requiring the implementation of the additional offense of obtaining
property by false pretenses. Other statutes were added to cover
areas related to theft. Thus, the offense of unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle was developed primarily for the case of teenagers
taking cars for joy-riding and abandoning them, because the "intent
to permanently deprive the owner" of possession of the property was
lacking.
248. See generally J. HALL, THEFr, LAw AND SocmTY (2d ed. 1952) (a seminal
work on the history of the law of theft); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMERCIAL LAW 70-74
(M. Howe ed. 1963); Edwards, Possession and Larceny, 3 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
127 (1950); Pearce, Theft by FalsePretenses, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967 (1953); Scurlock, The Element of Trespass in Larceny at Common Law, 22 TEMP. L.Q. 12
(1948); Scurlock, The Element of Trespass in Larceny under the Statutes, 22 TEMP.
L.Q. 253 (1949); Snyder, The Influence of Equity Principles in Embezzlement
Prosecutions,30 ILL. L. REV. 995 (1936).
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Activities relating to theft, such as receiving stolen property and
theft by such means as extortion, also received separate attention.
Finally, as special problems developed in applying common law
offense categories to new forms of carrying on commerce, other special provisions were added. These included "fraud by operation of
coin-controlled mechanism by use of slugs," 249 "making, drawing or
uttering check, draft, or order with intent to defraud,12 and "issue
of receipt containing false statement" by a warehouseman.2
Commenting on the existence of this proliferation of theft sections
in the District's code, the President's Commission on Crime in the
District of Columbia observed:
This surfeit of theft offenses makes it difficult in many cases to
determine just what statutory offense has been committed. In a given
case a prosecutor might proceed against a defendant on two theories,
such as larceny and embezzlement, the difference turning on the
nebulous distinction between "custody" and "possession." If a jury
convicts on one, the defendant may appeal on the ground that the
2
facts proved the other offense, and the appeal may be successful .
The common law distinctions embodied in the offenses of larceny,
embezzlement, false pretenses and the specialized "spin-off'
offenses added by statute presently serve no useful purpose in the
criminal law. The differences among the various kinds of theft have
become less important than the common central element: an involuntary loss of property to another without some socially prescribed
justification.
The alternative to the approach of the District of Columbia Code
is some form of consolidation of theft offenses. Most revised codes
have utilized consolidation, frequently based on the Model Penal
Code approach.2 3 Consolidation itself has been achieved by a variety of code revision approaches.
A major revision is the more rational definition of property subject to theft adopted by the Model Penal Code. The definition of
"anything of value" in the District's code 54 might be expanded to
include "anything that is part of one person's wealth and of which
249. D.C. CODE § 22-1407 (1973).
250. Id. § 22-1410.
251. Id. § 22-3702.
252. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRIME IN THE DIsTRICr OF
629 (1966).
253. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0-.9 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
254. D.C. CODE § 22-102 (1973).
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another person can deprive him." '55 This definition is more related
to the underlying rationale of the offense area since any property
right of any worth to someone other than the actor and which is
capable of being wrongfully acquired by the actor is properly subject
to the sanctions of the theft law.
The concept of ownership of property has also been revised in
many codes. "Property of another" has commonly been redefined to
include property in which anyone other than the actor has an interest upon which the actor is not entitled to infringe. 56 It thus becomes irrelevant, except perhaps for the defenses of mistake of fact
or claim of right, whether the actor also had an interest, even a
superior one, in the property. Consolidation will eliminate the outmoded distinctions as to whether the actor had possession, custody,
control, or title to the property in favor of the more rational determination as to whether the actor's conduct wrongfully deprived another person of a right or interest in the property.
Other than a wrongful transfer of rights in real property, realty
disputes should be left to the civil law for determination of conflicting claims.2 57 Theft of services should be limited to those which the
actor knows are available only for compensation. This would eliminate from criminal sanctions situations in which the one providing
services had no expectations of receiving consideration for the serv2 58
ice, irrespective of the service's value.
Lost, mislaid, or misdelivered property should be subject to the
theft provision's coverage only if the actor intended to deprive the
owner thereof and had made no efforts to restore the property to the
255. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1(3), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
256. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-118(5) (1972); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 434C.1-101(6) (Baldwin 1974).
257. The drafters of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code noted this distinction:
Thus, a trustee who manages (or attempts) to sell the land of another for
his own benefit could be prosecuted for theft. But the bully who excludes the
owner from his land or the landlord who unlawfully evicts the tenant from
his leasehold cannot be prosecuted for exercising unauthorized control over
the property of another. This is because of the exclusion in the definition of
"property," namely that immovable property cannot be the subject of theft
unless the underlying conduct involves a transfer or an attempt to transfer
an interest in it. Other forms of unauthorized conduct in relation to immovable real property must therefore be dealt with under trespass laws and other
traditional real property remedies.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,

2
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(1970).
258. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.7(2), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
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rightful owner.2 59 This revision eliminates the technical common law
distinctions between these categories of conduct and establishes an
affirmative duty to attempt restoration of the property if the actor
eventually intends to convert the property to his or her own use.
Similarly, the actus reus elements of a trespassory taking and
carrying away should be redefined in light of the rationale for the
offense instead of historical categories involving confusing and subtle distinctions concerning the manner or time sequence of the acquisition. Theft, then, should include "any form of control over
property which exceeds the permissible range of control attributable
to any legal interest he [the actor] may have in the property or to
authority given by someone entitled to give it. ' 260 The circumstances and specific manner of unauthorized control are relevant only
to the issue of gradation 261 and not guilt of the substantive offense.
The requisite mens rea for theft has also been redefined to coincide more closely with the offense's rationale. Thus, the acquisition
of property must be intentional and with a specific intent to permanently deprive another of an interest therein. 22 This precludes to a
great extent problems arising from having to prove the ambiguous
and often technically-construed intents to defraud or steal. Yet, this
broad definition should not be expanded further by allowing the
specific intent to be inferred from the proof of the general intent.
The free alienation of property rights would be greatly hindered if
one always had to consider whether clever bargaining could imply
theft in the minds of a jury. While the circumstances under which
the actor used or disposed of the property may properly give rise to
inferences as to the specific intent, the knowing or intentional acquisition should not be sufficient alone.
Since these broad definitions may be just as likely to deny defendants specific notice, revised codes have further delineated specific
categories of sanctioned conduct. Also, conduct involving theft of
services, unauthorized use of vehicles, extortion, deception, and receiving stolen property should be given separate treatment to clarify
the scope of the main theft provisions.6 3 These additional specifica259. See id. § 206.5, Comment.
260. NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMiNAL LAWS, 2 WORKING PAPERS
915 (1970).
261. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(grading of theft offenses).
262. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
263. The Model Penal Code, in discussing the desirability of specific delineation,
states:
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tions of sanctioned conduct are necessary for specific notice, especially where the theft offenses enter areas of conduct which were not
subject to criminal sanctions or were not cognizable as theft-related
offenses at common law.
The consolidation or limited consolidation of the theft and theftrelated offenses seems necessary for a more efficient and equitable
administration of criminal justice." 4 The law of theft in the District
of Columbia is similar to the description of the state of the law of
theft at the end of the nineteenth century:
[A]n enormous, lumbering, ramshackle machine . . . [with] a variety of attachments of whimsical aspect and mysterious purpose
added at various times by maladroit journeymen." 5
Not only does such a system provide "an open invitation to the
technical defense,12 but the creation of legal fictions to avoid technical distinctions has virtually eliminated the notice function which
the code should provide. Such consolidation would seem to be the
preferred method of assuring adequate coverage of conduct culpable
in light of contemporary social problems.
E.

Sexual Discriminationin the Criminal Code

One major disadvantage of an unrevised criminal code is that it
often reflects values which have been largely rejected by the community. Nothing is more illustrative of this point than the retention
of sexual discrimination in the substantive criminal laws of the
Consolidation, therefore, cannot have for its purpose the avoiding of a
properly specific delineation of the various types of criminal property deprivations....
The purpose of consolidation is to prevent procedural difficulties resulting
from the fact that the boundaries between the traditional offenses are obscure
and from the rule that a defendant who is charged with one offense cannot
be convicted by proving another.
MODEL PENAL CODE, App. A, at 106-07 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
264. See Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 50, Comment to Q. II 10
a ("Code needs one theft statute to eliminate common law categories and equalize
the grading."); id., Response No. 50, Comment to Q. I A 6 ("Theft and fraud
offenses are not set forth in a coherent fashion. They are inconsistent and need
reworking into one unified theft statute."); id., Response No. 52, Comment to Q.
II 10 a ("The larceny, [receiving stolen property,] & false pretense sections overlap
& the code should return to the traditional definitions of these offenses."). See also
Appendix infra.
265. Elliott, Ten Years of Larceny and Such 1954-63, 1964 CiuM. L. REv. 182.
266.

NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,

914 (1970).

2 WORKING

PAPERS

1975]

LAW REFORM

District of Columbia. Indeed, it is most unfortunate that certain
notions relating to criminal liability based upon the sex of the actor
or the victim still permeate the criminal code when they have begun
to disappear from the prevailing community value structure.
Without becoming embroiled in the as yet unresolved controversy
surrounding the advisability of ratifying the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment," suffice it to say that sexual differences which may
or may not be a valid factor in certain regulatory classifications have
little importance in determining ultimate criminal liability. In fact,
while many regulatory classifications based upon sex often are at
least tangentially related to physical differences,268 in the area of
criminal offenses they more often relate to differences in social
roles"' 9-roles which are inappropriate as determinants since they
are more likely to be continually evolving.
If one accepts the assumption "that the law must deal with the
individual attributes of the particular person, not with a vast overclassification based upon the irrelevant factor of sex, ' 2 0 it is clear
that there is no place for such discrimination in an area of the law
founded upon the idea of individual responsibility. Yet, substantive
discrimination survives in both the statutory and case law of the
District of Columbia.
This problem has gained even more significance in light of recent
developments in recognizing the equal rights of women under the
law. The Supreme Court has recently held that "classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or
national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. 2 1 Unless the legislative distinc267. H.R.J. RES. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., March 23, 1972.
268. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 36-301-11 (1973) (employment of women).
269. While regulations of working hours for women may be justified upon such
physical differences as stamina (although this point has been disputed), with the
possible exception of rape, there are no general differences between the sexes which
can justify legislative or judicial discrimination for substantive criminal offenses.
Such distinctions can only be predicated upon ad hoc determinations of relative
social roles. "Unless the difference is one that is characteristic of all women and
no men, or all men and no women, it is not the sex factor but the individual factor
which should be determinitive." Emerson, The E.R.A.: The Legal Basis, 57 WOMEN
LAWYERS' J. 12 (1971).

270. Id.
271. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). Therein, a female Air
Force employee was denied certain dependency allowances normally available to
a male employee under similar circumstances; the Court held the ruling to be based
on sex and violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
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tion is based upon a characteristic exclusive to one sex, it is clear
that the Constitution requires that one's individual, rather than
sexual, attributes should control, particularly when the possibility
of criminal
sanctions is present as a consequence of the distinc2
27

tion .

In the first instance, as a matter of drafting, it is suggested that
the legislature should strive towards avoiding even the appearance
of sexual discrimination through the use of sexually neutral language in the drafting of penal statutes. 73 Such a development would
demonstrate a social policy determination favoring sexual equality
under the criminal law.
Probably the most blatant example of a sexual distinction based
upon a legislative determination of social roles (a determination of
questionable validity today) is that of the adultery provision.
Whoever commits adultery in the District shall

. . .

be punished

• . . and when the act is committed between a married woman and
a man who is unmarried both parties to such act shall be deemed
guilty of adultery; and when such act is committed between a married man and a woman who
is unmarried, the man only shall be
24
deemed guilty of adultery.
It is patent that the premise upon which this distinction is based
involved a legislative determination of the relative sexual aggressiveness of the two sexes.25 Assuming, arguendo, that this distinc272. It is difficult to distinguish between racial and sexual discrimination in this
regard:
The similarities between race and sex discrimination are indeed striking.
Both classifications create large, natural classes, membership in which is
beyond the individual's control; both are highly visible characteristics on

which the legislators have found it easy to draw gross, stereotypical distinctions.
Note, Sex Discriminationand Equal Protection: Do We Need A Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1499, 1507 (1971).
273. The criminal code necessarily embodies a formal moral statement by the
community. If it reflects, however subtly, discriminatory attitudes, the code will
impede the general elimination of such discrimination in the community. Cf. M.
BERGER, EQuALrrY BY STATuTE 205-27 (rev. ed. 1967).
274. D.C. CODE § 22-301 (1973).
275. Numerous commentaries have attacked such a double standard.

[T]he extra-legal sanctions of social disfavor, ostracism and lessened attractiveness on the marriage market imposed upon the female transgressor are
the clear results of society's double standard of sexual behavior, which allows
males great sexual freedom and imposes severe restrictions where females are
concerned. Laws that provide special penalties for male offenders in this area
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tion is still valid as to a majority of the population, there exists a
sufficiently significant minority to which it does not apply so that
its retention as a basis of criminal liability is clearly discriminatory.
Another problem is evident in the rape provision. Putting to one
side the difficult question as to whether there is a need for including
men as victims of forcible rape, the clause defining "statutory" rape
is discriminatory. 278 The rationale presented for equating consensual
intercourse involving a female under 16 years of age with the forcible
rape of a woman is that the female child is deemed unable to consent to the act. 7 Yet, in limiting the protection of the statutory rape
section to females, it is evident that the law presumes a male under
16 years of age to be capable of consent.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently rejected a
constitutional challenge to this section by two juveniles under the
age of 16.278 The court held that convicting the juvenile male but not
the female was not a denial of due process since there was a valid
interest in protecting the female only, due to the possibility of pregnancy. 71 The court noted that the statute on its face referred to the
actor as "whoever," and thus was not patently discriminatory, even
though a female would be incapable of committing the proscribed
28 0
act.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has also recently upheld the solicitation statute against a similar challenge.2 8' That section proscribes solicitation for the purpose of prostitution or "any
other immoral or lewd purpose. ' 28 2 The court dismissed the claim
of defendants that solicitation for sodomy was unconstitutional in
effectively lend their support to those social sanctions and ultimately to the
perpetuation of the hypocritical double moral standard upon which they are
based.
Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discriminationin American Law I: Law and the Single Girl,
11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 293, 318 (1967) (footnote omitted).
276. See D.C. CODE § 22-2801 (1973). See also Questionnaire, supra note 125,
Response No. 32, Comment to Q. II 3 b (statutory rape "section is discriminatory,
undefined & completely unconstitutional in its present form"); id., Response No.
40, Comment to Q. II 3 b ("Violates equal protection-should be repealed and
rewritten. Should not apply when male is less than 3 years older than the female-defense of seduction by the female should be recognized.").
277. See Sanselo v. United States, 44 App. D.C. 508, 510 (1916).
278. See In re W.E.P., 318 A.2d 286 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974).
279. Id. at 290.
280. Id. at 289-90.
281. See United States v. Cozart, 321 A.2d 342 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974).
282. D.C. CODE § 22-2701 (1973).
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that sodomy as defined could only be committed if at least one male
were a party to the act by finding that the sodomy statute included
cunnilingus within its scope.8 3 The defendant introduced testimony
that no women had been arrested for the offense of solicitation for
sodomy between September 22, 1962 and July 20, 1973, indicating
the statute's unconstitutionality as applied. However, the court
held that discretionary enforcement was not tantamount to discrimination.24
A related evidentiary problem which evinces discrimination towards women is the general requirement of corroborative evidence
in all sexual offenses. 215 While this requirement exists in only a small
minority of other jurisdictions,"' the highest court in the District of
Columbia has yet to question even the efficacy of the rule. While
the rule recognizes a realistic assumption that the possibility of
fabrication is high in the sexual offense area, it is not clear that the
results of the rule's application are anything more than a general
2
deterrent to the reporting and prosecuting of sexual offenses. 1
Another instance of an anachronistic distinction based upon the
sex of the party and victim of an offense is found in manslaughter.
The common law provocation-heat-of-passion definition of manslaughter has been retained in the District.2 11 One of the circumstances to be considered by the jury as constituting adequate provocation to reduce an intentional homicide from murder to manslaughter is based upon a moral standard relating to extramarital sex. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
held that "[a] wife's adulterous conduct has long been recognized
as the classic provocation for homicide. 218 9 While this rule is not as
abusive as the "unwritten law" defense found in some jurisdictions
which would completely excuse a husband from criminal liability in
283. 321 A.2d at 343.
284. Id. at 343-44.
285. See note 139 supra.
286. Thirty-five jurisdictions have no requirement, eight have limited requirements, five have adopted the full requirement by statute, and only the District of
Columbia and Nebraska have required full corroboration by judicial decision.
Note, The Rape CorroborationRequirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J.
1365, 1367-68 (1972).
287. See id. at 1370-72.
288. See text accompanying notes 483-91 infra.
289. United States v. Comer, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 214, 220, 421 F.2d 1149, 1155
(1970).
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the same situation,"' it preserves the double moral standard which,
if not obsolete, is certainly on the decline.
It is evident that sexual discrimination based upon factors other
than exclusive physical differences survives in the District's criminal laws. Since "[e]ven in our own day [criminal] law is still
looked upon as the codification of the morality to which a community adheres,"1 it is imperative that the revisers of the District's

criminal code do their utmost to eliminate unnecessarily sexist classifications which act to continue discrimination against women
2 92
based upon stereotyped social roles.

F. Absence of Provisionsin Areas Deserving Protectionof a Criminal Code
One of the advantages of comprehensive code revision and a periodic reevaluation of the code's function is the identification of conduct threatening to the public welfare which is not covered in the
code. The criminal code's definition of conduct unacceptable to
fundamental community values must be reexamined in light
of
23
changing social, technological, and even political conditions.
Probably the major weakness of the District of Columbia Code in
this regard is the virtual absence of provisions governing consumer
fraud. 94 With the exception of a minor provision concerning false
advertising 95 and a number of specialized provisions concerning the
sale of kosher meat and the like, 26 consumers are not protected from
290. See Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discriminationin American Law II: Law and the
Married Woman, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 3, 61-63 (1967).
291. M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE 205 (rev. ed. 1967).
292. See Note, Sex Discriminationand EqualProtection:Do We Need a ConstitutionalAmendment?, 84 HARv. L. Rnv. 1499 (1971).
The requirement that all statutes be written asexually is attractive because
it eliminates the difficulties of evaluating sophisticated medical, sociological,
and actuarial theories of aggregate differences between the sexes. It is also
attractive because it represents the highest degree of societal commitment
to the ideal of legal sexual equality.
Id. at 1511 (footnotes omitted).
293. See notes 34 & 35 supra.
294. See Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 50, Comment to Q. III A
5 (".

.

. the statutory provisions dealing with corruption & fraud are inadequate

to protect."); id., Response No. 56, Comment to Q. III A 5 ("We are in dire need
of consumer fraud ... legislation."). See also Appendix infra.
295. D.C. CODE §§ 22-1411-13 (1973).
296. See, e.g., id. §§ 22-3404-06 (Kosher meat); id. §§ 22-3409-12 (mislabeling
potatoes).
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a wide variety of fraudulent conduct. 9 ' While special statutes have
been enacted proscribing check fraud29 and embezzlement of mortgaged chattels, 299 no similar protections have been extended to the
consumer.
In other situations where contemporary social problems have been
included in the code's coverage, the legislature has almost always
enacted special statutes rather than redefining the scope of applicable statutes. Thus, the common law definition of arson, limiting the
actus reus to burning, has been retained,"0 and a special statute
relating to use of explosives has been enacted."' Revised codes have
followed the more preferable route of comprehensive redefinition of
general statutes to govern these special problems. 2 Similarly, because of the difficulty involved in placing theft from vending machines within the common law categories of theft, the legislature
enacted separate provisions covering vending machines instead of
3
redefining the theft provisions. 3
The theft area's patchwork coverage is inadequate in three major
categories of property rights: services, intangibles, and realty.30 '
297. See generally

NEIGHBORHOOD CONSUMER INFORMATION CENTER, A COMPRE-

HENSIVE AND COORDINATED STUDY OF CONSUMER EXPLOITATION IN THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA (1968).
298. D.C. CODE § 22-1410 (1973).
299. Id. § 22-1209.
300. Id. § 22-401 ("Whoever shall maliciously bum or attempt to bum"). See
also id. § 22-403 (malicious burning of movable property). This section creates
problems, for although the actus reus is described in the terms "by fire or otherwise," the subject property to be protected is unclear. Further, while the provision
heading speaks of "movable property," the language of the section deals with
property "whether real or personal."
301. Id. § 22-3105 (placing explosives with intent to destroy or injure property).
302. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
("starts a fire or causes an explosion"); id. § 220.2(1) ("causes a catastrophe by
explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of building, release of poison gas, radioactive material. . . or by any other means of causing potentially widespread injury
or damage . .
").
303. D.C. CODE § 22-1407 (1973) (fraud by operation of coin-controlled mechanism by use of slugs), id. § 22-1408 (manufacture, sale, offer for sale, possession of
slugs or device to operate coin-controlled mechanism); id. § 22-3427 (breaking and
entering vending machines and similar devices, and penalties therefore).
304. The National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws prefaced its comments to the proposed theft provisions by noting this problem existing
in the present federal theft law:
It is practically impossible to develop an overview of the kinds of conduct
reached by Federal law, for the purpose of measuring the extent to which it
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With the exception of certain limited circumstances, the District's

code does not recognize services as being subject to the protection
of the theft provision. The use of artificial devices to operate vending machines"' and the use of certain insignia to gain aid or assistance by one not entitled to use them"0 are examples of these special
circumstances.
The only substantial reform in this regard was the 1970 amendment to the false pretenses statute which inserted the phrase, "any
service or," before "anything of value, 3

7

expanding the provision's

scope beyond the previous coverage which was limited to innkeeping
services. Yet, to prosecute for theft of services under this section, the
government must prove all five elements of common law false pretenses: false representation, knowledge of the falsity, reliance, obtaining something of value, and specific intent to defraud.0
A recent case demonstrates the inadequacy of the code in relation
to theft of services. 3 The defendant was tried for unauthorized use
of a motor vehicle after failing to return a rented automobile to the
rental agency. The question before the court was "whether a use in
excess of the express consent given in the contract is to be equated
with use 'without the consent of the owner'" in the unauthorized
use statute. 10 The district court, noting that no case law exists on
this question in the District of Columbia, found insufficient evidence for conviction. The court held that in the absence of evidence
that the agency had informed the defendant of his breach of the
rental agreement and his concommitant liability under the criminal
laws, he could not be convicted.311 The case indicates a deficiency
is in accord with modem economic circumstances or for the purpose of assuring consistency of sanction for comparable conduct.
THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRMINAL LAws, 2 WORKING PAPERS

914 (1970).
305. See note 249 supra.
306. D.C. CODE § 22-1307 (1973).
307. Id. § 22-1301, amending D.C. CODE § 22-1301 (1967).
308. See note 142 supra.
309. United States v. McLaughlin, 278 F. Supp. 320 (D.D.C. 1967).
310. Id. at 321. The unauthorized use statute is D.C. CODE § 22-2204 (1973).
311. The trial court indicated its preference for civil over criminal remedies in
its holding:
It does not appear from the evidence that the rental agency ever served
notice on the defendant that it considered the contract breached and that if
he failed to return the car within a certain period of time he would be charged
with a violation of the criminal laws. Nor does it appear that the agency tried
to replevy the car. To hold that one using a rented car in excess of authority
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in the coverage of the laws relating to theft of services as well as the
reluctance of the courts to extend the coverage of the criminal code
to services without more affirmative assistance from the legislature.
The coverage of intangible property by the criminal code in the
District of Columbia is likewise inadequate. The phrase "anything
of value" is used in the major offense provisions to describe the
property subject to protection.3 21 Yet, the common law requirement

of intrinsic as opposed to intangible value has been amended only
to include documents representative of value:
The words "anything of value," wherever they occur in this title,
shall be held to include not only things posessing intrinsic value, but
bank notes and other forms of paper money
and commercial paper
3
and other writings which represent value.1

Even with this statutory extension, the courts have had some difficulty in applying the common law theft crimes to intangible prop31
erty of this sort.

The existing definition, while purporting to establish "value" in
some intangibles, has either received too little attention by the
courts or is not sufficiently definitive. The wording of this provision
also does not protect such valuable intangibles as trade secrets,
ideas, and information.
The District of Columbia, while extending the coverage of its theft
statutes to crops and fixtures,315 does not recognize real property as
given is subject to prosecution under the criminal laws, in the absence of
adequate notice and attempts to recover possession of the car by civil process,
would be tantamount to making a person criminally liable for a simple
breach of contract. It is true that this case represents an aggravated breach
of contract, but the breach still appears to go no further than to the amount
of time the defendant was authorized to use the car.
278 F. Supp. at 321.
312. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-1202 (1973) (embezzlement); id. § 22-1301 (false
pretenses); id. § 22-2201 (larceny).
313. Id. § 22-102.
314. Despite the clear language of sections 102 and 1203 (embezzlement of note
not delivered), the courts have had difficulty with promissory notes. See Reeves v.
United States, 56 App. D.C. 376, 15 F.2d 734 (1926) (defense that note could not
be subject of embezzlement rejected). See also Partridge v. United States, 39 App.
D.C. 571, 580 (1913), where the defense to conviction of false pretenses-a promissory note is "not a thing of value"-was rejected, but the court held that even if
that count were defective, it would be harmless error.
315. See D.C. CODE § 22-2201 (1973) (grand larceny includes "things savoring
of the realty").
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being subject to theft. This notion is a hold-over from the common
law doctrine that realty and its appurtenences were impossible to
carry off.
With the advent of an economic system of greater complexity,
however, it becomes apparent that one can indeed steal the land of
another by a wrongful transfer of interest therein. Many revised
codes expressly include the transfer of an interest in real property
within the scope of the theft section.3 1 1 Other disputes over 31rights

to realty, however, are left to the disposition of the civil law.
Another example of inadequate coverage can be found in the Dis-

trict code's coverage of child abuse. 3 8 As was indicated to the D.C.

Criminal Code Revision Committee:
Cruelty to children (22 D.C. Code § 901) is a very serious offense
in the District of Columbia. Some of the archaic language in the
statute should be modified, and the punishment should be increased.
Because such violence on the part of a parent (or often the commonlaw spouse of the parent) is often the result of a profound and perva316. The Model Penal Code's section states:

A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully transfers immovable property of
another or any interest therein with purpose to benefit himself or another not
entitled thereto.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-118(1) (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00(1)
(McKinney 1967).
317. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.10, Comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
318.
Any person who shall torture, cruelly beat, abuse, or otherwise wilfully
maltreat any child under the age of eighteen years; or any person, having the
custody and possession of a child under the age of fourteen years, who shall
expose, or aid and abet in exposing such child in any highway, street, field,
house, outhouse, or other place, with intent to abandon it; or any person,
having in his custody or control a child under the age of fourteen years, who
shall in any way dispose of it with a view to its being employed as an acrobat,
or a gymnast, or a contortionist, or a circus rider, or a rope-walker, or any
exhibition of like dangerous character, or as a beggar, or mendicant, or pauper, or street singer, or street musician; or any person who shall take, receive,
hire, employ, use, exhibit, or have in custody any child of the age last named
for any of the purposes last enumerated, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, when convicted thereof, shall be subject to punishment by a
fine of not more than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment for
a term not exceeding two years, or both.
D.C. CODE § 22-901 (1973).
See also Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 32, Comment to Q. II 13 c
("Statute is vague, ambiguous, not definitive, and unconstitutional."); Appendix
infra.
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sive frustration, visits to a social services office could be required
where the parents would consult with professionals on how to cope
with their feelings toward children. Another possibility is prosecution, with strict penalties, coupled with removal of the child from the
home through neglect proceedings. Because the battered child is
often too young to testify or to make a good witness, the main witness
is usually one spouse who files a complaint against the other spouse;
often the complaining spouse decides by the time of the trial that he
does not wish to testify. To protect the child we should consider
providing for the use of depositions and the abrogation of the
husband-wife privilege in this type of case."'

The Model Penal Code contains a far more comprehensive section,"'
although the penalty may be considered too mild."'1
It is submitted that these and similar deficiencies in the coverage
of the criminal code can best be identified and corrected through
comprehensive code revision.
G. Summary
The extent of the need for comprehensive criminal code revision
is analyzed by identifying code deficiencies. The significance of
these deficiencies may be seen by grouping them in broad problem
areas, reflecting minimum standards of a modern criminal code.
The fundamental standard of fair notice of what constitutes criminal behavior is lacking in such basics as the total absence of, or
inadequate definitions of, offense elements for most crimes, the absence of any general definition and consistent application of mens
rea terms, an inadequate code index, and poor organization and
placement of code sections. Another basic problem is the existence
of numerous provisions that are inconsistent with contemporary values, encouraging selective and discriminatory law enforcement,
misallocation of scarce criminal justice resources, and lessening respect for the criminal law.
319. P. Friedman, Crimes Against Morals and Social Welfare 5 (1972) (unpublished memorandum presented to the D.C. Criminal Code Revision Comm., Young
Lawyer's Section, D.C. Bar Ass'n).
320.
A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under
18 commits a misdemeanor if he knowingly endangers the child's welfare by
violating a duty of care, protection or support.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2301.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1967).
321. See Questionnaire, supra note 125, Response No. 42, Comment to Q. I 13
c ("The penalties for willful abuse should be raised commensurate with those for
[assault with a deadly weapon, D.C. CODE § 22-502 (1973)] .... ").
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Moreover, the District's criminal code lacks a system for grading
and penalizing criminal behavior in a manner consistent with the
degree of social harm. Unlike other modern criminal codes, no general classification scheme exists for distinguishing among types of
felonies and misdemeanors. Also, similar penalties are frequently
authorized for qualitatively different acts, providing inadequate
guidance to judges in exercising sentencing responsibilities, law enforcement officials, and the public. Another general problem is the
existence of numerous overlapping and confusing code provisions,
especially in the theft offense area. Not surprising in a criminal code
based on nineteenth century values is the existence of unjustified
sexual discrimination. Finally, the criminal code fails to provide
adequate protection in some areas, such as consumer fraud and
child abuse, deserving of attention in a modern criminal code.
III. A
A.

CASE STUDY OF THE UNLAWFUL HOMICIDE PROVISIONS

Introduction
The minimum standards for a modern penal code analyzed in the
preceding sections will be applied in a closer scrutiny of one offense
area. Unlawful homicide was chosen for a case study of the need for
code revision since it is a complex offense area involving a serious
social problem in the District of Columbia. This part of the article
also suggests the type of questions that a law review commission
might raise in analyzing an offense area and presents some recommendations for its consideration.
The offense area approach to code revision will be more likely to
produce a criminal code coextensive with the social problems with
which it should deal. In this discussion, only a cursory description
of the nature and extent of the problem of homicide in the District
of Columbia is presented. A law review commission should receive
more detailed and complete information on the types and patterns
of homicide, characteristics of offenders and victims, and the response of police, prosecutors, courts, and correctional institutions to
the problem. In addition to aiding in the development of a more
rational system of gradation and penalty structure, this information
provides a basis for recommendations of complementary measures,
in order for the legislature to more adequately respond to the social
problem.
Supplementary proposals that a law review commission might
consider relating to the social problem of homicide include the fol-

286

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:207

lowing: 1) stricter regulations of handguns;3 12 2) a preventative prodrivers; 3 3 and 3) a
gram for vehicular homicide involving drunk
324
police family crisis intervention program.

After an introduction to the problem of homicide in the District
of Columbia, problems of general definition of the elements of homicide are analyzed. Next, the existing statutory scheme and its evolution are set forth. This is followed by a discussion of murder and
manslaughter with suggested reforms.
B.

The Social Problem Area
Unfortunately, there is little accurate data available concerning

322. Robert M. Boyd, Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department's homicide
unit, reported that 60 percent of the 295 homicides occurring in the District during
1974 were carried out with handguns. See 2 More Slain; 295 Killings A City Record,
Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 8.
Comparing the number of serious crimes committed by handguns in Washington
and New York City, the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia stated:
We are convinced by the experience in New York City that a strictly enforced
licensing law can have a significant impact on the amount of handgun crime
... . While the District of Columbia had a handgun murder rate of 9.1 per
100,000 population in fiscal 1966, New York City had a rate of 1.7; the
handgun assault rate was 79.8 in the District and 20.0 in New York City; and
the handgun robbery rate was 141.7 in the District and 45.4 in New York
City.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRImE IN THE DisTRicr OF COLUMBIA 624
(1966).

323. For the incidence of alcohol use accompanying homicides in the District,
see text accompanying note 332 infra. The Vehicle Research Safety Office of the
District of Columbia Motor Vehicle Department presently has plans to institute a
rehabilitation program for persons who lose their licenses on charges of driving
under the influence of intoxicants. At this time, however, there is no preventative
program to deal with the problem of "drinking drivers" before they come into
contact with the criminal justice system.
Both Fairfax and Arlington Counties in Virginia have recently instituted such
programs. The results should be evaluated for possible adaptation to the problem
in the District.
324. Specially trained police units, combined with increased cooperation between police departments and social service agencies, have been developed to decrease the number of homicides resulting from family altercations in such cities as
New York and Louisville, Kentucky. For a general discussion of such programs see
Parnas, Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents of Intra-family Violence, 36
LAw & CONTSMP. PROB. 539 (1971).
The Regional Office of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has
announced plans to hold a conference with District police officials within the next
three or four months to discuss possible implementation of such a program.
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the true breadth of the homicide problem in the District of Columbia. Dr. James L. Luke, Chief Medical Examiner for the District of
Columbia, has described the general scope of the problem:
Homicide is by far the leading cause of death in the nation's capital
between the ages of 15 and 44 years. We are killing each other here
at the rate of nearly 40/100,000 population, more than double New
York City's rate. Extrapolated to the entire United States, at this rate
the annual toll would be 80,000 lives, which places the situation here
in proper perspective."'
There is also a problem (less serious in the District than elsewhere) of obtaining accurate information to distinguish between
criminal and non-criminal homicides in determining cause of death.
Dr. Luke has stated:
[Tihe specific cause of death is incorrect in approximately 50% of
the total cases investigated by any functional medical-legal agency
when pre- and post-autopsy causes of death are compared ....
[T]he circumstances or manner of death (i.e. homicide, suicide,
accident, natural causes, etc.) is incorrect in some 20-30% of cases
investigated when pre- and post-autopsy circumstances of death are
compared .... 329
In the same speech, he commented:
Most of us in the specialty are of the opinion that only 50% of homicides are even recognized, much less completely and expertly interpreted. Data recently accumulated in Oklahoma and extrapolated to
the country as a whole, for example, lead to the conservative conclusion that there are an estimated 4,500 homicides that are medically
certified as having occurred via other modalities every year .... 37
The official police crime reports show that there were 106 and 100
actual criminal homicides reported in fiscal years 1962 and 1963
respectively.aH In fiscal years 1972 and 1973 there were 375 and 356
actual criminal homicides reported, 39 an increase of over 300 per325. Address by Chief Medical Examiner James L. Luke before the Mayor's
Criminal Justice Coordinating Board and the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments, January, 1972 (unpublished).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. ANN. REP. OF THE METRoPoLrrAN Poc DEP'T, WASHINGTON,

D.C. 22 (1962);

ANN. REP. OF THE MEROPOLITAN POLCE DEP'T, WASHINGTON, D.C. 22 (1963).
329. ANN. REP. OF THE MErROPOLITAN POICE DEP'T, WASHINGTON, D.C. 14 (1972);

ANN. REP. OF THE MrRoixOLrrAN PoLIcE DEP'T, WASHINGTON,

D.C. 14 (1973).

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:207

cent. Thus, based upon data which can only be regarded as conservative estimates,o the social harm from homicides has presented an
increasingly serious problem for residents of the District of Columbia. While the loss to the families of homicide victims and the loss
to the community cannot be expressed adequately in economic
terms, studies have shown that homicides have a greater relative
economic impact on the community than the loss from any other
criminal offense.3I
A profile of the characteristics of homicide offenses in the District
of Columbia was made in 196.6, based on an intensive analysis of
some 172 unlawful homicides:
Murders are most likely to occur from 6:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. on
weekends. Murder is not a markedly seasonal crime, nor is it primarily a street crime: the majority take place indoors at the residence of
the victim or offender. Almost 80 percent of murder victims and
offenders are acquainted or related. Approximately half of all victims
and offenders are between 30 and 50 years old. Negroes account for
the overwhelming majority of offenders and victims. For the most
330. The statistics are published annually in a pamphlet entitled ANNUAL REP.
OF THE METROPoxrAN POLICE DEP'T, WASHINGTON, D.C. Reliance on these figures
presents two problems, however. First, whether a homicide is reported as a criminal
homicide depends upon whether the police define it as such at the time the report
for the offense is written. See generally FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK (1974). Second, a study has shown that police statis-

tics do not have a high rate of correlation with an independent survey of crime
incidence. PRESmENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FrLD SuRvEYs No. 1, REPORT ON APILOT STUDY IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ON VICTIMIZATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD LAW ENFORCEMENT 118 (1967). However,

the police statistics do provide at the very least a conservative illustration of the
great increase in criminal homicides over the last decade.
331. As the President's Commission on Law Enforcement has indicated:
Willful homicide results in an economic loss both to the community, which
loses a productive worker, and to the victim's family or dependents who lose
a source of support. This loss is essentially the same as the loss in other kinds
of death and is normally measured by the earning capacity of the victim at
the time of death. Other expenses, such as medical bills before death may
also be involved. In 1965 there were an estimated 9,850 victims of murder and
non-negligent manslaughter. The present value of their total future earning
potential at the time of death, computed on the basis of the average national
wage for persons of the victim's age, amounts to about $750 million (discounted at 5 percent). This estimate represents total earnings rather than
savings.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK

FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 45 (1967) (footnotes omit-

ted).
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part murder has been and remains an intra-racial crime: Negroes kill
Negroes; whites kill whites. Alcohol plays a significant part in the
prelude to murder; almost half the victims and offenders had been
drinking prior to the crime. A gun is the weapon most often employed
2

by offenders.11

This profile suggests that major attention needs to be focused on the
problem of homicide among non-strangers. It also suggests the need
for additional information on the role of guns, as the weapon of
choice, and the relationship between alcohol and unlawful homicide
in order to understand more fully the social problem. The law can
operate to prevent homicides only by preventing the behavior which
causes them.
The Definition of Criminal Homicide: Some Difficult Issues
Following a familiar pattern in the District's criminal code,
"homicide" is not defined in the existing statutory scheme. If homicide is defined simply as the death of one human being caused by
another, 333 then criminal homicide is homicide committed without
legal justification or excuse. 34 The elements of criminal homicide
C.

332. REPORT OF THE PRESmENT'S COMM'N ON CRIME IN THE DisTIr OF COLUMBIA
45 (1966).
333. Professor Perkins defines homicide in these terms:
Homicide is the killing of a human being by another human being.
The older authorities gave this definition: Homicide is the killing of a
human being by a human being. The difference between the two is that
suicide is excluded by the first but included in the second. The problems of
self-destruction are so different from those involved in the killing of another
that it is desirable to use "suicide" and "homicide" as mutually exclusive
terms, and the modem trend is in this direction.
R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 28 (footnotes omitted).
In order to assure the exclusivity of suicide and homicide, a revised criminal code
for the District of Columbia should clearly except suicide from the homicide
sections. See notes 367-75 & accompanying text infra.
334. Professor Perkins defines criminal homicide as "homicide without lawful
justification or excuse." R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 34. The rationale underlying
this qualification is based upon the complexity of behavior which may result in
homicide:
Though the principal end to be served by the law of homicide is the preservation of life, it is obvious that this does not mean the prevention of all
homicides. In the first place, while it is generally desirable to preserve life,
not all homicides are undesirable. In the second place, the law can operate
to prevent homicides only by preventing the behavior which causes them and
even if a homicide viewed alone is undesirable, the behavior which causes it
may not be, because it serves ends which justify the creation of such risk of
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thus are: 1) the death, 2) of a human being, 3) caused by, 4) another
human being, 5) without legal justification or excuse. This section
will discuss certain general problems involved in defining criminal
homicide.
1. "Death"-When is a person legally dead?
Without a resolution of the problem of defining death, the criminal code provides inadequate guidance to the medical profession
and others as to what minimum standards are to be applied. Moreover, in the absence of a clear standard, criminal homicide prosecutions of certain types of cases are extremely difficult." 5
With medical technology capable of prolonging the vital functions
of a human being long after the brain has entirely ceased to function
and with the advent of organ transplantation, the issue of defining
death takes on added importance. When is a person actually dead
for the purposes of the law of homicide?
To illustrate the problem, consider two situations. First, suppose
an elderly patient is in a coma for five months with virtually no
chance of regaining consciousness. The resident doctor of a hospital
makes a decision to discontinue the use of a machine maintaining
circulatory or respiratory functions to which the patient is attached,
knowing that life cannot otherwise be sustained. Has a criminal
homicide been committed? Second, suppose as a result of an automobile accident the victim's brain is no longer functioning, but the
victim's beating heart is removed for transplant into another human
being. Is the victim's death caused by injuries inflicted in the automobile accident or by removal of the viable heart?
Obviously it is legally impossible to commit homicide after death
occurs. Regardless of intent, a person does not commit homicide by
firing a bullet into a corpse."' The requisite element of death raises
death as it creates. Moreover, if it does not serve justifying ends and is
therefore undesirable, it may nevertheless be behavior which the law cannot
possibly prevent. Finally, even if the behavior is of a sort which it is possible
to prevent by law, the likelihood of prevention may be so low, and the probability that undesirable consequences will attend the effort to achieve prevention so high, that the effort will produce more harm than good.... Subject
to these four qualifications, it can be said that the principal end of the law
of homicide is the prevention of behavior which may cause death.
Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 CoLuM. L. REv. 701,
730-31 (1937) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler & Michael].
335. Cf. text accompanying notes 325-27 supra.
336. "It is a general requirement of the law of homicide that the victim be a
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difficult issues in the law of homicide because of the absence of any
legal definition of death, not to mention a satisfactory definition of
death, in many jurisdictions. 337 The authors have been unable to

find any homicide case in the District of Columbia which has defined death for the purposes of criminal homicide prosecutions. In
the absence of a legal definition of death, most cases where the issue
is raised seem to be resolved either by a lay or a medical definition.ns
A few attempts to provide an appropriate legislative standard
have been made. One such attempt is the Maryland provision which
provides alternative definitions of death:
(a) A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, based
on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of
spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the
disease or condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because of the passage of time since these functions

ceased, attempts at resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in this
event, death will have occurred at the time these functions ceased.
(b) A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical prac-

tice and because of a known disease or condition, there is the absence
living human being. Shooting a dead body is not homicide, although it may be
another crime." W.

LAFAVE

& A. Scorr, HANDBOOK

(footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as W.

LAFAvE

ON

CRIMINAL LAw 530 (1972)

& A. Scor]. "Shooting or

otherwise damaging a corpse is not homicide even if done by one wholly unaware
of the lifeless condition of the body." R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 31 (footnote
omitted).
337. "Searching the reported cases for judicial definitions of death, one is struck
immediately by the scarcity of attempts to define the term." 1B R. GRAY,
ATTORNEY's TEXTBOOK OF MEDICMNE § 29.22 (3d ed. 1974).
338. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 488 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) ("The cessation
of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by phsyicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent
thereon. . . ."); DORIAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDicAL DICTIONARY 387 (24th ed. 1965)
("Suspension or cessation of vital processes of the body, as heart beat and respiration."); B. MALoY, THE SmIMLFmD MEDIcAL DICTIONARY FOR LAwYERs 168 (2d ed.

1951) ("The state of being without life, energy, or activity. The stoppage of all vital
functions.. . ."); MERRIAM-WE STER NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 581 (3d ed.
1961) ("the ending of all vital functions without possibility of recovery").
Legal scholars have been, if anything, more indefinite than the dictionaries cited
above. For example, one text states that "[d]eath, for a human being, is the end
of temporal existence. Homicide is a form of truncating human existence, and
accelerating the inevitable termination of life." CLARK & MARsHALL,A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CRIMES § 10.00, at 597 (7th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as LAw OF
CRIMES].
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of spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards of
medical practice, during reasonable attempts to either maintain or
restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory function in the absence
of spontaneous brain function, it appears that further attempts at
resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not succeed, death will
have occurred at the time when these conditions first coincide. Death
is to be pronounced before artificial means of supporting respiratory
and circulatory function are terminated and before any vital organ is
removed for purposes of transplantation."
Most jurisdictions, as an alternative to attempting to draft a precise legal definition of death, have not specified criteria for determining when death occurs. Rather, they have incorporated the contemporary medical definition as was done in the Uniform Anatomical Gifts Act.34 It is argued that to insist upon a legal definition of
death may preclude the incorporation of subsequent medical advances.
Having raised this difficult issue and discussed some alternate
responses, the authors make no attempt herein to recommend an
appropriate definition of death. The Law Review Commission
should consider such fundamental problems of definition in the
course of revising the District's criminal code and make their recommendations to the legislature. 4 '
2.

"Human being"-When does human life begin?

When will human life be deemed to have begun insofar as the
homicide law is concerned? The search for a legally precise definition of the human person has been hampered by discord in philo42
sophical, theological, and scientific circles.
339. ANN. CODE MD. art. 43, § 54F (Supp. 1974).
340. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-277(b) (1973) ("The time of death shall be determined by a physician who attends the donor at his death, or, if none, the physician
who certifies the death."). This solution by the National Commisioners for the
Uniform Anatomical Gifts Act was substantially adopted by 47 states and the
District of Columbia as of October 15, 1971. 9 TIE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1972-1973, at 106 (1972).
341. Consideration of the problem would require a thorough investigation of the
medical as well as legal problems involved in formulating any such definition. Such
a study could be modeled on several similar investigations into the question already
conducted. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A.
337 (1968); Task Force on Death and Dying, Institute of Society, Ethics and the
Life Sciences, Refinements in Criteria for the Determination of Death: An
Appraisal, 221 J.A.M.A. 48 (1972).
342. As the Supreme Court has stated:
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Early common law held that the killing of a fetus was homicide
only after a certain point in the stage of pregnancy, 3 3 defined as
"quickening," or when the fetus showed signs of movement, usually
344
early in the second trimester of pregnancy.
As the common law developed, however, a fetus had to be born
alive in order to be the subject of homicide.345 Under the "born
alive" test, questions of precisely when an infant died during the
process of childbirth were soon presented. These cases generally
arose outside of the setting of a modern hospital. Is it necessary for
an infant to be entirely separated from its mother? Is it required
that there be an entirely independent life, with the umbilical cord
cut and tied, and with its own breathing and heart action? Under
the common law, jurisdictions have not been uniform in deciding
'346
the exact point in the birth process when an infant is "born alive.
California was recently faced with an interpretation of its
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology
are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
343. See Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of
the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality,14 N.Y.L.F. 411,
422 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Means].
344. The Supreme Court has recently defined quickening as "the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th
week of pregnancy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973) (footnote omitted).
345. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 336, at 530-31; Means, supra note
343, at 420.
346. This lack of uniformity was noted in a California case:
[U]nder the older common law ... a child did not become a human being
and could not be the subject of a homicide until it was completely born alive,
was entirely separated from its mother and had an entirely independent life,
with the cord cut and with its own breathing and heart action .... [These
rules have largely been retained in the modem common law and in common
law states in this country. While there have been some modifications of the
rules these jurisdictions still require a rather complete separation from the
mother and a rather complete demonstration that there was an entirely independent existence in the child before considering the infant as a human
being, although in some of the more modem cases it has been held that the
cutting of the cord was not necessary to this end.
People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 623, 176 P.2d 92, 94 (1947) (emphasis
added).
In affirming a conviction of manslaughter, the Chavez court did not follow the
strict common law standard:
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homicide laws.u7 The Keeler case involved a deliberate assault upon
an unborn child with the intent to kill it. The lower court held that
such conduct could be murder, noting that "[w]e are satisfied that
a fetus which has reached the stage of viability is a human being
for the purposes of California's homicide statutes. '348 In rejecting
the live birth test that court held that "[piroof beyond a reasonable
doubt of capacity to live outside the womb provides a test more in
'34
keeping with the realities of continuous human development. "
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that
in declaring murder to be the unlawful and malicious killing of a
"human being" the legislature of 1850 intended the term to have the
settled common law meaning of a person who had been born alive,
and did not intend the act of feticide-as distinguished from abortion-to be an offense under the laws of California. 5"
In reaction to this decision the California legislature immediately
enacted a feticide statute, 35 1' despite the notation of the California
Supreme Court indicating that such statutes were basically a nineteenth century phenomenon and had recently been abrogated in
2
several jurisdictions.3
Other jurisdictions have also seen legislative reactions to this position taken by the courts. The actions have ranged from legislative
definition of the subject of homicide to include fetuses, 313 separate
There is no sound reason why an infant should not be considered a human

being when born or removed from the body of the mother, when it has
reached that stage of development where it is capable of living an independent life as a separate being, and where in the natural course of events it will
so live if given normal and reasonable care. It should equally be held that a
viable child in the process of being born is a human being within the meaning
of the homicide statutes, whether or not the process has been fully completed.
It should at least be considered a human being where it is a living baby and
where in the natural course of events a birth which is already started would
naturally be successfully completed.
Id.
347. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481
(1970). See also State v. Dickinson, 23 Ohio App. 2d 259, 263 N.E.2d 253 (1970)
(court refused to extend homicide to cover viable fetuses).
348. 80 Cal. Rptr. 865, 869 (Ct. App. 1969).
349. Id. at 868 n.2 (emphasis added).
350. 2 Cal. 3d at 628, 470 P.2d at 622, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
351. CAL.

PENAL CODE §

187(a) (West Supp. 1974), amending CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 187 (West 1970).
352. 2 Cal. 3d at 633 n.16, 470 P.2d at 625 n.16, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 489 n.16.
353. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2223 (1964).
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feticide laws, 3 4 and stringent birth reporting laws.3 55
While the issue of when human life begins has never been decided
in the District of Columbia, it has been held that the local murder
statutes define the crime as it was at common law 56 with certain
statutory additions which are irrelevant to this discussion.37 It can
thus be presumed that the District's definition of a human being
will be that of the common law. While it is apparent that there is
no constitutional bar to extending the common law definition of
human being to include the unborn but viable fetus, 358 such a step
should be undertaken, if at all, only after careful study. The authors
believe there is merit in providing a definition which includes a
child in the process of being born, a slight extension of the common
law. A fetus should "at least be considered a human being where it
is a living baby and where in the natural course of events a birth
which is already started would naturally be successfully completed. ' '3 9 In addition, the authors submit that consideration should
be given to the adoption of a separate feticide statute to cover conduct not currently within the scope of the District's criminal code.
3. "Omissions to act resulting in death"-What should be the
scope of the duty to preserve the life of another?
The common law rule, reflected in the District's case law, is that
there is no general legal duty to provide aid to preserve the life of
another, no matter how great the danger or how easily the actor
354. The Supreme Court in Keeler undertook a detailed discussion of the various
feticide statutes. See 2 Cal. 3d at 627-33, 470 P.2d at 621-26, 87 Cal. Rptr. at
485-90.
355. See, e.g., N.D. CENr. CODE § 12-25-05 (1960).

356. See, e.g., Bishop v. United States, 71 App. D.C. 132, 107 F.2d 297 (1940);
Hamilton v. United States, 26 App. D.C. 382 (1905) (adoption of common law from
Maryland as of 1801).
357. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-2401 (1973) (felony-murder rule); id. § 22-2402
(death caused by obstructing railroad-first degree murder).
358. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In discussing the interest of a state
in protecting the unborn, the Court recognized an important state interest in this
regard:
Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or
fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other
point prior to live birth. In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be
given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potentiallife is involved,
the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman
alone.
Id. at 150.
359. People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 623, 176 P.2d 92, 94 (1947).
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could have prevented the death, unless there is a specific legal duty
" ' Judge Wright identified the
to do so.36° In Jones v. United States,36
sources of specific legal duties:
There are at least four situations in which failure to act may constitute breach of a legal duty. One can be held criminally liable: first,
where a statute imposes a duty to care for another; second, where one
stands in a certain status relationship to another; third, where one
has assumed a contractual duty to care for another; and fourth, where
one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the
helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid." 2
Excluding these four limited circumstances, the law imposes no
affirmative duty to save human life if within one's power. Nowhere
in the criminal law is the potential gap between law and morality
greater than in the area of omissions to act. An example provided
by the nineteenth century criminal law scholar, Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen, expresses the current state of the law:
A number of people who stand round a shallow pond in which a child
is drowning, and let it drown without taking the trouble to ascertain
the depth of the pond, are no doubt, shameful cowards, but they can
hardly be said to have killed the child. 63

A more modern example which further illustrates the gap between
360. A malicious omission to perform an act which one has a duty to perform is
murder if death is the result. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78
N.E.2d 644 (1948) (second degree murder conviction of mother for death of illegitimate child who died when deprived of food and liquid affirmed); Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 14, 141 S.E.2d 710 (1965) (murder conviction for wilfully and
maliciously withholding food from baby reversed for failure to prove case beyond
a reasonable doubt).
An omission to perform an act which one has a duty to perform which under the
circumstances amounts to reckless conduct is manslaughter if death is caused
thereby. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 352, 308 F.2d 307
(1962) (manslaughter conviction reversed due to failure to instruct jury that it must
first find that defendant had a legal duty to provide food to infant).
361. 113 U.S. App. D.C. 352, 308 F.2d 307 (1962).
362. Id. at 355, 308 F.2d at 310. It may be questioned whether the third source
of legal duty exists independently of the fourth source. Merely quitting a job in
breach of contract would seem to be an inadequate basis for criminal liability in
the absence of reliance upon the contract and the lack of opportunity to obtain a
suitable replacement.
363. 3 J. STEPHEN, A HiSTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 10 (1883). If one
of the on-lookers in the above hypothetical were the parent of the child, the second
source of legal duty enumerated in Jones would be satisfied. A legal duty would
similarly be found if one of the persons had contractually assumed a duty to care
for the child, such as a baby sitter.
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specific legal and moral obligations is that of 28-year old Catherine
Genovese. She was repeatedly stabbed over a half-hour period in
front of her apartment house in New York City, in the plain view of
at least 37 respectable, middle-class residents who witnessed her
death from their apartments but did nothing to help her. 3 4
The concepts of individual insularity and independence which
underlie the Anglo-American doctrine of extremely limited responsibility for non-feasance are in need of reevaluation in light of the
exigencies of contemporary society. Problems presented by advanced technology and denser population demand a more cooperative attitude among citizens, the encouragement of which may be a
proper end of the criminal law. 365 It should be noted, however, that
any steps taken in this direction should be carefully made and accompanied by some process which would adequately educate the
citizenry as to what circumstances would create an affirmative duty
to act and what sanctions would be-imposed upon failure to do so.
4.

"Another"-The treatment of conduct related to suicide

At earlier common law, suicide was considered a form of homicide
and was punishable by forfeiture of the decedent's estate.3 66 No
cases have been discovered in the District of Columbia concerning
364. 37 Who Saw MurderDidn't Call Police, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1964, § 1, at
1, col. 4. In an editorial entitled "What Kind of People Are We," the New York
Times commented:
[A] simple telephone call in the privacy of their own homes was all that
was needed. How incredible it is that such motivations as "I didn't want to
get involved" deterred them from this act of simple humanity ....

Who can

explain such shocking indifference on the part of a cross section of our fellow
New Yorkers?
N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1964, § 1, at 18, col. 2.
365. In many European countries statutes punish by fine or imprisonment persons who knowingly fail to aid a person in danger of death or serious bodily harm,
if such aid could be given without danger to that person or others. For a compendium of such legislation see Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans, 14 Am. J.
CoMP. L. 630, 655-57 (1966).
366. See Rudolph v. United States ex rel. Stuart, 36 App. D.C. 379 (1911) (civil
suit for policeman's pension after he committed suicide). In denying the heirs'
claim for the pension, the court stated:
Suicide was a common-law crime, punishable by the forfeiture of the estate
of the decedent. To support relators' contention [that suicide should not be
considered a crime], therefore, would be equivalent to holding that, if the
decedent had been killed while in the perpetration of a crime, or executed
for a crime, during the term of his employment on the police force, relators
would be entitled to the pension. Such a construction is impossible.
Id. at 386.
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criminal prosecution for suicide or its attempt.3 6 While it is not
clear whether suicide is a substantive offense in the District, the
present code language could be read to exclude suicide from the
scope of the murder provisions by the presence of the word "another." 8
Other than perhaps clarifying that suicide should be excluded
from the substantive law of homicide in the District, is there a need
for some form of statutory language on the subject of suicide and
related conduct? Some of that conduct is currently clearly within
the purview of the homicide statutes. Someone causing, aiding, or
soliciting the suicide of another would be the subject of the appropriate homicide provision. Thus, maliciously aiding another's suicide with deliberation and premeditation would be first degree murder; without premeditation and deliberation, second degree murder;
and without malice, but in the absence of justification or excuse,
manslaughter."'
The concept of suicide and related conduct as a substantive criminal offense raises many abstract questions in regard to the sanctity
3 7 0 It has
of life versus an inherent right of self-destruction.
been
367. Indeed, "whether attempted suicide is a crime is in doubt in some jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia." Application of the President & Directors
of Georgetown Col., Inc., 118 U.S. App. D.C. 80, 89, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (1964)
(footnote omitted) (proceeding by hospital for writ authorizing blood transfusion
for patient who refused on religious grounds).
368. A New Jersey case, however, utilizing a statute incorporating common law
crimes, similar to that of the District's, held attempted suicide to be a crime in
that jurisdiction. State v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478, 479, 55 A. 44, 45 (Super. Ct. 1903).
The legislature, however, defined attempted suicide as a form of disorderly conduct, apparently because no indictments would be issued by the grand jury. See
Potts v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 48 N.J. Super. 554, 557, 138 A.2d 574, 578
(1958). Recently, the legislature expressly decriminalized attempted suicide. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, § 85-5.1 (Supp. 1974).
369. Many jurisdictions hold such conduct to be murder, but of varying degrees.
See, e.g., McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89 (1910) (a defendant could be
guilty of either first or second degree murder depending on the circumstances);
Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N.E. 505 (1903) (a hypothesis that there was an
agreement between two parties to commit suicide, and that the agreement was in
part the inducing cause of deceased's taking poison, was insufficient evidence for
conviction); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 118 Ky. 637, 82 S.W. 265 (1904) (an accessory could be guilty of murder, first or second degree, as would be the principal, if
there were sufficient evidence of his actions); People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178
N.W. 690 (1920) (after plea of guilty in murder case court may determine degree
of murder without calling a jury); State v. Jones, 86 S.C. 17, 67 S.E. 160 (1910)
(affirming a conviction of first degree murder).
370. See, e.g., Larremore, Suicide and the Law, 17 HARv. L. REV. 331 (1904)
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argued that criminalization of suicide is an indirect means of criminalizing related conduct such as attempted suicide. While there
may be some merit in the argument that criminalizing attempted
suicide guarantees the state's jurisdiction over the would-be suicide
for rehabilitative purposes, 7 ' it can serve to create a reverse deterrence, i.e., the actor must succeed in the attempt or be faced with
possible criminal sanctions. Attempted suicide has also been held
to be an "unlawful act" sufficient to invoke the misdemeanor3 2
manslaughter rule when a rescuer was accidentally killed. 1
Although several states recognize attempted suicide as a crime,373
the authors concur with the draftsmen of -the Model Penal Code,
who concluded: "[W]e think it clear that this is not an area in
which the penal law can be effective and that its intrusion on such
tragedies is an abuse.

3174

Some conduct in regard to suicide, how-

ever, would seem to warrant criminal sanctions, and the American
Law Institute included separate provisions dealing with soliciting or
aiding another to commit suicide.3 7 5 The District would be well ad-

vised to clarify the position of such conduct in the criminal code
upon revision.
5. Other general terms in the definition of criminal homicide
Two other terms relevant to any discussion of the definition of
criminal homicide involve "causation" and "without legal justification or excuse." A general definition of causation, as appears in
many of the modem criminal codes,3

would seem to be sufficient

to cover criminal homicide as well. A full discussion of affirmative
defenses included within the concept "without legal justification or
excuse" is beyond the scope of this article.3 77 Hence, these terms

receive only brief mention here.
(discussion of philosophical and practical problems of New York's law on suicide);

Mikell, Is Suicide Murder?, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 379 (1903) (discussion of common
law development of suicide and its philosophical problems).

371. See Larremore, Suicide and the Law, 17 HARv. L. Rav. 331, 339-40 (1904).
372. Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 25 Am. R. 109 (1877).
373. See Note, Criminal Law-Attempted Suicide, 40 N.C.L. REV. 323, 326
(1962).
374. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
375. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). In this
section soliciting or aiding another to commit suicide is a separate offense. It is a
second degree felony if suicide or attempted suicide results; otherwise it is a misdemeanor.
376. See, e.g., Ky.Rav. STAT. ANN. § 433B.1-060 (Baldwin 1974); PA. CONSOL.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 303 (Purdon 1973).
377. See note 153 & accompanying text supra.
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a.

causation
As a necessary, but not sufficient, basis for the requirement of
causation, the actor's conduct must be proven to have been the
cause in fact of the death. 7 With rare exceptions,379 this principle
is easily applied.
Although the victim's death may not have occurred "but for" the
actions of the accused, there may have transpired such intervening
events contributing to the victim's death that the accused will not
be held criminally responsible. The general rule, then, is that "for
homicide, the death must be the natural and probable consequence
of the unlawful act, and not the result of an independent intervening
cause in which the accused does not participate, and which he cannot foresee." 8 '
This principle does present difficulties in application to the facts
of each case, and the rules which have evolved under it are diverse.38
Thus it has been held in the District of Columbia that failure of the
victim to seek medical treatment,3 2 and even affirmative action on
the part of the victim to counteract the benefits of medical treatment, 3 3 will not relieve the accused of criminal liability for the
homicide.
Also, cases from other jurisdictions have been cited by our courts
to the effect that even the suicide of the victim may not absolve the
one who first dealt a serious, but not mortal, wound.3 There is some
378. See generally 40 AM. JUR.

2D

Homicide §§ 13-16 (1968); Williams,

Causationin Homicide, 1957 CraM. L. Rav. 429, 430-33.
The importance of factual cause for legal purposes is that nothing that is
not a factual cause can be legal cause. A legal cause is, therefore, a species
of factual cause.
Id. at 431.
379. Certain instances, for example, independent and simultaneous injuries
which jointly cause death, present problems in the determination of factual cause,
but these may be resolved by the jury as any other question of fact.
380. 40 Am.Jun. 2d Homicide § 17 (1968). See also W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra
note 336, at 248.
381. A perfect example of an arbitrary, technical rule of causation is the socalled "year and a day rule." Probably for lack of scientific proof reliable as to any
great length of time, the common law refused to prosecute if death occurred more
than a year and one day from the time of the injury. See generallyR. PERKINS, supra
note 138, at 28-29.
382. Hopkins v. United States, 4 App. D.C. 430, 438-41 (1894).

383. United States v. Hamilton, 182 F. Supp. 548, 550-51 (D.D.C. 1960).
384. Id. at 551, citing People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 559, 57 P. 470, 473 (1899)
(serious but not mortal wound); Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 183, 179 N.E.
633, 649 (1932) (mortal wound).
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authority, though, for the proposition that clear negligence on the
part of those attending to the victim's wounds may be considered
in some circumstances as relieving the actor's responsibility for the
seems to be that the original
death;" 5 one of the circumstances
381
itself.
in
mortal
not
was
wound
b.

without legal justification or excuse

The absence of legal justification or excuse is the dividing line
between criminal and non-criminal homicide." 7 While the two categories of "legal justification" and "legal excuse" were markedly
different at common law, 3 they have blended into a single concept,
recognizing that 'certain homicides, based on the realities of the
human condition, should not be labelled criminal.
Basically, a homicide is "justified" if commanded or authorized
by law.389 The typical examples are execution of a convicted felon
of war,38 ' or
by order of the court, 30 the killing of an enemy in time
32
the killing of a person engaged in a forcible felony.
385. See Hopkins v. United States, 4 App. D.C. 430 (1894), where the court
stated:
But if the wound or hurt be not mortal, but with ill applications by the
party, or those about him, of unwholesome salves or medicines the party dies,
if it can clearly appear, that this medicine, and not the wound, was the cause
of his death, it seems it is not homicide, but then that must appear clearly
and certainly to be so.
Id. at 440, citing 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CRowN 428 (1678).
386. In Hopkins, the court implied that the defendant's burden of proving this
intervening cause is significant:
[The defendant] will be held guilty of the murder unless he can make it
clearly appear that the maltreatment of the wound, or the medicine administered to the patient, or his own misconduct, and not the wound itself, was
the sole cause of his death.
4 App. D.C. at 441.
387. See note 334 supra. While it is a tautology to explain criminal homicide
simply as homicide committed without legal justification or excuse, it is a descriptive term signifying a conclusory statement of law.
388. At early common law, excusable homicide was punishable by forfeiture of
chattels, while justifiable homicide was a complete exoneration from blame. One
early commentator, Sir Edward Coke, even maintained that excusable homicide
was punishable by death, but this view has since been repudiated. See LAW OF
CRIMES, supra note 338, § 7.01, at 470.
389. See id.; R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 33.
390. See LAw OF CRIMES, supra note 338, at § 7.01; R. PERKINS, supra note 138,
at 33.
391. R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 33.
392. See, e.g., Laney v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 56, 294 F. 412 (1923) (homi-
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Excusable homicide recognizes exculpation in certain circumstances which do not involve the exercise of a legal duty or right,
33
but are considered sufficiently mitigating to bar criminal liability.
Such situations are represented by accidents, wherein the actor was
not criminally negligent,394 deaths caused by persons not considered
legally responsible for their actions, 395 and certain of the self-defense
cases which lie somewhere
between justifiable homicide and volun3 96
tary manslaughter.

D. Existing Statutory Provisions and Their Evolution
1. The common law

At common law there were but two categories of criminal homicide, murder and manslaughter.3 97 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia discussed the definitions of and
distinctions between these categories of criminal homicide and their
evolution in the case of Marcus v. United States.318 Murder was
defined as "[w]hen a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in being, and under the
king's peace, with malice aforethought, either express or implied." '
Manslaughter was defined as "[t]he unlawful killing of another
cide is justifiable if necessary in defense of domicile, self, or others under actor's
protection).
393. See LAW OF CRIMES, supra note 338, at § 7.01; R. PERKINS, supra note 138,
at 33.
394. See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 49 App. D.C. 351, 265 F. 991 (1920)
(death excusable as accident if vehicle malfunction occurred without fault on the
part of the actor).
395. Certain persons lack the capacity to commit criminal homicide in the eyes
of the law. Such incapacity normally excuses their conduct. See R. PERKINS, supra
note 138, at 33 (infants and raving maniacs excused for homicides they commit).
396. While one is justified in the killing of another if necessary to prevent imminent death or bodily injury, an unnecessary killing under a reasonable apprehension of imminent death or bodily injury may be excused. See id. at 33-34. If the
killing is unnecessary and the actor's apprehension is unreasonable, the homicide
would probably be voluntary manslaughter, not murder, since there would be no
malice on the part of the actor.
397. See Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 472-73 (1946) (first degree
murder conviction affirmed despite lower court's refusal to allow jury to consider
defendant's alleged mental deficiency).
398. Marcus v. United States, 66 App. D.C. 298, 86 F.2d 854 (1936) (first degree
murder conviction affirmed where jury could have found that homicide in course
of robbery was purposeful).
399. Id. at 304, 86 F.2d at 860 (at common law murder was not divided into
degrees and its punishment was death by execution).
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without malice either express or implied."' 400
These definitions were adopted as part of the common law of
Maryland and subsequently of the District of Columbia when the
territory comprising the District was ceded to the federal government. 01' A later act of Congress expressly adopted the common law
definitions of crimes as2 part of the substantive criminal law of the
40
District of Columbia.
"Accordingly, under the common law of this District, an unlawful
homicide with malice expressed or implied was murder whether
with or without premeditation, deliberation, or an express purpose
to kill." 4 3 An unlawful, that is inexcusable or unjustifiable, homicide without malice would thus have been manslaughter.
2.

The 1901 codification

The first comprehensive codification of a code of laws for the
District of Columbia was enacted by Congress in 1901.404 The Code
established two degrees of murder, punishment therefore, and punishment but no codified definition for manslaughter.4 5 The entire
statutory scheme for unlawful homicide consisted of the following
brief provisions:
'

*

.MURDER IN FIRST DEGREE.-Whoever,

being of sound memory

and discretion, purposely, and either of deliberate and premeditated
malice or by means of poison, or in perpetrating or in attempting to
perpetrate any offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, kills another, is guilty of murder in the first degree.
, * *Whoever maliciously places an obstruction upon a railroad or
street railroad, or displaces or injures anything appertaining thereto,
or does any other act with intent to endanger the passage of any
locomotive or car, and thereby occasions the death of another, is
guilty of murder in the first degree.
. . . MURDER IN SECOND DEGREE.-Whoever with malice aforethought, except as provided in the last two sections, kills another is
guilty of murder in the second degree.

' * .PUNISHMENT.-The

punishment of murder in the first degree

shall be death by hanging. The punishment of murder in the second
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Id.
Id.
Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 37, § 16, 4 Stat. 448.
66 App. D.C. at 304, 86 F.2d at 860.
Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, 31 Stat. 1189.
Id. §§ 798-802.
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degree shall be imprisonment for life, or for not less than twenty
years.
S.. MANSLAUGHTER.-Whoever commits manslaughter shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 0 '
Thus, of these five code sections, two sections dealt with murder in
the first degree, and one of these sections dealt exclusively with
endangering the passage of railroad or street railroad. As can be seen
from the above provisions, no clarification was provided for "malice
aforethought" in second degree murder or for the definition of
"manslaughter."
The motives for this modification of the common law have been
attributed to various notions of effectively deterring homicide and
differences in culpability. The redefinition of murder into varying
degrees by statute allows for the treatment of criminal behavior on
a more individual basis, and is designed to provide grades of punishment to cover "the wide range of atrocity with which the crime of
murder might be committed."410 The distinction likewise recognizes
a substantial difference in culpability of one who deliberately takes
another's life, as distinguished from one who impulsively accomplishes the same result." 8
3.

Subsequent amendments

Since the 1901 codification of the homicide laws in the District of
Columbia, there have been a few substantive amendments made by
Congress. In 1925, the mode of execution for first degree murder was
changed from hanging to electrocution." 9 That same section was
406. Id.
407. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 472 (1946).
408. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted:
Statutes like ours, which distinguish deliberate and premeditated murder
from other murder, reflect a belief that one who meditates an intent to kill
and then deliberately executes it is more dangerous, more culpable or less
capable of reformation than one who kills on sudden impulse; or that the
prospect of the death penalty is more likely to deter men from deliberate than
from impulsive murder.
Bullock v. United States, 74 App. D.C. 220, 221, 122 F.2d 213, 214 (1941).
Accordingly, convictions of both first and second degree murder for the same slaying have been held to be inconsistent as "contrary to the intent of the nineteenth
century legal reforms which displaced undifferentiated common law murder."
Naples v. United States, 120 U.S. App. D.C. 123, 132, 344 F.2d 508, 517 (1964).
409. Act of Jan. 30, 1925, ch. 115, § 1, 43 Stat. 798, amending Act of Mar. 3,
1901, ch. 854, § 801, 31 Stat. 1321.
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subsequently amended in 1962 to provide for electrocution unless
the jury unanimously recommends life imprisonment; if the jury is
unable to reach a unanimous recommendation, the judge is given
the power to provide for execution or life imprisonment in first
41
degree murder convictions. 1
An Act of Congress in 1940 amended the first degree murder provision because of a lack of clarity of the status of the felony-murder
rule." ' That provision used "purposely" in a manner that could be
read in conjunction with the phrase "in perpetrating or in attempting to perpetrate any offense punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary." It was suggested in two cases that the felony-murder
rule was part of the second degree murder statute which incorporated common law murder.412 Congress thus made it clear that the
word "purposely" was solely a limitation on deliberate and premeditated homicides, and not on the above quoted phrase, thereby insuring that the felony-murder rule was part of the first degree murder
statute.
Congress limited the application of the felony-murder rule to specifically enumerated felonies.41 3 Thus, a killing, even without intent,
410. Act of Mar. 22, 1962, PuB. L. No. 87-423, § 1, 76 Stat. 46, amending Act of
Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 801, 31 Stat. 1321 (codified at D.C. CODE § 22-2404 (1973)).
The section now provides:
The punishment of murder in the first degree shall be death by electrocution unless the jury by unanimous vote recommends life imprisonment; or if
the jury, having determined by unanimous vote the guilt of the defendant
as charged, is unable to agree as to punishment it shall inform the court and
the court shall thereupon have jurisdiction to impose and shall impose either
a sentence of death by electrocution or life imprisonment.
D.C. CODE § 22-2404 (1973).
411. Act of June 12, 1940, ch. 339, 54 Stat. 347, amending Act of Mar. 3, 1901,
ch. 854, § 798, 31 Stat. 1321 (codified at D.C. CODE § 22-2401 (1973)).
412. See Jordan v. United States, 66 App. D.C. 309, 87 F.2d 64 (1936); Marcus
v. United States, 66 App. D.C. 298, 86 F.2d 854 (1936).
413. See note 411 supra. The section on first degree murder was thus amended
to what is now its present form:
Whoever, being of sound memory and discretion, kills another purposely,
either of deliberate and premeditated malice or by means of poison, or in
perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or without purpose so to do kills anotherin perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any arson, as defined in section 22-401
or 22-402, rape, mayhem, robbery, or kidnapping, or in perpetratingor attempting to perpetrate any housebreaking while armed with or using a dangerous weapon, is guilty of murder in the first degree.
D.C. CODE § 22-2401 (1973) (emphasis added).
While it might be argued that Congress intended to allow the common law
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during the perpetration of arson, rape, mayhem, robbery, kidnapping, or armed housebreaking was made first degree murder and the
felons involved liable to the death penalty.
Congress also provided coverage for negligent homicide if committed through the operation of a motor vehicle.414 The amendment
provided misdemeanor sanctions for homicides committed "by the
operation of any vehicle at an immoderate rate of speed or in a
careless, reckless, or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly."4 '5 The crime of negligent homicide was expressly included
within every charge of manslaughter by operation of a vehicle, and
was to be considered by the jury if they returned an acquittal on the
manslaughter charge. 6
Thus, the District of Columbia's criminal code includes purposeful and felony-murder as first degree murder, a special provision
concerning railroads, killing with malice aforethought as second
degree murder, common law manslaughter, and negligent homicide
if done with a vehicle.
E.

Murder

This section will consider the existing law of first and second
degree murder in three sections according to the following problem
areas: first, the mens rea of second degree murder-the meaning of
"malice aforethought"; second, the meaning of the phrase "premeditation and deliberation" in the first degree murder statute and
whether the distinction between first and second degree murder
should be continued; and, third, the felony-murder rule in the first
degree murder statute-whether it should be modified and, if so, in
what manner.
1. The mens rea of second degree murder-Malice aforethought
As indicated above, second degree murder in the District of Columbia retains the common law meaning of the commission of a
criminal homicide with "malice aforethought." ' This qualifying
phrase, however, has become a generic term and, in the law of
felony-murder rule to continue to operate through the second degree murder statute
for felonies not specified in the first degree murder statute, there is no evidence of
any such theory propounded by prosecutors subsequent to this amendment.
414. Act of June 17, 1935, ch. 266, 49 Stat. 385, amending Act of Mar. 3, 1901,
ch. 854, § 802, 31 Stat. 1321 (codified at D.C. CODE §§ 40-606 to -08 (1973)),
415. D.C. CODE § 40-606 (1973).
416. Id. § 40-607.
417. See text accompanying notes 397-403 supra.
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homicide, has virtually ceased to even approach its literal meaning." ' The requisite "aforethought" has been construed to merely
exclude post facto intent from murder." ' Moreover, "malice" no
longer necessarily implies any sort of "ill-will, spite, hatred, or hostility."4I 0 Consequently, malice aforethought identifies but no longer
describes the dividing line between murder and manslaughter.2
The term "malice aforethought" encompasses both express and
implied malice.4 2 Thus, it is often stated that malice may be presumed from the circumstances of the commission of the criminal
homicide.4 23 In Carter v. United States,4 24 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia attempted to provide a more
operationally meaningful definition of malice aforethought by quoting from Perkins' statement that "[m]alice aforethought is an un418. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 336, at 528.
419. See R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 34-35.
Undoubtedly the word "aforethought" was added to "malice" in the ancient cases to indicate a design thought out well in advance of the fatal act.
But as case after case came before the courts for determination involving
killings under a great variety of circumstances, there came to be less and less
emphasis upon the notion of a well-laid plan. And at the present day the only
requirement in this regard is that it must not be an afterthought.

Id.
420. United States v. Bush, 135 U.S. App. D.C. 67, 70, 416 F.2d 823, 826 (1969)
(conviction on second degree murder charge reversed because government failed to
prove that defendant exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense and acted with
malice).
421. See United States v. Hamilton, 182 F. Supp. 548 (D.D.C. 1960). Here, the
defendant was found guilty of manslaughter where the victim of defendant's assault himself removed nasal drain tubes while undergoing hospital treatment, and
died from asphyxiation. The government had sought a conviction on a charge of
second degree murder, but the court refused to accept this position, noting that
[t]he difference between murder in -the second degree and manslaughter is
found in the presence or absence of malice aforethought ....

The Court is

of the opinion that there was no malice in this case in the legal sense. Moreover, any reasonable doubt as to the nature and degree of homicide should
inure to the defendant's benefit.

Id. at 551.
422. As Professor Perkins commented:
While not always used with the same import, "express malice" is generally
employed to indicate that type of malice aforethought represented by an
intent to kill, whereas any state of mind sufficient for murder while lacking
that specific intent is denominated "implied malice."
R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 49 (footnotes omitted).
423. See generally LAW OF CRMES,supra note 338, at § 10.06; W. LAFAVE &
A. Scorr, supra note 336, at 528-30; R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 48-49.
424. 141 U.S. App. D.C. 259, 437 F.2d 692 (1971).
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justifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated man-endangeringstate of
mind." 5 The court has stressed that "intent to do an injurious act,
even one highly dangerous to human life, is equivalent to malice
only in the absence of justification, extenuation or excuse for that
state of mind. Intent may be, and
often is, an ingredient of malice,
' '42
but never its exact counterpart.

6

Modem criminal codes have tended to eliminate the phrase malice aforethought in the statutory definition of murder and to replace
it with terms more descriptive of the underlying states of mind that
42
will be given legal recognition as constituting malice aforethought.

This approach is recommended for the District of Columbia. Such
a revision would provide clearer notice to citizens as to what conduct
is encompassed in the offense of murder and by what standards it
will be determined. Perhaps of greater significance, it would provide
a clearer basis for instructing juries called upon to perform the
difficult task of determining which, if any, of the grades of unlawful
homicide fits the facts of a particular case. Additionally, more descriptive statutory language would aid in minimizing problems
which generate appeals under the present law, such as variations
between the offense as charged and as proved,42 as well as problems
in instructions to the jury.
In the absence of mitigation, excuse, or justification, it is clear
that the intent or purpose to kill another human being is one of the
underlying states of mind that will fall within second degree murder
and is the equivalent of express malice.4 2 In the District of Colum-

bia, assaulting another person with the intent to inflict serious bodily injury where the victim somehow dies as a result is also sufficient
to support a second degree murder verdict."' This is in accordance
with the common law proposition that the intent to commit serious
bodily injury supplies the element of malice necessary for murder.
Thus, in United States v. Hinkle, the court stated that "malice" is
425. Id. at 263, 437 F.2d at 696 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
426. Id.
427. See, e.g., Ky.Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 434A.1-02-0(1) (Baldwin 1974); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (West 1958).
428. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 144 U.S. App. D.C. 368, 447 F.2d 338
(1971).
429. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 127 U.S. App. D.C. 180, 382 F.2d 129
(1967).
430. The offense can only be second degree murder, however, because first degree
murder requires a specific intent to kill. See Collazo v. United States, 90 U.S. App.
D.C. 241, 196 F.2d 573, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 968 (1952).
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a "state of mind showing a heart that is without regard for the life
and safety of others."4"1
In addition to intent to kill and the intent to inflict serious bodily
injury, there is a third mental state that will qualify for malice
aforethought. A person may intentionally do an act that creates an
extremely high risk of death, and may even be aware of this risk,
without subjectively intending death or serious bodily injury to result. Examples where the jury, perhaps, could have found such a
mental state to exist may be seen in two District of Columbia cases.
In Lee v. United States,432 the defendant drove an automobile carrying a load of "bootleg" whiskey. When defendant discovered he was
being followed by a government car, he accelerated his car from
twenty-two miles per hour to seventy to eighty miles per hour
through a busy intersection at dusk where he struck another car and
4 33
killed a child who was riding therein. In United States v. Grady,
evidence was introduced that the defendant killed his three-year-old
daughter while punishing her for eating baby powder by holding her
at the shoulders and apparently banging her head against the floor.
On previous occasions, the evidence showed that he had beaten his
daughter with his fists, slammed her into the wall, and pushed her
head down a toilet.
However, there is an absence of clarity in both the District's case
law as well as that of other common law jurisdictions regarding what
has been referred to as depraved-heart murder or extremely reckless
behavior manifesting a disregard for the life and safety of others.
The difficult problem is how to articulate a standard for the jury to
apply that distinguishes this form of malice aforethought from reckless or criminally negligent conduct that constitutes involuntary
manslaughter.
In a concurring opinion in United States v. Dixon, Judge Leventhal observed:
There is a basis for a verdict of murder at common law, and also
as to second degree murder under our Code, when a defendant's act
is so reckless as to indicate a disregard of human life. Thus, there is
431. 159 U.S. App. D.C. 334, 336, 487 F.2d 1205, 1207 (1973) (emphasis added)
(jury instruction that "malice is a state of mind showing a heart regardless of social
duty" was harmless error since mortal wound inflicted by a knife).
432. 72 U.S. App. D.C. 147, 112 F.2d 46 (1940) (second degree murder conviction
affirmed where actor's conduct sufficient for jury to have found malice).
433. 157 U.S. App. D.C. 6, 481 F.2d 1106 (1973) (second degree murder conviction reversed for jury should have been instructed upon the requisite elements of
recklessness for murder and manslaughter).
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an objective element in "malice" and second degree murder.
Yet it was settled at common law, and, I think, is true under our
statute that reckless conduct resulting in death may constitute manslaughter. The difference between that recklessness which displays
depravity and such extreme and wanton disregard for human life as
to constitute "malice" and that recklessness that amounts only to
manslaughter lies in the quality of awareness of the risk. 4
We are left, then, with a continuum of culpable behavior unintentionally resulting in death, for which there is no legal justification
or excuse, beginning with extreme recklessness constituting malice
aforethought, then recklessness, and concluding with criminal negligence. Although the case law in the District is less than clear, it
seems that the degree of the actor's culpability, ranging from murder, reckless manslaughter, and negligent manslaughter to accidental-and thus excusable-homicide, depends upon the jury's application to the facts of the case of the following factors: 1) the degree
of risk to human life which the actor's conduct presented;43 5 2) the
434. 135 U.S. App. D.C. 401, 404-06, 419 F.2d 288, 291-93 (1969).
This mental state would seem to be included in the D.C. Bar Association's jury
instructions:
Implied malice is such as may be inferred from the circumstances of the
killing, as, for example where the killing is caused by the intentional use of
fatal force without circumstances serving to mitigate or justify the act, or
when an act which imports danger to another is done so recklessly or wantonly as to manifest depravity of mind and disregard of human life.
D.C. BAR Ass'N, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DismTicr OF COLUMBIA 104 (2d
ed. 1972) (emphasis added).
435. Judge Leventhal's concurring opinion in Dixon [see text accompanying

note 434 supra] seemed to disregard the degree of risk and placed primary emphasis in distinguishing between murder and manslaughter upon the "quality of
awareness of the risk." Cf. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 334, at 721. For a
description of a continuum of relative degrees of risk, see W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'r,
supra note 336, at 541-42:
Conduct which creates an unreasonable risk of injury to other persons or to
their property is generally termed "ordinary negligence," a type of fault
which will generally serve as the basis for tort liability and occasionally for
criminal liability. Conduct which creates not only an unreasonable risk but
also a "high degree" of risk (something more than mere "unreasonable" risk)
may be termed "gross negligence," and if in addition the one who creates
such a risk realizes that he does so, his conduct may be called "recklessness."
. . . For murder the degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury must be
more than a mere unreasonable risk, more even than a high degree of risk.
Perhaps the required danger may be designated a "very high degree" of risk
to distinguish it from those lesser degrees of risk which will suffice for other
crimes. Such a designation of conduct at all events is more accurately de-
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of intent to cause serious bodily injury under the mental state of
extreme recklessness.44 Consequently, intent to kill and extreme
recklessness accurately describe the underlying mental states that
qualify for malice aforethought.
2.

First or second degree murder

When codified in 1901, the legislature divided the common law
offense of murder into two degrees, 44' the more serious of the two
carrying the possibility of a death sentence."4 This section discusses
the meaning of and justification for the general standard distinguishing first and second degree murder.
The District's code provides that "[w]hoever, being of sound
memory and discretion, kills another purposely . . . of deliberate
and premeditated malice . . . is guilty of murder in the first degree. 443 There is a required specific intent to kill,444 the premeditation representing the formation of that intent,445 and the deliberation element reflecting the conscious contemplation of the previously formed decision. 46
Of the many efforts to explain the meaning of premeditation and
deliberation, and, therefore, the difference between first and second
degree murder, the most frequently cited and, perhaps, clearest
expression is Judge Leventhal's discussion in Austin v. United
States.4 4
In homespun terminology, intentional murder is in the first degree
if committed in cold blood, and is murder in the second degree if
committed on impulse or in the sudden heat of passion. These are the
archtypes, that clarify by contrast. The real facts may be hard to
classify and may lie between the poles. A sudden passion, like lust,
rage, or jealousy, may spawn an impulsive intent yet persist long
enough and in such a way as to permit that intent to become the
440. See note 122 supra.
441. See text accompanying notes 404-06 supra.
442. Id.
443. D.C. CODE § 22-2401 (1973). The felony-murder rule enacted in 1940 and
the statutory presumptions enacted in 1901 are not covered by this discussion of
mens rea. See notes 465-80 & accompanying text infra.
444. See Collazo v. United States, 90 U.S. App. D.C. 241, 196 F.2d 573 (1952);
Jordan v. United States, 66 App. D.C. 309, 87 F.2d 64 (1936).
445. See United States v. Sutton, 138 U.S. App. D.C. 208, 426 F.2d 1202 (1969);
Austin v. United States, 127 U.S. App. D.C. 180, 382 F.2d 129 (1967).
446. See id.
447. 127 U.S. App. D.C. 180, 382 F.2d 129 (1967).
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subject of a further reflection and weighing of consequences and
hence to take on the character of a murder executed without compunction and "in cold blood." The term "in cold blood" does not
necessarily mean the assassin lying in wait, or the kind of murder
brilliantly depicted by Truman Capote in In Cold Blood. . .. Thus
the common understanding might find both passion and cold blood
in the husband who surprises his wife in adultery, leaves the house
to buy a gun at a sporting goods store, and returns for a deadly sequel.
The analysis of the jury would be illuminated, however, if it is first
advised that a typical case of first degree is the murder in cold blood;
that murder committed on impulse or in sudden passion is murder
in the second degree; and then instructed that a homicide conceived
in passion constitutes murder in the first degree only if the jury is
convinced beyond a resonable doubt that there was an appreciable
time after the design was conceived and that in this interval there was
a further thought, and a turning over in the mind-and not a mere
persistence of the initial impulse of passion." 8
The formation of the specific intent to kill need only precede the
actual killing by an "appreciable" interval of time.44 In many cases,
the jury is forced to decide, as a question of fact, whether the killing
was deliberate or impulsive. Additionally, these two elements may
be inferred by the jury from conduct prior to the killing, such as
threats or disputes between the parties, 5 ' or from the actor's use of
a deadly weapon to commit the offense. 51
Many revised criminal codes have eliminated the degrees of murder,45 2 thereby repealing what was actually a fairly brief experiment
in criminal reform. 53 The reasons for the merger of degrees into a
single offense revolve around two basic issues: 1) the problems attendant upon distinguishing between the two degrees;" 4 and 2) the
decreasing use of the death penalty in first degree murder cases.455
Justice Benjamin Cardozo in a now famous address before the
448. Id. at 188, 382 F.2d at 137 (emphasis added).
449. See Bullock v. United States, 74 App. D.C. 220, 122 F.2d 213 (1941) (jury
instruction that no time interval was necessary to finding deliberated and premeditated malice).
450. See Hemphill v. United States, 131 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 402 F.2d 187 (1968).
451. See Parman v. United States, 130 U.S. App. D.C. 188, 399 F.2d 559 (1968).
452. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 434A.1-020 (Baldwin 1974).
453. See notes 406-08 & accompanying text supra.
454. This problem has become even more prevalent with the development of
allowable inferences concerning mens rea. See cases cited in notes 450-51 supra.
455. See text accompanying notes 458-60 infra. See also text accompanying
notes 205-06 supra.
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degree to which the actor was aware of the risk potential of his
conduct;"' and 3) the degree to which the actor's conduct deviated
from an objective standard of conduct. 37
scriptive than that flowery expression found in the old cases and occasionally
incorporated into some modem statutes-i.e., conduct "evincing a depraved
heart, devoid of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief."
Id.
436. There was some debate at common law as to whether awareness of risk
should be required for murder.
Holmes thought that the actor's awareness of the danger was immaterial if
he was aware of circumstances that would lead a man of common experience
to conclude that the danger was very great; that the common law employed
an external standard even in the case of murder. Whether the common law
judges carried the law of murder so far along the line of externality must be
doubted. Stephen believed, as we have said, that the actor must have knowledge of the danger and not merely of the circumstances. .

.

. The cleavage

between the two positions is, however, wider in theory than it is in practice.
Inferences as to a particular man's knowledge must usually proceed from
propositions about the knowledge that men like the actor would generally
have, if they should act as he did under like circumstances. .

.

. Neverthe-

less some cleavage remains.
Wechsler & Michael, supra note 334, at 709-11.
Cf. United States v. Dixon, 135 U.S. App. D.C. 401, 419 F.2d 288 (1969).
A determination of "wanton disregard of human life" implies the defendant's awareness of a serious danger to life. The defendant would be entitled
to an express instruction that the jury must find he I-ad awareness of such
danger. But the judge should also then charge that this awareness may be
found even though defendant had not acually formulated an intent to kill,
that it may be inferred from the very fact that the conduct was extremely
dangerous to life and from a presumption that one is aware of the probable
consequences of his conduct.
The requirement of "awareness" of risk imports a subjective element even
to this wanton recklessness aspect of murder, but of course not a subjective
intention to kill.
Id. at 406-07 n.8, 419 F.2d at 293-94 n.8.
437. LaFave and Scott state:
[T]he risk must not only be very high, as the defendant ought to realize in
the light of what he knows; it must also under the circumstancesbe unjustifiable for him to take the risk. The motives for the defendant's risky conduct
thus become relevant; or, to express the thought in another way, the social
utility of his conduct is a factor to be considered. If he speeds through
crowded streets, thereby endangering other motorists and pedestrians, in
order to rush a passenger to the hospital for an emergency operation, he may
not be guilty of murder if he unintentionally kills, though the same conduct
done soley for the purpose of experiencing the thrill of fast driving may be
enough for murder.
W. Li FAv & A. Scor, supra note 336, at 542 (emphasis added).
See also R. PERKINs, supra note 138, at 37:
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Applying the above formulation (absent justification, excuse, or
mitigating circumstances), a person's conduct evidences extreme
recklessness constituting malice aforethought when such person
consciously disregards a very high or extreme degree of risk to
human life or safety which will result from the conduct. This risk
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature
and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to
the actor, its conscious disregard manifests an extreme indifference
to the value of human life. 38 On the other hand, a person's conduct
evidences recklessness constituting involuntary manslaughter when
such person consciously disregards a high degree of risk to human
life or safety which will result from the conduct. The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to the
actor, its conscious disregard evidences a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law abiding person would observe in the
actor's situation. As discussed below, involuntary manslaughter
may also be committed in the District of Columbia where the actor
is not consciously aware of the risk created but, under the circumstances, should have been aware of such risk."'
This standard for malice aforethought is sufficiently broad to include the mental state of intent to cause serious bodily injury. If a
person intends to cause serious bodily injury, such person is doing
an act in conscious disregard of a very high or extreme degree of risk
to human life or safety. For this reason both the Model Penal Code
and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code subsume the mental state
In other words, the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of
the obvious likelihood of causing death or great bodily injury is a malicious
intent. The word "wanton" is the key word here ....

[A] motorist who

attempts to pass another car on a "blind curve" may be acting with such
criminal negligence that if he causes the death of another in a resulting traffic
accident he will be guilty of manslaughter. And such a motorist may be
creating fully as great a human hazard as one who shoots into a house or train
just for "kicks" who is guilty of murder if loss of life results. The difference
is that in the act of the shooter there is an element of viciousness-an extreme
indifference to the value of human life-that is not found in the act of the
motorist.

Id.
438. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (criminal
homicide constitutes murder when "committed recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life"). See also PROPOSED
FEDERAL CRIMnAL CODE, supra note 3, § 1601 (1971) (adopts Model Penal Code
formula).
439. See notes 513-21 & accompanying text infra.
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New York Academy of Medicine in 1928 expressed his concern that
the standard of premeditation and deliberation was inadequate to
distinguish between first and second degree murder.
I think the distinction is much too vague to be continued in our law.
There can be no intent unless there is a choice, yet by the hypothesis,
the hoice without more is enough to justify the inference that the
intent was deliberate and premeditated .... What we have is merely
a privilege offered to the jury to find the lesser degree when the
suddenness of the intent, the vehemence of the passion, seems to call
irresistibly for the exercise of mercy. I have no objection to giving
them this dispensing power, but it should be given to them directly
and not in a mystifying cloud of words. 5
Justice Cardozo believed that the distinction was especially inadequate for determining whether the death penalty should be im45 7
posed.
Moreover, it is apparent that the District of Columbia's death
penalty provision is unconstitutional. 5 8 The legislature has not to
date taken any steps to remedy the situation; therefore, the District's murder statutes no longer have any punitive distinctions between first and second degree murder. 5 Unless this situation is
remedied-and it is possible that even the most carefully drawn
death penalty statute may not survive an eighth amendment attack

in the courts48 -the District of Columbia should consolidate murder
into a single offense as it was at common law.
This step would eliminate the troublesome technical distinctions
now determining the degrees of murder, thus allowing for more efficient prosecution and defense of murder charges. While one alterna456.

B. CARDozo,

LAW AND

LrERATURE

AND

OTHER ESSAYS 99-100 (1931).

457. The present distinction is so
obscure that no jury hearing it for the first time can fairly be expected to
assimilate and understand it. I am not at all sure that I understand it myself

after trying to apply it for many years and after diligent study of what has
been written in the books. Upon the basis of this fine distinction with its
obscure and mystifying psychology, scores of men have gone to their death.
Id. at 100-01.
458. See notes 205-06 & accompanying text supra.
459. Both first and second degree murder are punishable by sentences of twenty
years to life. D.C. CODE § 22-2404 (1973).
460. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In the short per curiam opinion
the Court indicated that imposition of the death penalty constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in light of the facts presented. However, the sharp division
on the Court, expressed in the five concurring and four dissenting opinions, left
open the question of whether the death penalty was unconstitutional in all cases.
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tive is to redefine the degrees of murder into clearer categories,", the
better approach seems to be consolidation.
Consolidation eases the burden on both parties to the action, as
well as diminishing the possibility of inequitable application of the
harsher sanctions attached to first degree murder.41 2 Sentencing
guidelines may be codified in order that the trial judge may consider
certain specified factors which indicate both aggravation and mitigation of the offense." 3
461. See, e.g., Wis.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 940.01-.03 (West 1958). The Wisconsin stat-

ute sets out the murder offense in clearly defined terms. First-degree murder is a
homicide accompanied by an intent to take a human life. Second-degree murder
is defined as a homicide caused by reckless conduct evincing a depraved mind, and
third-degree murder is felony-murder.
462. Such a potential abuse of discretion has been cited as a controlling reason
for banning the death penalty as violative of due process. See Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 253 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
463. The drafters of the Model Penal Code incorporated an extensive list of
aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered by the court in sentencing:
(3) Aggravating Circumstances
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed
another murder.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was
an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercouse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity.
(4) Mitigating Circumstances
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another
person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another
person.
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Thus, in lieu of a reenactment of the death penalty, and since
such a reenactment, should it occur, would in all likelihood apply
only in very limited circumstances,464 murder should be consolidated into a single offense which can be committed in two basic
ways: intentionally or knowingly, and by conduct evidencing extreme recklessness. The sentencing considerations would provide
sufficient insurance that the totality of the circumstances resulting
in murder would be considered by the sentencing judge and would
not influence the jury's decision on guilt or innocence.
3. The felony-murder rule
While there is some doubt as to the scope of the felony-murder
rule at common law,465 it is clear that murder could be committed
even by accident in the course of commission of what are now violent felonies."' In the District of Columbia, first degree murder is
committed if a person has died as a result of the commission, or
attempted commission, by the accused of arson, rape, mayhem,
robbery, kidnapping, or armed housebreaking.6 ' There is no need
for the government to prove a specific intent to kill,6 8 premeditation
or deliberation,469 or even malice.470
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate

the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect

or intoxication.
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 210.6(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

464. To avoid having a reenacted death penalty provision declared invalid on
constitutional grounds, the legislature should carefully restrict the amount of discretion vested in either the judge or the jury. Thus, it is likely that the legislature
would be forced to draft mandatory death penalties for certain crimes. Yet, that
solution, which would not account for the individual vagaries of each offense, may
still be violative of the cruel and unusual punishment clause.
465. See generally LAW OF CRammS, supra note 338, at § 10.07; W. LAFAvE &
A. Scour, supra note 336, at 545-61; R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 37-45.
466. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 336, at 545-47.
467. D.C. CODE § 22-2401 (1973).
468. See Fuller v. United States, 132 U.S. App. D.C. 264, 290-91,407 F.2d 1199,
1225-26 (1968) (first degree felony-murder and murder not inconsistent charges).
469. See Burton v. United States, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 208, 151 F.2d 17 (1945)
(court properly instructed jury on robbery, even though not charged in the indictment, since robbery takes the place of premeditation in first degree felony-murder).
470. See Wheeler v. United States, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 363, 165 F.2d 225 (1947)
(appellant guilty of felony-murder even where it was shown that co-defendant
actually committed the murder while appellant was in another part of the building).
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Any accessory before the tact to the felony may be charged as a
principal, even if not present at the time of the killing.4 7' The death
of a co-felon may be sufficient to charge felony-murder.472 The
phrase "perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate" has been interpreted to include a killing which occurs during a "continuous pursuit immediately organized, ' 473 which may be even further expanded by crimes such as robbery which are not consummated until
474
the asportation is entirely completed.
The impact of this rule was very limited at common law because
the majority of the felonies at that time were punishable by death,
even if no one died during their commission.7 5 The modern extension of the felony concept to embrace many sorts of conduct, including non-violent conduct, has led jurisdictions to limit the felonies
4 76
subject to the rule as was done in the District.
Yet, it is not entirely clear that the substantive felony-murder
rule still serves a valid function. Since its purpose is to deter the
commission of violent felonies, particularly when committed while
armed, it would seem that specialized sentencing statutes would
serve the same purpose without creating legal fictions of transferred
malice or, even worse, strict liability for the results of one's conduct,
regardless of intent. Situations which would not be included within
murder, such as conduct evidencing extreme recklessness, could
probably be.effectively handled by existing sentencing statutes. For
example, section 22-3202 provides additional penalties for committing a crime while armed which, at the court's discretion, may be
up to life imprisonment.4 77 Since the present death penalty provision
is unconstitutional,4 71 there is no advantage in maintaining the
felony-murder rule.
471. See Coleman v. United States, 111 U.S. App. D.C. 210, 295 F.2d 555 (1961);
Wheeler v. United States, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 363, 165 F.2d 225 (1947).
472. See D.C. CODE § 22-2401 (1973) ("kills another"). "Another" would necessarily include a co-felon.
For an excellent discussion of whether the scope of the felony-murder rule should
exclude situations such as the killing of a co-felon by a police officer or a bystander
see Morris, The Felon's Responsibilityfor the LethalActs of Others, 105 U. PA. L.
REV. 50 (1956).
473. Carter v. United States, 96 U.S. App. D.C. 40, 223 F.2d 332 (1955).

474. Id.
475. See LAW OF CRIMES, supra note 338, § 10.07, at 656 n.13.
476. See R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 38-39.
477. D.C. CODE § 22-3202(a)(1) (1973).
478. Compare id. § 22-2404, with GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (held
unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
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An appropriate compromise, however, might be to have a statutory presumption that death resulting from the commission of certain violent felonies is the result of conduct evidencing extreme
recklessness. Such a presumption, while rebuttable, should comprise a prima facie case, sufficient to put the evidence before the
jury. The jury would, however, have the power to consider rebuttal
testimony and perhaps to reduce to a lesser included offense, such
as the substantive felony and the additional charge of committing
a violent felony while armed.
Most revised codes have kept the felony-murder rule in some
form,479 but Kentucky has totally rejected it."' The trend, however,
is to severely limit the scope and application of the rule. The District of Columbia would be well advised to consider the suggested
presumption as a means of qualifying the application of the rule
without sacrificing its deterrent effect.
F.

Manslaughter

For organizational purposes, the common law distinction which
held all criminal homicides other than murder as being manslaughter" ' will be followed in this section. The discussion will therefore
include the common law of manslaughter, as represented by the
District's case law in the area, as well as its vehicular homicide
statute.
The major problem which this area presents is a function of its
indefinite nature. Manslaughter became a "catch-all" for all homicides which were neither murder nor justifiable or excusable."8 2 Consequently, the exact parameters of the offense were constantly in
479. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(B) (Page
Current Material 1974); REv. CODE WASH. ANN. § 9.48.030(3) (1961); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 45.940.03 (West 1958).
480. See Lawson, Kentucky Penal Code: The Culpable Mental States and Related Matters, 61 Ky. L.J. 657, 684-85 (1973).
481. This distinction is followed in the District of Columbia. Since no statutory
definition for manslaughter has been enacted, the common law definition is in
force. See United States v. Pender, 309 A.2d 492 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973), citing Simon
v. United States, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 310, 424 F.2d 796, 798 (1970).
482. According to Professor Perkins:
All homicides which were neither with malice aforethought nor under circumstances of justification or excuse were dealt with as manslaughter. Hence this
was definitely a "catch-all" group, and confusion can be avoided best by
thinking of the development of this crime in terms of this process of elimination.
R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 51 (footnote omitted).
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flux and various categories of conduct have been subsumed under
the name of manslaughter. The classical resolution of this problem
was to place manslaughter into two basic classes: voluntary and
involuntary. For that reason, further discussion of manslaughter
will proceed upon a single qualifying distinction: whether the unlawful death was caused intentionally or unintentionally.
1. Intentional killing-Voluntary manslaughter
There are basically two situations involving intentional killings
which the law regards as lacking the requisite intent for murder, yet
still regards as criminal. These are: 1) where the actor's emotions
have been reasonably and sufficiently aroused; and 2) where the
actor has used an inordinate amount of force under the unreasonable belief that he was privileged to kill another.
The first situation is the so-called "heat of passion" theory of
voluntary manslaughter. 4s Under this theory, even though the actor
intended to kill his victim, the law deems him to have been acting
under the passion generated by the circumstances-circumstances
which have caused him to be unable to reasonably assess his actions.4 Such passion has been considered in the District of Columbia to include rage, resentment, anger, terror, and fear."'
Yet it is not enough that the actor was in a heat of passion; that
passion must have been caused by legally adequate provocation.4"'
The standard applied to the circumstances to determine whether
there was adequate provocation is objective. That is, the circumstances must "produce hot blood in the mind of a reasonable man
or a man of ordinary self-control.""4
This standard excludes considerations of whether the actor's intoxication at the time could have influenced his emotional reaction.4"' Likewise, "mere words standing alone, no matter how insult483. See generally LAW oF CRIMES, supra note 338, at § 10.11; W. LAFAVE &
A. ScoTr, supra note 336, at 572-82; R. PERKMNS, supra note 138, at 53-69.
484. See Bishop v. United States, 71 App. D.C. 132, 136-37, 107 F.2d 297,
302-03 (1939) (even if provocation is sufficient, "passion and hot blood" must
actually be caused thereby).
485. See Kinard v. United States, 68 App. D.C. 250, 254, 96 F.2d 522, 526 (1938)
(passion includes emotions such as rage as well as fear).
486. See Bishop v. United States, 71 App. D.C. 132, 107 F.2d 297 (1939) (while
appellant may have been in a heat of passion, his voluntary intoxication will not
change the standard for provocation).
487. Hart v. United States, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 193, 195, 130 F.2d 456, 458 (1942).
488. Bishop v. United States, 71 App. D.C. 132, 107 F.2d 297 (1939).
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ing, offensive or abusive, are not adequate provocation,"4, 9 and a
minor assault upon the actor by the victim is not sufficient to reduce
the intentional homicide from murder to manslaughter.4 9 However,
the adulterous conduct of a wife has been recognized "as the classic
9
provocation" for mitigating what might otherwise be murder. '
Other jurisdictions, in revising their penal codes, have changed
the wording and substance of this offense.49 Thus, instead of the
"heat of passion for which there is legally adequate provocation"
formula, many jurisdictions have followed the lead of the American
Law Institute in enacting a different formula.493 The modern version
is basically a determination of whether the actor was under "the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is reasonable explanation or excuse. 4 94
Thus, "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" is substituted
for "heat of passion," a change which is more descriptive of the
existing law but not a substantive revision. "Adequate provocation"
is replaced by "reasonable explanation or excuse." This innovation
qualifies the rigid objectivity of the present standard and moves
toward a more realistic subjective standard. To enforce the subjectivity of this standard, the American Law Institute included immediately thereafter in the proposed statute the following test:
The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined
situation under the
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's
4 95
circumstances as he believes them to be.
489. D.C. BAR Ass'N, CRInINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRmICT OF COLUMBIA
105 (2d ed. 1972).
490. United States v. Edmonds, 63 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D.D.C. 1946).
491. United States v. Comer, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 214, 421 F.2d 1149 (1970). See
also notes 288-90 & accompanying text supra.
492. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-55(a)(2) (1971); Ky.Rnv. STAT. ANN. §
434A.1-030(1)(b) (Baldwin 1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(2) (McKinney 1967).
493. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). This
section states that a criminal homicide will be considered manslaughter when:
[A] homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is
reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or

excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.

Id.
494. Id.
495. Id. Tentative Draft No. 9 of the Code contained the following comment:
We ...introduce a larger element of subjectivity in the appraisal, though
it is only the actor's "situation" and "the circumstances as he believes them

to be," not his scheme of moral values, that are thus to be considered. The

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:207

This formulation, if adopted, would be more representative of
actual culpability than the present objective standard. Thus, words
alone could conceivably arouse ordinary persons to an emotional
state wherein their reason can no longer control their conduct."'
Similarly, such a standard can account for the actors' diminished
capacity to appreciate the circumstances in which they find themselves. An intoxicated person's reactions to a given stimulus, therefore, may be entirely reasonable under the circumstances as perceived by the actor. While the law does not excuse such an individual from criminal responsibility for his or her actions, it should
permit consideration of diminished cognitive capacity as a circumstance militating against punishment as a murderer.497
ultimate test, however, is objective; there must be "reasonable" explanation
or excuse for the actor's disturbance. This is, we think, to state in fair and
realistic terms the criteria by which men do and should appraise the mitigating import of mental or emotional distress when it is a factor in so grave a
crime as homicide.
[Tihe formulation seeks to qualify the rigorous objectivity of the prevailing law insofar as it judges the sufficiency of the provocation by its effect on
the reasonable man....
Though it is difficult to state a middle ground between a standard which
ignores all individual peculiarities and one which makes emotional distress
decisive regardless of the nature of its cause, we think that such a statement
is essential. For surely if the actor had just suffered a traumatic injury, if he
were blind or were distraught with grief, if he were experiencing an unanticipated reaction to a therapeutic drug, it would be deemed atrocious to appraise his crime for purposes of sentence without reference to any of these
mattters. They are material because they bear upon the inference as to the
actor's character that it is fair to draw upon the basis of his act.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3, Comment at 41, 47-48 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1958).
496. With regard to adultery, it has been stated:
A wife's adulterous conduct has long been recognized as the classic provocation for homicide. Whether that provocation was "such as might naturally
induce a reasonable man in the passion of the moment to lose self control
and commit the act on impulse and without reflection," thereby justifying a
verdict of manslaughter, is ordinarily for the jury, particularlywhere, as here,
the husband is reminded of the conduct immediately before the fatal act.
United States v. Comer, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 214, 220, 421 F.2d 1149, 1155 (1970)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
497. The defense of capacity diminished by intoxication-to the extent that the
accused is unable to form a specified intent-has been recognized in the District
as effective to reduce the offense from first degree murder to second degree murder.
See Bishop v. United States, 71 App. D.C. 132, 135-36, 107 F.2d 297, 301-02
(1939). However, this defense has been held insufficient to negative the malice
aforethought which distinguishes second degree murder from manslaughter. Id. at
136, 107 F.2d at 302.
Additionally, in United States v. Brawner, 153 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 471 F.2d 964
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The second situation which has been recognized as distinguishing
an intentional homicide from murder is the unreasonable exercise
of what would otherwise be privileged conduct, i.e., the "imperfect
defense" manslaughter. Thus, if the actor actually and reasonably
believes it is necessary to kill another in self-defense in order to save
the actor from death or grave bodily injury, the homicide is noncriminal." 8
Yet, if the belief is unreasonable or the force employed unreasonably excessive, the actor is deemed to have committed manslaughter
and not murder, even though the killing was intentional.4 99 Thus,
(1972), the Court of Appeals prospectively modified the rule of Fisher v. United
States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). The Fisher Court had refused to require a requested
instruction that, on the question of premeditation and deliberation necessary for
first degree murder, the jury "should consider the entire personality of the defendant, his mental, nervous, emotional and physical characteristics as developed by
the evidence in the case." Id. at 471 n.6. Taking heed of the Supreme Court's
statement that it would not interfere with such rules fashioned by District of
Columbia courts [id. at 476], the court held in Brawner that henceforth evidence
of abnormal mental condition would be considered on the question of specific
intent in first degree murder charges. 153 U.S. App. D.C. at 32-34, 471 F.2d at
1000-02.
498. See R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 33-34.
499. See, e.g., United States v. Wharton, 139 U.S. App. D.C. 293, 300-01, 433
F.2d 451, 458-59 (1970).
[A] possible verdict of manslaughter might have arisen on the failure of
appellant's claim of self-defense. . . .An unprovoked assault by another,
such as appellant described, is sufficient cause for one to take up his own
defense, especially when he finds himself lying on his back before his attacker. At the same time, as the trial judge instructed, the level of the
defensive response must be related to the apparent necessities of the occasion, including the degree of force used by the attacker. Here . . .a fistic
assault by a smaller man was met with a blazing pistol in the hand of one
larger. Such a response may well be deemed disproportionate, but a jury is
free to take into consideration not only the magnitude of the attack but also
the predicament the accused believes himself to be in. Appellant's jury may
have recognized an obstacle to finding self-defense simply from the amount
of force appellant used to repel the deceased's attack. And if the jury rejected
self-defense just because appellantimprudently misjudged the response necessary in the situation, his offense might well have been manslaughter,arising from the unreasonablenessof the judgment he made.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The Wharton opinion was unclear as to whether the force employed, or the belief
that it was necessary, was unreasonable. Yet, the use of excessive force in selfdefense, if in the heat of passion, will not defeat a defense of self-defense if the
defendant reasonably believed that the force was necessary. See Inge v. United
States, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 6, 356 F.2d 345 (1966). That case has been cited for the
proposition that "one who is attacked may repel the attack with whatever force he
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one is not excused for unreasonable conduct or judgment, but the
circumstances in which the actor was involved are considered sufficient to treat the conduct as being qualitatively different from murder. This category of manslaughter has been judicially recognized
in the District of Columbia"0 and enacted in a few of the revised
codes. 50 '
It is suggested that the American Law Institute's "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" formulation and its concomitant
qualified objective standard, as well as the "imperfect defense"
form of intentional manslaughter, be codified in the District of Columbia. Both of these categories should also be incorporated by reference into the murder statute so that an accused is assured of an
appropriate instruction for the jury, and to clarify the fact that all
0 2
intentional killings are not murder.1

2. Unintentional killing-Involuntary manslaughter
The law recognizes that certain situations resulting in death, although unintended by the actor, are nonetheless deserving of criminal sanction. This spectrum of human conduct covers a wide variety
of circumstances wherein the actor inadvertently causes another's
death. As was noted in the discussion on murder, certain forms of
unintended killing are classified as murder, either under a theory of
extreme indifference to the risk posed to human life (such as extreme recklessness or intent to injure), or the stricter imposition of
liability under the felony-murder rule.
Manslaughter by unintentional killing is the complement to those
murder definitions, covering conduct deemed culpable but not as
serious as that governed by the murder provisions. It should be
noted that this conduct represents a broad category of proscribed
behavior and the ascertainment of its full scope under the District
of Columbia's homicide laws is made all the more difficult by the
absence of legislative guidance. Involuntary manslaughter includes
two basic types: 1) unintentional killing in the commission of an
reasonably believes is necessary under the circumstances ..... Harris v. United
States, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 309, 364 F.2d 701, 702 (1966). It would thus appear
that a separate category of intentional manslaughter is evolving from imperfect
self-defense situations.
500. See cases cited in note 499 supra.
501. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 38, § 9-2(b) (Smith-Hurd 1972); PA. CONSOL.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2503(b) (Purdon 1973).
502. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1967) (incorporation
of manslaughter definition as affirmative defense to murder prosecution).
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unlawful act, i.e., the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule; and 2) unintentional killing by reckless or negligent conduct." 3
The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule has been criticized as
sharply, if not as often, as the felony-murder rule." 4 Remarkably, it
was never employed in the District of Columbia until 1973. In
United States v. Owens,' 5 Superior Court Chief Judge Greene
stated:
Generally, the courts have distinguished between two types of
manslaughter, voluntary (unlawful killing in the sudden heat of passion caused by provocation) and involuntary (reckless killing in the
course of conduct involving extreme danger of death or serious bodily
injury). .

.

. Actually, it would appear that the category of involun-

tary manslaughter encompasses a third possible factual situation,
that is, a killing in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting
to a felony."'
Although the only precedent to be found for use of the
misdemeanor-manslaughter rule was references to the theory in
footnotes of two District of Columbia Circuit opinions,0 7 the Owens
503. At common law, involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional homicide,
committed without excuse and under circumstances not manifesting or implying
malice. A traditional classification of types of common law involuntary manslaughter is the three-fold one of malfeasance, non-feasance, and misfeasance. Malfeasance is an unintentional homicide in the doing of a criminal act which is not a
felony, and does not naturally tend to cause death or great bodily harm (i.e., the
misdemeanor-manslaughter theory). Nonfeasance is the unintentional killing of
another by omission to perform a legal duty owed to that person under circumstances showing inexcusable recklessness or criminal negligence. Since omissions to act
may also constitute murder where the failure to act was intentional or otherwise
malicious, the topic of omissions was discussed under the general problem of defining the scope of the duty to provide aid to preserve the life of another. The following
discussion relating to involuntary manslaughter is equally applicable to omission
to act where the duty to act is established. Finally, misfeasance is the unintentional
killing of another by recklessness or gross negligence in the doing of a lawful act.
See LAW

OF CRrMaS,

supra note 338, § 10.12, at 711-14.

504.
The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule may result in an unreasonably extreme extension of liability ....

In fact, it would be wise, by statute, to

abolish the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, as has been done by the 1957
English Homicide Act, and as is recommended in the Model Penal Code.
R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 78-79 (footnotes omitted).
505. 101 DAiLY WASH. L. RrR. 993 (D.C. Super. Ct., Crim. No. 9969-73, April

19, 1973) (motion for judgment of acquittal denied since jury could find that victim
died as a result of defendant's commission of a misdemeanor-a fistic assault).
506. Id. at 993, 996 (citation omitted).
507. See Simon v. United States, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 310 n.5, 424 F.2d 796,
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opinion was based upon a federal statute, considered to be representative of the common law. However, if the one case cited as
interpreting the section of the United States Code concerning
misdemeanor-manslaughter is consulted,"' the Fourth Circuit
would appear to limit the application of the section to conduct
within the scope of criminal recklessness and negligence."'
The court in Owens, however, rejected the "recklessness" theory
because that theory proceeds upon the assumption that the conduct

of the defendant was such that he could reasonably have anticipated
the consequence of death, or as Judge Leventhal puts it in his concurring opinion in Dixon .

the risk."5 '

there must have been an "awareness of

798 n.5 (1970); United States v. Dixon, 135 U.S. App. D.C. 401, 405-06 n.4, 419
F.2d 288, 292-93 n.4 (1969). Both footnote references were to 18 U.S.C. § 1112
(1970) which provided the manslaughter penalty if death resulted from commission
of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony.
508. See United States v. Pardee, 368 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1966).
509. Id. at 373-74, citing Maryland v. Chapman, 101 F. Supp. 335, 340-41 (D.
Md. 1951). The Pardee court specifically cited with approval the interpretation of
Judge Chesnut in Maryland v. Chapman:
Judge Chesnut thus points to two separate divisions of the unlawful act,
i.e. (1) an act "in its nature dangerous to life" and (2) an act constituting
negligence. The first is self-explanatory and the second he expounds as follows: "In my view the law is reasonably clear that a charge of manslaughter
by negligence is not made out by proof of ordinary simple negligence ....
In other words, the amount or degree or character of the negligence to be
proven in a criminal case is gross negligence. . ....
368 F.2d at 374.
In reversing Pardee's homicide conviction because of inadequate instruction to
the jury, the court further observed:
Although requested to instruct the jury that the unlawful act must have one
or more of these characteristics-inherent danger to life or gross negligence-the Court declined to charge in this respect. Doubtlessly it was of the
opinion, and not illogically, that under the facts of the case the wrong-way
driving provided the knowingly and "needlessly doing [of an act] in its
nature dangerous to life" or a wanton or reckless disregard for human life;
therefore potential danger or recklessness was not made an issue by the
evidence. Nevertheless, we think resolution of this question should have been
left to the jury. For this determination the jury would be told to measure the
conduct of the defendant against all of the existing circumstances and determine therefrom whether what he did was in its nature dangerous to life or
grossly negligent.
Id. at 375.
Thus, the application of the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule is limited to conduct within the scope of criminal recklessness and negligence, unless there is a
misdemeanor which is "in its nature dangerous to life" but does not support a
conviction under a criminal recklessness or negligence theory.
510. United States v. Owens, 101 DAuLY WASH. L. RTRn. 993, 996 (D.C. Super.
Ct., Crim. No. 9969-73, April 19, 1973) (citation omitted).
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Judge Leventhal, however, while noting the misdemeanormanslaughter theory of Owens, chose in a subsequent case to apply
the recklessness theory of manslaughter, clarifying the "awareness"
element.
[Tihe jury should convict the defendant only of manslaughter if
they found him guilty of reckless conduct creating an extreme danger
of death or serious bodily injury by virtue of a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe, even
though the defendant was not aware of the risk."'
It is thus less than clear that the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule
adds protection from culpable conduct which would otherwise go
unsanctioned. The revised criminal codes of other jurisdictions have
relied more upon the reckless or grossly negligent conduct standard
of involuntary manslaughter than the straining of general principles
of criminal responsibility in maintaining a broad misdemeanormanslaughter rule.5 12 The District of Columbia, having done without the rule until 1973, would be better advised to discard it, upon
revising the criminal code, in favor of a more comprehensive definition of involuntary manslaughter based upon the standards of recklessness and criminal negligence.
Putting aside the questionable theory of the misdemeanormanslaughter rule, the other theories of involuntary killings
amounting to criminal homicide involve points along a continuum
of culpable behavior, beginning with extreme recklessness or "depraved heart" murder discussed earlier in defining malice aforethought. 511 Four distinct points along this continuum may be identified: 1) extreme recklessness-malice aforethought for murder;
2) recklessness-involuntary manslaughter; 3) criminal negligence
-involuntary manslaughter; and 4) negligence or carelessness in
the operation of any vehicle causing death-the misdemeanor of
negligent homicide under a provision in the motor vehicles section
of the District's code. 54 As discussed earlier, the determination
of exactly which one of the culpable types of behavior, if any, is
511. United States v. Grady, 157 U.S. App. D.C. 6, 9, 481 F.2d 1106, 1109 (1973)
(second degree murder conviction for child beating reversed since defendant entitled to manslaughter instruction if awareness of risk not sufficient for "malice")
(emphasis added).
512. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § § 53a-55, -56, -58 (1972); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 434A.1-030 to .1-050 (Baldwin 1974); N.Y. PFNAL LAw §§ 125.10-.20 (McKinney 1967).
513. See note 435 & accompanying text supra.
514. Cf. note 503 supra.
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present under the facts of a particular case is based upon the application of the following factors: 1) the degree of risk to human life
which the actor's conduct presented; 2) the degree to which the
actor was aware of the risk potential of his conduct; and 3) the
degree to which the actor's conduct deviated from an objective stan5 15
dard of conduct.
The difference between criminally reckless and criminally negligent behavior depends on whether the actor is conscious or aware
of the risk to human life presented by his conduct.5 1 A person who
is aware of the risk and nevertheless intentionally proceeds on that
course of action is more culpable than a person whose conduct en515. See notes 435-39 & accompanying text supra.
516. The Model Penal Code defines criminal recklessness as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element [death] exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose
of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
The Code provides that homicides committed with criminal negligence should
be made a lesser offense than manslaughter. Id. §§ 210.3, .4. "Negligently" is
defined as follows:
A person acts [criminally] negligently with respect to a material element
of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element [death] exists or will result from his conduct. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive
it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances
known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
As to how rigorously objective the standard of the reasonable man is interpreted
to be, the reporter of the Model Penal Code stated:
A further point merits attention: the draft invites consideration of the
"care that would be exercised by a reasonable person in his (i.e. the actor's)
situation." There is an inevitable ambiguity in "situation." If the actor were
blind or if he had just suffered a blow or experienced a heart attack, these
would certainly be facts to be considered, as they would be under present law.
But the heredity, intelligence or temperament of the actor would not now be
held material in judging negligence; and could not be without depriving the
criterion of all its objectivity. .

.

. The draft is not intended to displace

discriminations of this kind; it is designed to leave the issue to the courts.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment at 126 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (citations
omitted).
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dangers human life to the same degree, but, through ignorance or
stupidity, is unaware of the dangerousness of his conduct. While the
latter behavior is not to be excused, the criminal law, based on a
model in which fault or mens rea properly plays a decisive role,
should provide for a reduced gradation and penalty range.
Some commentators have argued that there should be no criminal
liability 17 and some common law authority exists for this position. 18
The general common law position, however, appears to be that
criminal liability for involuntary manslaughter depends upon the
degree of negligence and not the element of awareness.' 9 That the
District of Columbia position is reflective of this general common
law tradition was recently affirmed in United States v. Grady.5"'
It is submitted that the criminal law properly should punish conduct that, although lacking in awareness, presents a substantial and
unjustifiable risk to life and involves a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the
actor's situation. The Reporter for the American Law Institute observed:
Knowledge that conviction and sentence, not to speak of punishment, may follow conduct that inadvertently creates improper risk
supplies men with an additional motive to take care before acting,
to use their faculties and draw on their experience in gauging the
potentialities of contemplated conduct. To some extent, at least, this
motive may promote awareness and thus be effective as a measure
of control. 2 '
It is emphasized, however, that conduct which passes the borders
of negligence and gross negligence and enters into the domain of
reckless conduct merits more serious criminal sanctions-a distinction which is presently lacking in the District's criminal code.
Assuming that criminal negligence should be punishable as a
lesser offense than criminal recklessness, should special provision be
made for killing by automobiles? The District's statute, originally
517. See generally Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal
Liability, 63 COLUM. L. Rv. 632 (1963); Comment, Is CriminalNegligence a Defensible Basis for PenalLiability?, 16 BuFF. L. REv. 749 (1967).
518. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902
(1944); Bussard v. State, 233 Wis. 11, 288 N.W. 187 (1939).
519. See R. PERKINS, supra note 138, at 73, citing State v. Hardie, 47 Iowa 646
(1878) (manslaughter conviction affirmed although killing resulted from a prank
involving a firearm thought to be entirely harmless).
520. 157 U.S. App. D.C. 6, 481 F.2d 1106 (1973).
521. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment, at 126-27 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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enacted in 1901, on its face provides for a confusing variety of mental states that will qualify for its special status. Section 40-606
(broadly labeled "negligent homicide") provides:
Any person who, by the operation of any vehicle at an immoderate
rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner, but not
wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by imprisonment for not
more than one year or by a fine of not more than $1,000 or both.2
Although there have been few decisions interpreting this statute,
United States v. Hendersonn and Sanderson v. United States524
clearly indicate that the standard of civil liability for ordinary or
simple negligence is sufficient for conviction under this statute.
A number of states have enacted similar statutes creating a new
crime of homicide by automobile, generally punishable less severely
than involuntary manslaughter.-"' One of the main justifications for
such statutes has been the acknowledged reluctance of juries to
convict the driver of the very serious crime of involuntary manslaughter for such a killing, apparently identifying with the defendant in such cases."' These statutes vary in the mens rea required
for the commission of the offense from recklessness to criminal negligence, and, as in the District of Columbia, ordinary negligence. 27
Although it may be argued that incorporating the civil standard
of negligence into the criminal law of homicide is justified by the
necessity of reducing the number of highway fatalities and the misdemeanor status of the offense of vehicular homicide, it is submitted
that a statute imposing criminal penalties for mere carelessness or
ordinary negligence is ill-advised. The better approach is to follow
the Model Penal Code, the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, and
other modem criminal codes in providing for the lesser offense of
criminal homicide, requiring gross negligence.52 If reduced punish522. D.C. CODE § 40-606 (1973). See also id. § 40-607 (establishing section 606
as a lesser included offense for vehicular manslaughter prosecutions).
523. 73 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 121 F.2d 75 (1941).
524. 125 A.2d 70 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956).
525. For a survey of such statutes see Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide-A Study
in Statutory Interpretation,25 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1936); Robinson, Manslaughterby
Motorists, 22 MINN. L. REv. 755 (1938).
526. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 336, at 593; R. PERKINS, supra note
138, at 80.
527. See W. LAFAv & A. Sco'rr, supra note 336, at 593; R. PERKINS, supra note
138, at 80.
528. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.3, .4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 3, §§ 1602, 03; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
53a-56, -58 (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 125.10, .15 (McKinney 1967).
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ment is to be provided for vehicular homicide, this can be provided
for by statute, or, perhaps, could better be left to the discretion of
the sentencing judge.
Since the manslaughter statute provides a penalty without any
definitions, the meaning of recklessness and other culpable behavior, determined by case law, needs to be codified in any effort to
clearly set forth the scope and gradations of criminal homicide. In
addition, there is presently no difference in gradation or penalty
range for recklessness and criminal negligence. It is recommended
that the vehicular homicide offense be combined with the concept
of criminal negligence, possibly providing for a reduced penalty
owing to the special circumstances of vehicular homicide. It is contended that a sharp line needs to be drawn between the standards
for criminal and civil negligence in defining criminal homicide. Finally, the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule should be integrated
into the theories of reckless and grossly negligent manslaughter.
G.

Summary

Unlawful homicide was chosen for a detailed case study of the
need for comprehensive code revision because it is a complex offense
area involving a serious social problem. Homicide is said to be the
leading cause of death among citizens of the District of Columbia
between the ages of 15 and 44. A substantial proportion of homicides
are committed by acquaintances of the victim-often resulting from
an assault, aggravated by intoxication, in which a handgun is used.
Following a familiar pattern in the District's criminal code, unlawful homicide is not defined by statute. A search for an acceptable
definition of "homicide" requires consideration of difficult moral
and philosophical issues. These include such issues as when death
occurs, when human life begins, and the scope of legal duty to preserve the life of another.
Clear definitions of the various mental states of unlawful homicide are needed in order to provide fair notice, improved instructions to juries, and more rational distinctions for grading the degrees of homicide. The desirability of retaining two degrees of
murder needs to be reconsidered. The felony-murder rule is in
need of revision.
The common law test for reducing second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter warrants improvement. The "imperfect defense"
theory of voluntary manslaughter should be codified. The
misdemeanor-manslaughter rule should be abolished as a distinct
and separate category apart from recklessness and gross negligence.
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Finally, the statute on negligent homicide, appearing in a separate
title of the code and intended for vehicular homicide cases, is inadequate. Preferrably, it should be revised and integrated into a new
section on unintentional homicide which clearly distinguishes between criminal recklessness and criminal negligence.
This case study of the criminal homicide provisions illustrates the
types of questions that should be raised in undertaking code revision
and indicates suggested reforms. It also suggests the need to consider various complementary responses to accompany criminal code
revision in order to adequately respond to the problems identified.
CONCLUSION

The need for comprehensive revision of the District of Columbia's
criminal laws is manifested throughout the code. The criminal code
has numerous and varied problems and represents a serious departure from the minimum standards of a modern, effective penal code.
While the authors have indicated a number of specific directions
which such revision might follow, these should not be viewed as
sufficient alone to respond to the general problems present in the
code.
The essential conclusion is that criminal code reform is long overdue. It is imperative that the new Law Review Commission receive
the funding necessary to accomplish this task. Its recommendations
should be presented to the legislature in the form of comprehensive
draft revisions. This will enable the legislature to enact for the first
time a code of criminal laws for the District that is clearly and
precisely drafted to respond to those social problems that warrant
criminal sanctions.
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APPENDIX
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE REFORM
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CRIMINAL CODE
The Questionnaire asked for responsesto two questions with respect to each
particular codesection: 1) is this section in need of revision; and 2) what was the
frequency
of contact with this particular codesection. The responsesto the first
question (need of revision) are charted into six major categories, ranging fom
*Stronglv Agree" to "No Opinion" and "No Answer". Each of thesemajor cate.
tories is then broken down according to the respondent's frequency of contact
with a particular codesection. to those who "never" had such contact, and those
who did not respond to this question. In compiling the results of the Question.
naire. a "no answer" column was added for both need of revision and frequency of
to account for missing answers.For a general discussion of the
contact responses
nature of the Questionnaire. the respondents, and the administration of the
Questionnaire, seenotes 5-12 & accompanving text supra.
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